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Analyzing and optimizing programs from their executables has received a lot of
attention recently in the research community. There has been a tremendous amount
of activity in executable-level research targeting varied applications such as security
vulnerability analysis, untrusted code analysis, malware analysis, program testing,
and binary optimizations.
The vision of this dissertation is to advance the field of static analysis of exe-
cutables and bridge the gap between source-level analysis and executable analysis.
The main thesis of this work is scalable static binary rewriting and analysis us-
ing compiler-level intermediate representation without relying on the presence of
metadata information such as debug or symbolic information.
In spite of a significant overlap in the overall goals of several source-code meth-
ods and executables-level techniques, several sophisticated transformations that are
well-understood and implemented in source-level infrastructures have yet to become
available in executable frameworks. It is a well known fact that a standalone exe-
cutable without any meta data is less amenable to analysis than the source code.
Nonetheless, we believe that one of the prime reasons behind the limitations of ex-
isting executable frameworks is that current executable frameworks define their own
intermediate representations (IR) which are significantly more constrained than an
IR used in a compiler. Intermediate representations used in existing binary frame-
works lack high level features like abstract stack, variables, and symbols and are
even machine dependent in some cases. This severely limits the application of well-
understood compiler transformations to executables and necessitates new research
to make them applicable.
In the first part of this dissertation, we present techniques to convert the bi-
naries to the same high-level intermediate representation that compilers use. We
propose methods to segment the flat address space in an executable containing un-
differentiated blocks of memory. We demonstrate the inadequacy of existing variable
identification methods for their promotion to symbols and present our methods for
symbol promotion. We also present methods to convert the physically addressed
stack in an executable to an abstract stack. The proposed methods are practi-
cal since they do not employ symbolic, relocation, or debug information which are
usually absent in deployed executables. We have integrated our techniques with a
prototype x86 binary framework called SecondWrite that uses LLVM as the IR. The
robustness of the framework is demonstrated by handling executables totaling more
than a million lines of source-code, including several real world programs.
In the next part of this work, we demonstrate that several well-known source-
level analysis frameworks such as symbolic analysis have limited effectiveness in
the executable domain since executables typically lack higher-level semantics such
as program variables. The IR should have a precise memory abstraction for an
analysis to effectively reason about memory operations. Our first work of recovering
a compiler-level representation addresses this limitation by recovering several higher-
level semantics information from executables. In the next part of this work, we
propose methods to handle the scenarios when such semantics cannot be recovered.
First, we propose a hybrid static-dynamic mechanism for recovering a precise
and correct memory model in executables in presence of executable-specific artifacts
such as indirect control transfers. Next, the enhanced memory model is employed
to define a novel symbolic analysis framework for executables that can perform the
same types of program analysis as source-level tools. Frameworks hitherto fail to
simultaneously maintain the properties of correct representation and precise mem-
ory model and ignore memory-allocated variables while defining symbolic analysis
mechanisms. We exemplify that our framework is robust, efficient and it signif-
icantly improves the performance of various traditional analyses like global value
numbering, alias analysis and dependence analysis for executables.
Finally, the underlying representation and analysis framework is employed
for two separate applications. First, the framework is extended to define a novel
static analysis framework, DemandFlow, for identifying information flow security
violations in program executables. Unlike existing static vulnerability detection
methods for executables, DemandFlow analyzes memory locations in addition to
symbols, thus improving the precision of the analysis. DemandFlow proposes a novel
demand-driven mechanism to identify and precisely analyze only those program
locations and memory accesses which are relevant to a vulnerability, thus enhancing
scalability. DemandFlow uncovers six previously undiscovered format string and
directory traversal vulnerabilities in popular ftp and internet relay chat clients.
Next, the framework is extended to implement a platform-specific optimization
for embedded processors. Several embedded systems provide the facility of locking
one or more lines in the cache. We devise the first method in literature that employs
instruction cache locking as a mechanism for improving the average-case run-time
of general embedded applications. We demonstrate that the optimal solution for
instruction cache locking can be obtained in polynomial time. Since our scheme
is implemented inside a binary framework, it successfully addresses the portability
concern by enabling the implementation of cache locking at the time of deployment
when all the details of the memory hierarchy are available.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Analyzing and optimizing programs from their executables has received a lot of
attention recently in the research community. In recent years, there has been a
tremendous amount of activity in executable-level research targeting varied applica-
tions such as security vulnerability analysis [42, 137], untrusted code analysis [13],
malware analysis [163], program testing [47], and binary optimizations [130, 103].
1.1 Motivation for executable analysis
Traditional source-code analysis frameworks have limited applicability in several
scenarios. It has been demonstrated that executable-level tools can eliminate such
limitations faced by source-code analysis frameworks. Below, we discuss some of
these scenarios.
Absence of source-code: There are several circumstances where the original
source-code is not accessible. Some of the most prevalent reasons are listed below:
→ IP-protected software




All such situations require executable-level tools for distinct applications. For
example, due to a rapid rise in cyber attacks, there is an increasing need to certify
the behavior and uncover vulnerabilities in IP-protected software and commercial
off-the shelf software components. The availability of such components only in an
executable form has created a huge demand for effective executable analysis tools
to achieve this goal [11, 20, 109].
Further, hundreds of malware are being uncovered almost daily which are
only available in executable form [109]. Security researchers requires novel tools to
understand the behavior of such malware and to develop effective counter strategies.
Various organizations [11] have critical legacy applications that have been de-
veloped for older systems and need to be ported to future versions. In many cases,
the application source-code is no longer accessible requiring these applications to
continue to run on outdated configurations. There is a huge demand of a framework
which can recover functionally correct source-code components from such legacy
software, so that such legacy systems can be ported to secure configurations.
Source-code analysis not sufficient: There are several scenarios where the
source-code analysis is not sufficient. An executable code might demonstrate differ-
ent behavior from the original source code. This phenomenon is popularly known as
What-you-see-is-not-what-you-execute [20]. Modifications can happen to the source
code during compilation (optimizations) or after the compilation process (bad code
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injection). These modifications can significantly alter the program behavior. Con-
sequently, the exact behavior of any program can only be uncovered by analyzing
the executable code.
Moreover, several components of a typical software might be developed in
multiple languages (Fortran, C and C++). The presence of different languages
complicate the task of analyzing the source-code. In such scenarios, a consistent
representation of the resulting executable code presents a more coherent analysis
opportunity.
1.2 Advantages of executable analysis
Section 1.1 underscored the underlying importance of executable-level tools. In ad-
dition, executable level tools offers many advantages over standard compiler frame-
works. Below, we discuss some of these advantages
• End-user security enforcement. Despite considerable research work on
several computing hierarchies, low-level software vulnerabilities remain an im-
portant source of compromises and a perennial threat to system security. At
the core, there exists a fundamental dichotomy in the capabilities and moti-
vation of producers and consumers of software, vendors and end-users respec-
tively. On the one hand, software producers are probably in the best position
to prevent and mitigate such vulnerabilities: they have access to the source
code. As a result, they can apply security mechanisms that offer high coverage
and effectiveness at low overhead, because they are applied at the point where
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the most semantic knowledge about the program and the code is available.
On the other hand, it is software consumers that face the risk and bear the
costs of compromise due to software vulnerabilities and are the most motivated
to mitigate a newly discovered vulnerability. However, consumers often only
have access to the program binary and configuration files. An executable-tool
can bridge the gap between incentive/motivation and capabilities on the con-
sumer side by enabling the end-users to retrofit custom security schemes into
untrusted binaries, to prevent them from taking unauthorized actions.
• Platform aware optimizations Binaries compiled for wide distribution are
often targeted for one particular ISA and are rarely optimized for a particular
processor. Binary tools on an end-user platform can apply custom transforma-
tions to take advantage of platform-specific information like exact knowledge
of the memory hierarchy or the precise version of multimedia instructions.
• Whole-program analysis/optimizations. Development toolchains typi-
cally employ separate compilation framework to minimize the compilation
time. Hence, even though the compilers can theoretically do whole-program
analyses, the applicability of such analysis is severely limited. In contrast,
executable-level tools operate on the merged compilation units, allowing them
to perform whole-program analyses on the compiled programs. Inter-procedural
link-time analyses are usually far less precise than compile-time optimizations
since they work on low-level object code without the benefit of the extensive
IR features available in the compiler.
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• Economic feasibility. An executable-level tool works for the code produced
from any source language and by any compiler. Hence, it is more efficient to
implement the transformations once in an executable-tool than repeatedly in
each compiler. The high expense of repeated compiler implementation often
cannot be supported by a small fraction of the demand1.
1.3 Thesis Statement
In order to effectively operate under the above mentioned applications scenarios,
an executable analysis system needs to perform similar to a source-code analysis
framework. However the reality of executable-tools today has fallen far short of this
desired vision. Existing binary frameworks [102, 107, 81, 33, 122, 66, 130, 149] are
a little more than tools for peephole optimization and instrumentation.
It is conventional wisdom that static analysis of executables is a very difficult
problem. There are several contributing factors towards the complexity of static
analysis such as undecidable nature of static disassembly [82] and loss of semantic
information during the compilation process [91]. These difficulties have resulted
in a plethora of dynamic binary frameworks [102, 107, 81] and frameworks relying
on metadata information [130, 95, 103, 149] to compensate for the loss of informa-
tion during compilation and to circumvent the undecidable nature of disassembly.
However, such metadata information is not present in commercial applications.
Our approach in this work is to enlarge the envelope of the types of program
1This cost barrier to repeated implementation is a partial explanation of why, for example,
there is a dearth of good commercial automatically parallelizing compilers, despite much progress
in research prototypes in that area over three decades.
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that can be handled by static analysis and rewriting. Our main thesis is scalable
static binary rewriting and analysis using compiler-level intermediate representa-
tion without relying on the presence of metadata information. Below, we discuss
the primary features of our thesis, followed by the assumptions under which we
demonstrate the evidence of our thesis.
• Static Framework: There are several dynamic frameworks for analyzing
executables [102, 107, 81, 33, 131]. Dynamic frameworks analyze a program
while it is executing. Hence, the analysis time gets added to the application
execution time. They have several limitations such as access to small portions
of code at a time and huge overhead for advanced analyses. Without access
to the complete code, it is extremely difficult to reason about the behavior
of an application. Hence, our belief is that we can never attain our vision of
reaching source-code analysis with dynamic framework. Hence, we focus our
attention on static executable analysis frameworks.
• Functionality: Our executable framework recovers a functional representa-
tion from an executable, so that a correct executable can be obtained subse-
quently. This is essential for several applications such as debugging a malware
or enforcing security schemes into applications.
• Capability: An executable framework must have no extra constraints in their
representation as compared to source-code. The presence of such extra con-
straints in frameworks hitherto restricts the application of source-level research
methods directly to executables.
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• Practicality: Several frameworks assume the presence of metadata informa-
tion such as debug information or relocation information which are not present
in real world applications. A practical executable framework should not make
such unreasonable assumptions.
• Scalability: An ideal executable framework must be able to scale to real
world applications.
1.3.1 Assumptions behind this work
Correctly rewriting all binary programs is very challenging, hence our goal is to an-
alyze and rewrite all compiled binaries. To this end, we declare a set of assumptions
and define a variety of techniques to successfully handle the programs adhering to
these set of assumptions. The methods proposed in this work rely on the follow-
ing assumptions, which constitute our limitations. This work demonstrates that
compiled code meets all these assumptions.
• Disassembly assumptions: The underlying disassembler employed in our frame-
work derives possible addresses using the restriction that an indirect control trans-
fer instruction requires an absolute address operand [135]. A compiled code is
expected to adhere to this convention unless it has been generated to be position
independent. Position-independent code (PIC) is typically generated only for
standalone dynamically linked library code, which we currently cannot rewrite.
Application code (with statically linked libraries or calls to external DLLs) is han-
dled without any restrictions. However, other researchers in our group are looking
7
to overcome this assumption by rewriting PIC code as well.
• Obfuscated Code: In order to protect intellectual property , some commercial
programs employ obfuscation mechanisms to enhance the resistance against re-
verse engineering tools. A variety of obfuscation mechanisms have been proposed
which make it harder to precisely construct a control flow graph. This includes
excessive use of indirect control transfers and usage of non-standard procedure
transfers without using the call/return mechanism. Debray et al [99] have pro-
posed more advanced obfuscation mechanisms such as branch functions to thwart
static disassembly. This work assumes that executables do not employ such kind
of obfuscations mechanisms and recursive disassembly. With these assumptions,
the techniques presented by Smithson and Barua [135] and Wazeer et al [63], are
successful in achieving 100% code coverage.
• Memory assumptions: Similar to most executable analysis frameworks [20, 22,
48, 130], our techniques assume that executables follow the standard compilation
model where each procedure optionally maintains a local frame frame, which grows
in only one direction and each variable resides at a fixed offset in its corresponding
region. We also assume that in x86 programs, a particular register esp refers to
the top of memory stack. This assumption is expected to hold in all practical
scenarios since x86 ISA inherently makes this assumption. For example, call
instruction moves eip to esp and return decrements esp. Moreover, interrupt
handler codes that are part of an operating system, and can be called during an
application program at any time, inherently assume a stack that follows these
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restrictions. Such handler codes typically allocate their own data on top of the
stack growing in one known direction pointed to by esp. Such mechanisms would
not work in programs without such a stack. An assembly code not adhering to
this convention would be extremely hard to write.
• Memory Consistency:Our framework mimics the assumptions behind all stan-
dard software transformation tools with regards to memory consistency. A ma-
jority of compilers (gcc, LLVM, Visual Studio) and popular binary frameworks
like PLTO [130], DynamoRIO [33], PIN [102], iSpike [103], Diablo [149] reorder
code without taking memory consistency into account. Since synchronization is
highly multiprocessor specific, most programmers are expected to write synchro-
nized programs using standard synchronization libraries [104]. The presence of
synchronization primitives legalizes the applications of all software optimizations.
Recently, the research community is exploring the possibility of preserving mem-
ory consistency in software transformation tools [104]. The key idea is to selec-
tively invalidate the transformations for possibly shared memory locations. In
current implementation, our framework can preserve consistency by declaring all
possibly shared memory regions as volatile in the IR.
• Self Modifying code: Like most static binary tools, we do not handle self mod-
ifying code. Various tools [156] statically detect the presence of self-modifying
code in a program. Such a tool can be integrated in our front-end to warn the
user and to discontinue further operation.
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In the next section, we discuss some of the limitations of existing executable
frameworks and discuss the contributions made by this work in eliminating these
limitations.
1.4 Contribution of this dissertation
As mentioned above, our main thesis is scalable static binary rewriting and analysis
using compiler-level intermediate representation without relying on the presence of
metadata information. Figure 1.1 depicts the overall contribution of this disserta-
tion. Below we briefly discuss the individual contributions.
1.4.1 Representation
As part of this work, we have tried to resolve what we believe is a fundamental
aberration - in spite of a significant overlap in the overall goals of several source-
code methods and executables-level techniques, several sophisticated transforma-
tions that are well-understood and implemented in source-level infrastructures have
yet to become available in executable frameworks. Many of the executable-level tools
suggest new techniques for performing elementary source-level tasks. For example,
PLTO [130], a link-time optimizer, proposes a custom alias analysis technique to
implement a simple transformation like constant propagation in executables. Simi-
larly, several techniques for detecting security vulnerabilities in source-code [154, 37]
remain outside the realm of current executable-level frameworks.
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Figure 1.1: Contributions of the dissertation
is less amenable to analysis than the source-code. Nonetheless, we believe that one
of the prime reasons behind the underlying aberration is that current executable
frameworks define their own intermediate representations (IR) which are signifi-
cantly more constrained than an IR used in a compiler. Intermediate representations
used in existing binary frameworks lack high level features such as abstract stack,
variables, and symbols and are even machine dependent in some cases. This severely
limits the application of well-understood compiler transformations to binaries and
necessitates new research to make them applicable.
In order to achieve our aim of a capable and a functional executable framework,
we present techniques to convert the binaries to the same high-level intermediate
representation that compilers use. We present techniques to segment the flat address
space in an executable containing undifferentiated blocks of memory. We demon-
strate the inadequacy of existing variable identification methods for their promotion
to symbols and present our methods for symbol promotion. We also present meth-
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ods to convert the physically addressed stack in an executable (with a stack pointer)
to an abstract stack (without a stack pointer). The proposed methods are practi-
cal since they do not employ symbolic, relocation, or debug information which are
usually absent in deployed executables.
The compiler IR is then employed for three distinct applications: binary
rewriting using the compiler’s binary back-end, vulnerability detection using existing
source-level symbolic execution tools, and source-code recovery using the compiler’s
C backend. Our techniques enable complex high-level transformations not possible
in existing binary systems, address a major challenge of input-derived memory ad-
dresses in symbolic execution and are the first to enable recovery of a fully functional
source-code.
1.4.2 Analysis
The effectiveness of any tool is governed by the effectiveness of its underlying analysis
frameworks. A source level program analysis framework typically employs multiple
static analyses for analyzing and optimizing the programs. Symbolic analysis is an
important static analysis method where the values of program variables and expres-
sions are represented through symbolic expressions in an abstract domain. Symbolic
analysis has been shown to improve the efficacy of various program analyses such
as global value numbering and dependence analysis.
However, such source-level symbolic analysis frameworks have limited effective-
ness in the executable domain since executables typically lack higher-level semantics
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like variable and structures and mainly contain memory locations instead of explicit
program variables. The IR should have a precise memory abstraction for an analysis
to effectively reason about memory operations.
Our techniques of recovering a compiler-level intermediate representation ad-
dress this limitation by recovering several higher-level semantics information from
executables. Below, we propose two techniques to handle the scenarios when such
semantics cannot be recovered.
First, executable specific artifacts such as indirect control transfers complicate
the task of recovering a precise memory abstraction while maintaining the func-
tionality in IR. The lack of a precise memory abstraction constrain the efficacy of
several executable analyses. We propose a hybrid static-dynamic mechanism for
recovering a precise and correct stack memory model in executables in presence of
executable-specific artifacts.
Next, the enhanced memory model is employed to define a novel symbolic
analysis framework for executables that can perform the same types of program
analysis as source-level tools. Frameworks hitherto fail to simultaneously main-
tain the properties of correct representation and precise memory model and ig-
nore memory-allocated variables while defining symbolic analysis mechanisms. The
proposed symbolic analysis framework for executables adapts source-level symbolic
analysis framework to perform well even in the absence of higher level semantics. We
exemplify that our framework is robust, efficient and it significantly improves the
performance of various traditional analyses such as global value numbering (GVN),
alias analysis and dependence analysis for executables. Such a powerful symbolic
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analysis framework can improve the effectiveness of any binary analysis tool where
it is employed.
1.4.3 Applications
The underlying representation and analysis framework is employed for two sepa-
rate applications. First, the framework is extended to define a novel static analysis
framework, DemandFlow, for identifying information flow security violations in ex-
ecutables. Unlike existing static vulnerability detection methods for executables,
DemandFlow analyzes memory locations in addition to symbols, thus improving
the precision of the analysis. DemandFlow proposes a novel demand-driven mech-
anism to identify and precisely analyze only those program locations and memory
accesses which are relevant to a vulnerability, thus enhancing scalability. Since De-
mandFlow uses static analysis, it does not incur a runtime performance overhead. In
contrast to other similar analyses, DemandFlow also does not require source code.
Next, the framework is extended to implement a platform-specific optimiza-
tion for embedded processors. Various different approaches have been suggested to
enable software involvement in the management of the on-chip memory. Several em-
bedded systems such as Intel’s XScale and ARM’s latest Cortex processors provide
the facility of locking one or more lines in the cache - this feature is called cache
locking. In spite of the presence of cache locking mechanism in modern processors,
there are no methods in the literature to employ cache locking for improving cache
performance. We devise the first method in literature employing instruction cache
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locking as a mechanism for improving the average-case run-time of general embed-
ded applications. We demonstrate that the optimal solution for instruction cache
locking can be obtained in polynomial time. However, the nature of cache locking in
existing hardware renders such optimal solutions impractical. Instead, we propose
two practical heuristics based approaches to achieve cache locking.
We reckon that portability is one huge issue for successful implementation of
cache locking inside a compiler. Cache locking inside a compiler yields executables
that are tied to a particular cache size known at compile-time. The executables
are not portable to other cache sizes. Cache sizes often increases among successive
processor generations of the same instruction set, as predicted by Moore’s law. This
is particularly troublesome when the same code is downloaded to each node in long-
lived networks of embedded systems, each with possibly different memory sizes.
Modern processors employ diverse memory hierarchy with cache sizes varying in
sizes and correspondingly varying in amount of locking involved.
Since our scheme is implemented inside a binary framework, it successfully ad-
dresses the portability concern by enabling the implementation of cache locking at
the time of deployment when all the details of the memory hierarchy are available.
This work proposes a next-generation cache locking aware memory manager where
the memory manager resides entirely in the install-time system, and NOT the com-
piler. In such a scenario, low-level memory management will be a service provided
by the install-time system in concert with the hardware, just like virtual memory.
Thus the memory management will be transparent to the software toolchain. To
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Figure 1.2: SecondWrite system highlighed with the contributions of this disserta-
tion
cache management in the literature.
1.5 SecondWrite
We have achieved all the above advantages by implementing our techniques in a
binary rewriter called SecondWrite [10], which employs the widely used open-source
Low-level Virtual Machine (LLVM) [96] compiler IR to represent the code. Fig 1.2
shows the flow of SecondWrite system, highlighting the techniques proposed in this
dissertation.
SecondWrite’s custom binary reader and decompiler modules parse the input
binary and produce a functionally equivalent LLVM IR code [135]. The disassembler
also implements several additional techniques [63] to recover procedure boundaries
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and inserts additional checks that are essential for the IR to be functional in case
of inaccurate recovered boundaries. Our techniques for obtaining a high-level repre-
sentation convert this initial LLVM IR to a richer LLVM representation, containing
abstract stack and symbols. The symbolic analysis framework proposed in this
dissertation is built over the LLVM representation recovered in the previous step.
Thereafter, the recovered representation is employed for two distinct applications.
First, the symbolic analysis framework is extended to define a scalable and precise
framework for uncovering information-flow vulnerabilities in executables. Second,
the recovered representation is employed in implementing a cache locking mechanism
for embedded processors.
SecondWrite is a highly collaborative research effort and was developed as part
of this dissertation in close efforts with Matthew Smithson, Khaled Elwazeer and
Aparna Kotha. Matthew Smithson and Khaled Elwazeer are primarily responsible
for techniques behind the disassembler module, Khaled and Aparna have major con-
tributions in implementing techniques for obtaining a richer LLVM representation
containing semantic variable types and adequate representation of floating point
x86 registers. Aparna also developed methods to parallelize binary executables and
implemented condition handling in SecondWrite.
Converting binaries to compiler-level IR acts as a great baseline for applying
binary-to-binary optimizations, as described below:
→ Ability to do any code transformation Using compiler IR enables every
compiler transformation to run without binary-specific customization on any
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binary.
→ Ability to do effective compiler analysis and optimization Using com-
piler IR with presence of variables and symbols allows dataflow analysis to
become much more effective.
→ Reuse compiler research A compiler IR allows rewriter to leverage a sub-
stantial body of work on source-level analysis by enabling the application of
existing compiler level research to binary rewriters without any modifications.
→ Binary to source conversion Existing compiler backends can be used to
convert the IR obtained from binary to source languages like C for better code
understanding of binaries with no source.
→ Reuse passes from mature compilers Sharing the IR with a mature com-
piler allows the binary rewriter to leverage the full set of compiler passes built
up over decades by hundreds of developers.
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, we demonstrate that a static binary framework based on a
compiler IR enables applications not possible in any existing tool and our results
establish the feasibility of this approach for most pragmatic scenarios. We do not
claim that we have fully solved all the issues; statically handling every program
in the world may still be an elusive goal. However, the resulting experience of
expanding the static envelope as much as possible is a hugely valuable contribution
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to the community.
The dissertation is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 highlights our contributions in light of several existing executable
analysis frameworks.
• Chapter 3 presents the techniques for recovering compiler-level intermediate
representation from executables. It constitutes our methods for symbol pro-
motion and for converting the physically addressed stack in an executable to
an abstract stack. Our system is the first to demonstrate that a compiler
intermediate representation can be successfully employed in a static binary
framework.
• Chapter 4 discusses our symbolic analysis framework for executables. The
proposed symbolic analysis framework enhances the efficacy of several trans-
formations on executables such as value numbering by 40% on average.
• Chapter 5 discusses the techniques to improve memory abstraction in pres-
ence of executable specific artifacts such as indirect control transfers. Our
techniques improve the precision of memory abstraction by 15% on average in
programs containing such artifacts.
• Chapter 6 extends our underlying representation and analysis framework for
uncovering information flow vulnerabilities in executables. Our tool uncov-
ers six previously unknown vulnerabilities in popular internet and relay chat
programs at a low false positive rate of 79%.
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• Chapter 7 addresses the problem of cache locking. We present the first method
in the literature for cache locking that is able to reduce the average-case run-
time of a program. Our mechanism results in 32% improvement in execution
time in memory constrained embedded applications.
• Finally, Chapter 8 postulates future research directions and discusses the con-
clusions of this dissertation.
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Chapter 2: Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss the related work in the broad field of executable analy-
sis and rewriting frameworks. The techniques related to individual techniques are
discussed separately within each chapter. Fig 2.1 summarizes the comparison of
our framework with existing executable frameworks, in light of individual features
introduced in Section 1.3.
2.1 Binary rewriting
Binary rewriting research is being carried out in two directions: static and dynamic.
Dynamic binary rewriters rewrite the binary during its execution. Examples are
PIN [102], BIRD [107], DynInst [81], DynamoRIO [33] and Valgrind [131]. None of
the dynamic binary rewriters we found employ an IR of an existing compiler. This
is not surprising since dynamic rewriters construct their internal representation at
run-time, and hence they would not have the time to construct a compiler IR. Dy-
namic rewriters are hobbled since they do not have enough time to perform complex
compiler transformations either; they have been primarily used for code instrumen-
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Figure 2.1: Comparing SecondWrite with other executable tools
further since our methods are primarily directed at static binary frameworks.
Existing static binary rewriters related to our approach include Etch [122],
ATOM [66], PLTO [130], Diablo [149], Spike [103] and UQBT [48]. All these rewrit-
ers define their own low-level custom IR as opposed to using a compiler IR. These
IRs are devoid of features such as abstract frames, symbols and maintain memory
as a flat address space; the limitations of which have already been discussed in
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Chapter 1. Diablo defines an augmented whole program control-flow-graph-based
intermediate representation with program registers as globals and memory as a black
box. It does not attempt to obtain high-level information such as function proto-
types and is geared mainly towards optimizations like code compaction. Taking
memory as a black box limits its applicability to architectures such as x86 which
contain very small number of registers. ATOM defines a symbolic RTL-based inter-
mediate format with infinite registers but does not do any attempt of analyzing or
modifying the stack layout. It is mainly targeted towards RISC architectures like
Compaq Alpha. PLTO employs a whole program CFG based IR and implements
stack analysis to determine the use-kill depths of each function [58]. However this
information is not used for converting it into high-level IR; rather it is used only
for low-level custom optimizations like load/store forwarding. Etch does not ex-
plicitly build an intermediate representation and allows user to add new tools to
analyze binaries. The primary goal of Etch appears to be instrumentation and has
only been shown to be applicable for simple optimizations like profile-guided code
layout. Some post-link time optimizers like Spike [103] promote memory locations
to symbols employing the symbol table information in the object files. However,
deployed binaries do not contain symbol information, rendering such solutions to be
impractical for executables.
UQBT [48] is a binary translation framework which defines its own custom
intermediate format as opposed to using an existing compiler’s IR; hence it loses
out on the advanced set of optimizations implemented in an already existing mature
compiler infrastructure. The IR involved is high level involving procedure prototype
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abstraction but the conversion to IR relies on user-provided information about the
number of parameters and their locations, instead of determining that information
automatically from a binary like we do. This severely limits the applicability of
UBQT since only the developers have access to that information, and moreover, the
translation process to an intermediate form is no longer automatic.
Virtual machines [6] implement stack-walking techniques to determine the call-
ing context by simply iterating over the list of frame pointers maintained as metadata
in the dynamic framework; making it orthogonal to our mechanism which statically
inserts run-time checks in the IR.
2.2 Binary Analysis/Intermediate Representation recovery
There are several executable analysis tools such as BAP [35], BitBlaze [137], Phoenix [114]
and others which recover an IR from an executable for further analysis. However,
these tools have several limitations. All these tools define their own custom IR with-
out the features of abstract stack and symbol promotion, facing limitations similar
to tools like Diablo [149] discussed above. Phoenix [114] recovers a register transfer
language (RTL) resembling architecture neutral assembly, which does not expose
the semantics of several complicated instructions. Further, Phoenix and several
other tools [95] require debugging information, which is usually absent in deployed
executables.
Various executable frameworks ease the specification of semantics of native
instructions [141] which is orthogonal to our task of recovering intermediate repre-
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sentation. Tools like Jakstab [89] address control flow challenges in executables by
resolving indirect branches using multiple rounds of disassembly interleaved with
dataflow analysis. However, they do not recover any high level information from
executables and have been shown to scale to programs of a limited size.
There are some frameworks which recover LLVM IR from executables. S2E [47]
and RevNIC [45] present a method for dynamically translating x86 to LLVM using
QEMU. Unlike our approach, these methods convert blocks of code to LLVM on
the fly which limits the application of LLVM analyses to only one block at a time.
RevNIC [45] recovers an IR by merging the translated blocks, but the recovered IR
is incomplete and is only valid for current execution; consequently, various whole
program analyses will provide incomplete information. RevGen [46] includes a static
disassembler to recover an IR for entire binary. However, the translated code retains
all the assumptions of the original binary about the stack layout. They do not
provide any methods for obtaining an abstract stack or promoting memory locations
to symbols, which are essential for the application of several source-level analyses.
King et al. [90] provide a comprehensive survey of several executable analysis
tools. Balakrishnan et al. [20, 22] present Value Set Analysis for analyzing memory
accesses and extracting high level information like variables and their types. As we
will discuss in detail in Chapter 3, analyzing variables does not guarantee promotion
to symbols in IR. Zhang et al. [164] present techniques for recovering parameters
and return values from executables but they do not consider the scenarios where
the information cannot be derived. As mentioned before, such best effort solutions
are good for executable analysis but do not certify the reliable behavior once these
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analyses fail.
Jianjun et al. [97] promote stack variables to registers dynamically, relying
on hardware mechanism for memory disambiguation. In contrast, we provide tech-
niques for symbol promotion in a static framework without any hardware support.
2.3 Industrial Tools
There are three popular industrial-level tools for analyzing executables - HexRays [80],
CodeSurfer/x86 [19] and Veracode [13].
The Hex-Rays decompiler [80] (the sister product to the IDA Pro disassem-
bler) is a commercially-available decompiler. Unfortunately, the product and its
research are proprietary, and its inner workings are closely guarded trade secrets.
Thus they are not available for others to replicate. However, two drawbacks are ap-
parent from their website. First, they acknowledge is that their output is not 100%
reliable (perhaps because of the inherent uncertainties of disassembly), whereas our
techniques always generates functional output. Second, they only support binaries
compiled from C/C++ using standard compilers. We conjecture that these could
be because they make language and compiler-specific assumptions. This severely
limits their applicability in practical scenarios.
CodeSurfer/x86 [19] is built on the techniques suggested by Balakrishnan et
al. [20, 22]. As mentioned before, such best effort solutions are good for executable
analysis but do not certify the behavior once these analyses fail. As opposed to
our techniques, it fails to maintain the functionality of the recovered intermediate
26
representation.
Veracode [13] uncovers vulnerabilities in executables. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the techniques used by Veracode are proprietary and have not been published
anywhere. Hence, the underlying techniques cannot be compared. Further, unlike
our techniques, Veracode requires the presence of debug information, which is not
present in deployed executables.
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Chapter 3: Decompilation to compiler level intermediate rep-
resentation
3.1 Introduction
We have identified the two tasks below as key for translating binaries to compiler
IR. We illustrate the advantages of these two methods through the source-code
recovered from a binary corresponding to the example code in Fig 3.1(a).
• Deconstruction of physical stack frames A source program has an abstract
stack representation where the local variables are assumed to be present on the stack
but their precise stack layout is not specified. In contrast, an executable has a fixed
(but not explicitly specified) physical stack layout, which is used for allocating local
variables as well as for passing the arguments between procedures.
To recreate a compiler IR, the physical stack must be deconstructed to indi-
vidual abstract frames, one per procedure. Since the relative layout of these frames
might change in the rewritten binary, the correct representation requires all the
arguments (interprocedural accesses through stack pointer) to be recognized and




      int z; 
      z = foo(10,20); 
      return z; 
} 
int foo(int a, int b) { 
      int temp3,temp1; 
      temp1 = a+b; 
      if(a>40){ 
           temp3 = temp1 + 10; 
      } 
      else { 
           temp3 = temp1 - 10; 
      } 
      return temp3; 
} 
(a)  Original C Code  
//Global Stack Pointer 
int* llvm_ESP; 
 
char *main(){  
    llvm_ESP = llvm_ESP-2; //Local Allocation 
   
     llvm_ESP[1] = 20; //Outgoing argument 
     llvm_ESP[0] = 10; 
     int llvm_tmp_3 = rewritten_foo(); 





     int* llvm_EBP = llvm_ESP; 
  //Local Frame Pointer 
     llvm_ESP = llvm_ESP-10;  
 //Local Allocation 
 
     int tmpIn1 = llvm_EBP[0]; //Incoming Arg 
     int tmpIn2; = llvm_EBP[1]; 
 
     int  llvm_tmp2 = tmpIn1+tmpIn2; 
     llvm_ESP[2] = llvm_tmp2; 
 
     int llvm_tmpIn3 = llvm_EBP[0]; 
     if (llvm_tmpIn3 > 40){ 
         int llvm_tmp5 = llvm_ESP[2]; 
         llvm_ESP[5] = llvm_tmp5 + 10; 
     }  
     else { 
        int llvm_tmp7 = llvm_ESP[2]; 
        llvm_ESP[5] = llvm_tmp7 - 10; 
    } 
    int llvm_tmp11 = llvm_ESP[5]; 
   return llvm_tmp11; 
} 
(b) Recovered C Code with physical stack  
char *main() 
{ 
    int llvm_ESP2[10]; 
 
    llvm_ESP2[1] = 20; 
    llvm_ESP2[2] = 10; 
    int llvm_tmp1 = llvm_ESP2[1]; 
    int llvm_tmp2 = llvm_ESP2[2]; 
    int llvm_tmp_3 =     
            rewritten_foo(llvm_tmp2, 
                  llvm_tmp1); 
    return llvm_tmp3; 
} 
 
int rewritten_foo( int llvmArg1,  
             int llvm_Arg2) 
{ 
     int llvm_ESP1[10]; 
 
     int llvm_tmp2 = llvm_Arg1+llvm_Arg2; 
     llvm_ESP1[2] = llvm_tmp2; 
     
     if (llvm_Arg1 > 40) { 
         int llvm_tmp5 = llvm_ESP1[2]; 
         llvm_ESP1[5] = llvm_tmp5 + 10; 
     }  
    else { 
          int llvm_tmp7 = llvm_ESP1[2]; 
          llvm_ESP1[5] = llvm_tmp7 - 10; 
     } 
 
     int llvm_tmp11 = llvm_ESP1[5]; 
     return llvm_tmp11; 
} 
 
(c) Recovered C Code with abstract stack 
char *main(){ 
     int llvm_tmp3; 
     llvm_tmp_3 = rewritten_foo(10,20); 
     return llvm_tmp3; 
} 
 
int rewritten_foo(int llvm_Arg1, 
              int llvm_Arg2){ 
     int llvm_tmp4; 
     int llvm_tmp2 = llvm_Arg1 +llvm_Arg2; 
     if (llvm_Arg1 >  40){ 
        llvm_tmp4 =  llvm_tmp2 +10; 
     }  
     else { 
        llvm_tmp4 = llvm_tmp2 - 10; 
     } 
     return llvm_tmp4; 
} 
(d) Recovered C Code with abstract 
stack and symbol promotion 
 
Figure 3.1: Source-code example. Variable names and types in the source-code re-
covered by LLVM C-backend have been modified for readability.
Unfortunately, guaranteeing the static discovery of all the arguments is impos-
sible. Some indirect memory references with run-time-computed addresses might
make it impossible for an analysis to statically assign them to a fixed stack location,
resulting in undiscovered interprocedural accesses. Existing frameworks circumvent
this problem by preserving the monolithic unmodified stack in the IR, resulting in
a low-level IR where no local variables can be added or deleted.
Some executable tools analyze statically determinable stack accesses to rec-
ognize most arguments [20], aiding limited code understanding. However, the lack
of guaranteed discovery of all the arguments renders such best-effort techniques in-
sufficient for obtaining a functional IR. Fig 3.2 shows an example procedure where
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Stack                  q: edx                       p: esp + 8 
allocations         a: esp + 20                b: esp + 24 
 
foo(int a, int b) { 
    int *p, *q; 
   
    p = &a; 
    … 
    *q = …;  
    … = b; 
    } 
foo: 
1    subl $16, %esp              
2    lea 20(%esp), 8(%esp)   
3    store …, (%edx)            
4    load 8(%esp),%ecx        
5    load 4(%ecx)                 
                                                
 
// Allocate 16-byte stack frame 
// Put &a(esp+20) into p(esp+8) 
// Store to MEM[q] 
// Temp ecx ← p (same as &a)  
// Load “b” by using the fact that 
     &b = &a + 4 = ecx + 4 
Source Code           Pseudo Assembly Code 
Figure 3.2: A small source-code example and its pseudo-assembly code, showing the
limitation of existing methods for detecting arguments.
the first argument a can be recognized statically while the second argument b is not
statically discoverable. In the assembly-code, &a (esp+20) is stored to the memory
location for p (esp+8) (Line 2), which is loaded later to temporary ecx (Line 4).
The source compiler exploited the layout information (&a+4=&b) to load b by incre-
menting p (&a) by 4 (Line 5). This is safe since the compiler was able to determine
that p does not alias q. However, the executable framework may not be able to es-
tablish this relation, since alias analysis in executables is less precise. Hence, it has
to conservatively assume that *q reference (Line 3) could modify p which contained
the pointer to a. Consequently, the source address at Line 5 is no longer known and
argument b is not recognized.
Our analysis in Section 3.3 defines a source-level stack model and checks if
the executable conforms to this model. If the model is verified for a procedure,
the analysis discovers the arguments statically when possible, but when not possi-
ble, embeds run-time checks in IR to maintain the correctness of interprocedural
dataflow. Otherwise, stack abstraction is discontinued only in that procedure.
Fig 3.1(c) demonstrates the impact of abstract stack on the recovered source-
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    main() { 
        int A[10], i, x; 
        x = read-from-file(); 
        for (i = 0; i < x; i++) { 
            A[i] = 10; 
        } 
    } 
main: 
1 subl $48, %esp 
2 %ebx = read_from_file 
3 mov %ebx, 44(%esp) //Initializing x 
4 movl $0, 40(%esp) //Initializing i 
5 jmp L2  // jump to condition check 
     L3: 
6 movl 40(%esp), %eax  //load i 
7 movl $10, (%esp,%eax,4) //Reference A[i] 
8 addl $1, 40(%esp)      //Increment i 
     L2: 
9 cmpl 40(%esp), 44(%esp) //compare x and i 
10 jl L3 
 
Figure 3.3: An example showing that variable identification and symbol promotion
are different.
code. Fig 3.1(b) employs a global pointer llvm ESP, corresponding to the physi-
cal stack frame in the input binary, for interprocedural communication as well as
for representing local allocations in each procedure. However, in Fig 3.1(c), the
stack pointer disappears; instead, local allocations appear as separate local arrays
llvm ESP1 and llvm ESP2 and arguments are represented explicitly.
• Symbol promotion Another key challenge we solve is symbol promotion, which
is the process of safely translating a memory location (or a range of locations) to a
symbol in the recovered IR. Existing frameworks do not promote symbols; instead
they retain memory locations in their IR [130, 149, 102, 122]. Some post-link time
optimizers like Ispike [103] promote memory locations to symbols employing the
symbol table information in the object files. However, deployed binaries do not
contain symbol information, rendering such solutions unsuitable for our framework.
At first glance, it may seem that the well-known methods for variable identifi-
cation in executables, such as IDAPro [84] and Divine [22], can be used for symbol
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promotion. However, this is not the case. The presence of potentially aliasing mem-
ory references is a key hindrance to the valid promotion of these identified variables
to symbols.
IDAPro characterizes statically determinable stack offsets in the program as
local variables while Divine divides the stack memory region into abstract locations
by analyzing indirect memory accesses instructions as well.
Fig 3.3 illustrates the key limitations of both these methods. When the code
is compiled, we obtain a stack frame for main() of size 48 bytes (10×4 bytes for A[],
and 4×2 = 8 bytes for i and x). The accesses to variables i and x appear as direct
memory references (Lines 3,4,6,9) while the array A is accessed using an indirect
memory reference (Line 7). Both Divine and IDAPro identify memory locations
esp+44(x) and esp+40(i) as variables based on the direct references. Since the
upper bound for the indirect reference A[i] is statically indeterminable, even Divine
does not generate any useful information about this access. Hence, it creates three
abstract locations — two scalars of 4 bytes each, and a leftover range of 40 bytes.
Despite dividing stack memory region into three abstract locations, none of
them can be promoted to symbols. It is impossible to statically prove from an exe-
cutable that the indirect reference at Line 7 does not alias with references to i or
x. Hence, the promotion of memory locations corresponding to i and x to symbols
would be unsafe since it leads to potentially inconsistent dataflow for underlying
memory locations. (Source-level alias analyses often assume that any A[x] will ac-
cess A[] within its size. However, such size information is not present in a stripped
executable.)
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Since identification is inadequate for promotion, we have devised a new algo-
rithm to safely promote a set of memory locations to symbols. It computes a set
of non-overlapping promotion lifetimes for each memory location taking into con-
sideration the impact of aliasing memory accesses. Our method is oblivious to the
underlying method employed for identifying these locations. The locations can be
identified by IDAPro, Divine or through a similar method we use.
Fig 3.1(d) shows the improvement in source-code recovery from symbol pro-
motion, illustrating the replacement of all access to local array llvm ESP1 and
llvm ESP2 in procedures foo and main respectively by local symbols. As evident,
this greatly simplifies the IR and the source-code.
3.1.1 Benefits of abstract stack and symbols
The presence of abstract stack and symbols has the following advantages:
→ Improved dataflow analysis since standard dataflow analyses only track sym-
bols and not memory locations.
→ Improved readability of the recovered source-code.
→ The ability to employ source-level transformations without any changes. Ad-
vanced transformations like compiler-level parallelization [148, 165] add new
local variables as barriers and rely on the recognition of induction variables.
Several compile-time security mechanisms like StackGuard [55] and ProPo-
lice [65] modify stack layout by placing a canary (a memory location) on the
stack or by allocating local buffers above other local variables. These methods
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can be implemented only if the framework supports stack modification and
symbol promotion.
→ Efficient reasoning about symbolic memory in case of symbolic execution, as
discussed next.
3.1.1.1 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution, e.g. [39], is a well-known technique for automatically detecting
bugs and vulnerabilities in a program. Among various challenges facing symbolic
execution, handling symbolic memory addresses (addresses derived from user-input)
is an important one. There are two primary approaches for handling symbolic
memory. Previous symbolic executors for executables [137] make simplifying and
unsound assumptions by concretizing the symbolic memory reference to a fixed
memory location. On the other hand, popular source-level tools [39, 38] employ
logical constraint solvers to reason about possible locations referenced by a symbolic
memory operation. Even though the expressions involving symbolic memory become
more sophisticated, these tools outperform the former approaches in terms of path
exploration and bug detection [42].
The presence of a physical stack and the lack of symbols in an executable pose
a difficult challenge in efficiently extending the logical solver based approach for rep-
resenting symbolic memory in executables. The most straightforward representation
of the memory would be a flat byte array. Unfortunately, the constraint solvers em-
ployed in existing source-level symbolic execution tools would almost never be able
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    int A[10], x,y; 
    x = read-from-file();           
    y=  read-from-file(); 
 
    if(x<10) 
    { 
       A[x] = 30; 
    } 
    if(y>20) 
    { 
        return; 
     } 
     ….. 
}     




1  FOO= alloca i32,48 
2 ebx1 = read_from_file() 
3  store ebx1, 48(FOO)   //store x 
4  ebx2 = read_from_file() 
5  store ebx2, 44(FOO)   //store y 
 
6  ebx3 = load 48(FOO) //load x 
7 if(ebx3>=10), jmp L2: 
 
L1:          
8  store $30, FOO[4*ebx3] 
 
L2: 
9  eax = load 44(FOO)    //load y 
10 if(eax<=20)  jmp L3 
      return 
L3:….. 




1  FOO= alloca i32,48 
2  ebx1 = read_from_file() 
3  symX=ebx1 
4  ebx2 = read_from_file() 
5  symY = ebx2 
 
6  ebx3= symX 
7  if(ebx3>=10), jmp L2: 
 
L1:          
8  store $30, FOO[4*ebx3] 
 
L2: 
9   eax = symY  
10  if(eax<=20)  jmp L3 




a) Original Code b) IR without symbol promotion c) IR with symbol promotion 
Figure 3.4: An example showing the simplification in symbolic execution constraints
with symbol promotion.




 A2= write(A1,44,ebx2) 
 read(A2,48)<10 
 A3 = write(A2, 
          4*read(A2,48),30) 
Solve:     
read(A3,44) <= 20 
Figure 3.5: Constraints for Fig 3.4(b).
The segmented memory representation in our framework, obtained by abstract
stack and symbol promotion, improves the efficiency of such constraint solvers by
enabling them to only consider the constraints related to the segments referenced
by the current memory address expression and ignore the remaining segments.
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Fig 3.4 illustrates this case. Fig 3.4(a) contains a symbolic memory store to
array A. Fig 3.4(b) and Fig 3.4(c) show the pseudo IR obtained from an executable
corresponding to Fig 3.4(a), without and with the application of symbol promotion.
Fig 3.5 shows the constraints and query generated at Line 10 while symbolically
executing the path L0→L1→L2 in Fig 3.4(b). Here, read(A,i) returns the value at
index i in array A and write(A,j,v) returns a new array with same value as A at
all indices except j, where it has value v.
However, in Fig 3.4(c), symbol promotion has segmented the array FOO in
different segments and references to variables x and y do not refer the segment FOO.
Hence, the solver only needs to solve the following simplified query:
Solve : symY ≤ 20
This example only shows the simplification of constraints with symbol promotion.
The presence of an abstract stack also results in a similar simplification of constraints
by segmenting the memory space within each procedure.
3.2 Overview of the framework
Fig 3.6 presents an overview of the SecondWrite framework. The frontend module,
consisting of a disassembler and a custom reader module, processes the individual
instructions in an input executable and generates an initial LLVM IR. The frame-
work implements several techniques [62] for recognizing arguments passed through
registers and for handling floating point registers. This initial IR is devoid of the
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Figure 3.6: SecondWrite system.
desired features like abstract stack frame and symbols. This initial IR is analyzed
to obtain an enhanced IR which has all the information and features mentioned
previously.
SecondWrite has been already been employed for several applications such
as automatic parallelization [93] and security enforcements [111]. As discussed in
Section 3.1, the features of abstract stack and symbols are critical for an efficient
implementation of these applications.
3.2.1 Disassembler Module
The disassembler module implements several mechanisms, as proposed by Smithson
and Barua [135], to address code discovery problems and to handle indirect control
transfers. Here, we briefly summarize these mechanisms.
A key challenge in executable frameworks is discovering which portions of the
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code section in an input executable are definitely code. Smithson and Barua [135]
proposed speculative disassembly, coupled with binary characterization, to efficiently
address this problem. SecondWrite speculatively disassembles the unknown portions
of the code segments as if they are code. However, it also retains the unchanged
code segments in the IR to guarantee the correctness of data references in case the
disassembled region was actually data.
SecondWrite employs binary characterization to limit such unknown portions
of code. It leverages the restriction that an indirect control transfer instruction
(CTI) requires an absolute address operand, and that these address operands must
appear within the code and/or data segments. The code and data segments are
scanned for values that lie within the range of the code segment. The resulting
values are guaranteed to contain all of the indirect CTI targets.
The indirect CTIs are handled by appropriately translating the original target
to the corresponding location in IR through a runtime translator. Each recognized
procedure (through speculative disassembly) is initially considered a possible target
of the translator, which is pruned further using alias analysis. The arguments for
each possible target procedure are unioned to find the set of arguments to be passed
to the translator; a stub inside the translator populates the arguments according to
the actual target.
The method above is not sufficient for discovering indirect branch targets where
addresses are calculated in binary. Hence, various procedure boundary determina-
tion techniques, like ending the boundary at beginning of next procedure, are also
proposed [135] to limit possible targets.
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The disassembler also implements several additional techniques [63] to recover
procedure boundaries and inserts additional checks that are essential for the IR to
be functional in case of inaccurate recovered boundaries.
3.3 Deconstruction of physical stack frames
In order to recover a source-level stack representation, we first recognize the local
stack frame of a procedure and represent it as a local variable in the IR. As ex-
plained in Section 3.1, this local variable is coupled with the rest of the stack due to
interprocedural accesses. We achieve this decoupling by recognizing interprocedural
accesses and replacing them with symbolic accesses to the procedure arguments.
Below, both these techniques are presented in detail.
3.3.1 Representing the local stack frame
We begin by finding an expression for the maximum size of the local stack frame in
a procedure X. We analyze all the instructions which can modify the stack pointer,
and find the maximum size, P, to which the stack can grow in a single invocation of
procedure X among all its control-flow paths. P need not be a compile-time constant;
a run-time expression for P suffices when variable-sized stack objects are allowed.
An array ORIG FRAME of size P is then allocated as a local variable at the entry point
of procedure X in the IR.
The local variables for the frame pointer and stack pointer are initialized to the
beginning of ORIG FRAME at the entry point of procedure X. Thereafter, all the stack
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pointer modifications — by constant or non-constant values — are represented as
adjustments of these variables. Allocation of a single array representing the original
local frame guarantees the correctness of stack arithmetic inside the procedure X.
In some procedures, it might not be possible to obtain a definite expression
for the maximum size of the local stack frame. For example, scoped variable-sized
local objects in source-code might result in a stack allocation with a non-constant
amount, whose expression is not available at the beginning of the procedure. Conse-
quently, a single array ORIG FRAME of a definite size cannot be allocated. Neither can
multiple local arrays, one per such stack increment, be allocated since IR optimiza-
tions and compiler backend can modify their relative layout thereby invalidating the
stack arithmetic. In such procedures, we do not convert the physical stack to an
abstract frame. A physical stack frame is maintained in the IR using inline assembly
versions of all the stack modification instructions while the remaining instructions
are converted to LLVM IR. The runtime checks mechanism presented in the next
section is employed to distinguish the local and ancestor accesses.
Persistent stack modification: Returns from a procedure ordinarily restore
the value of the stack pointer to the value before the call. However, in some cases,
the stack pointer might point to a different location after returning from a procedure
call. For example, the called procedure can cleanup the arguments passed through
the stack. To represent this stack pointer modification, which persists beyond a
procedure call, we introduce the following definition:
Balance Number : The balance number for a procedure is defined as the net
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shift in the stack pointer from before its entry to after its exit. Four different cases
can arise:
Case 1: Balance Number = 0
This is the common case; no modification required.
Case 2: Balance Number < 0
This case arises when a procedure cleans up a portion of the caller stack frame and
is represented as an adjustment of the stack pointer by Balance Number amount in
the caller procedure after the call. The amount need not be a constant.
Case 3: Balance Number > 0
This case implies that a procedure leaves its local frame on the stack and the cor-
responding frame outlives the activation of its procedure. Such procedures are rep-
resented by considering their allocation as part of the caller procedure allocation.
The Balance Number amount is added to the size of ORIG FRAME array in the caller
procedure and the stack pointer is adjusted after the call by this amount.
Case 4: Balance Number Indeterminable
In such a case, we do not convert the physical frame into abstract frame and represent
the stack as a default global variable in the IR, as shown in Fig 3.1(b). This is an
extremely rare case and in fact, it did not appear in our experiments.
3.3.2 Representing procedure arguments
As per the source-level representation, we aim to represent all the stack-based in-
terprocedural communication through an explicit argument framework. We discuss
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why this is not feasible in all the cases and propose our novel methods based on
run-time checks to handle such scenarios.
We use Value Set Analysis (VSA) [20] to aid our analysis. VSA determines
an over-approximation of the set of memory addresses and integer values that each
register and memory location can hold at each program point. Value Set (VS) of the
address expression present in a memory access instruction provides a conservative
but correct estimate of the possible memory locations accessed by the instruction.
VSA accurately captures the stack pointer modifications and the assignments of
stack pointer to other registers.
The stack location at the entry point of a procedure is initialized as the base
(zero) in VSA and the local frame allocations are taken as negative offsets. In-
tuitively, memory accesses with positive offsets represent accesses into the parent
frame and constitute the arguments to a procedure. A formal argument is defined for
each constant offset into the parent frame and each such access is directly replaced
by an access to the formal argument.
However, the above method for recognizing arguments is suitable only if VS
of the address expression is a singleton set. If the VS has multiple entries, it is not
possible to statically replace it with a single argument.
Fig 3.7 contains an x86 assembly fragment which will be used to illustrate the
handling of interprocedural accesses. Fig 3.8 shows the output IR that results from
Fig 3.7.
We introduce the following definitions to ease the understanding:
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1. function foo: 
2.     sub 100, esp              // Subtract 100 from sp  
3.     call bar           // call bar  
 
4. function bar: 
5.     sub 10, esp               // Subtract 10 from sp  
6.     lea  4(esp),edi          //Move address esp+4 to edi  
7.     mov  2, ebx              // Move value 2 to ebx 
8.     mov  15, ecx            // Move value 15 to ecx 
9.     if (esi < 5) jmp B2     //Conditional Branch 
 
10. B1: mov 4,ebx            // Move value 4 to ebx 
11.   mov 16,ecx              //Move value 16 to ecx 
 
12. B2: store 10, ebx[edi]  // Store 10 to indirect offset (edi + ebx) 
13.   store 10, ecx[esp]     // Store 10 to indirect offset (esp + ecx) 
14.   store 10, edx[edi]    // Store 10 to indirect offset (edi + edx) 
Figure 3.7: A small pseudo-assembly code. The second operand in the instruction is
the destination.
CURRENT BASE: Stack pointer at the entry point of a procedure.
addrm: The address expression of a memory access instruction m
VS(addrm):Value Set of addrm
(x,y): Lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the possible offsets relative to
CURRENT BASE in VS(addrm)
LOCAL SIZE: Size of local frame variable ORIG FRAME
SIZEi:Size of ORIG FRAMEi of the ‘ith’ ancestor in the call graph, with the caller
being represented as the first ancestor. SIZE0 is defined as value 0.
Three different cases for memory reference categorization of a memory access
instruction m arise:
Case 1: (x,y) ⊂ (-LOCAL SIZE,0)
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This condition implies that the current memory access instruction strictly
refers to a local stack location. In Fig 3.7, Line 12 corresponds to this case. Instruc-
tion at Line 6 moves address esp+4 to register edi. Since the size of the current
frame in bar (LOCAL SIZE) is 10 and the local allocations are taken as negative
offsets, this translates to VS of edi as {CURRENT BASE-6}. The VS of ebx at Line
12 is {2,4}; therefore the VS(addrm) is {CURRENT BASE-2,CURRENT BASE-4}, which
translates as a subset of (-LOCAL SIZE,0). In this case, we replace the indirect
access by an access to the local frame as shown Fig 3.8 (Line 12).





This case implies that the current instruction exclusively accesses the local
frame of Nth ancestor. In such cases, we make the local frame variable of the
Nth ancestor procedure, ORIG FRAMEN, an extra incoming argument to the current
procedure as well as to all the procedures on the call-graph paths from the ancestor to
the current procedure. The indirect stack access is replaced by an explicit argument
access.
Line 13 in Fig 3.7 represents this case. Here, VS of ecx is {15,16} which
translates to the stack-offset range (5,6) which is subset of (0,SIZE1). Line 13 in
Fig 3.8 shows the adjusted offset into the formal argument inArg.
Case 3:









i‖i∈(0,N+1) SIZEi) } }




2.     ORIG_FRAME_FOO=alloca i32, 100   // Local frame allocation  
3.     call bar(ORIG_FRAME_FOO)              // call bar  
 
4.function bar(i32* inArg)  
5.     ORIG_FRAME_BAR=alloca i32, 10     // Local frame allocation  
6.     edi = ORIG_FRAME_BAR+4  
7.     ebx = 2                   // Move value 2 to ebx 
8.     ecx = 15                // Move value 15 to ecx 
9.     if (esi < 5) jmp B2 
 
10. B1: ebx = 4               // Move value 4 to ebx 
11.   ecx = 16                // Move value 16 to ecx 
 
12. B2: store 10, ebx[edi]            // Store 10 to local frame 
13.   store  10, (ecx-SIZE_BAR)[inArg]   // Ancestor Store 
14.   if ((edx+edi - ORIG_FRAME_BAR) < SIZE_BAR) //Run Time Check 
15       store 10, edx[edi]            //Local Store 
16.   else 
17.      store 10, (edx+edi – SIZE_BAR)[inArg]  //Ancestor Store 
Figure 3.8: IR of the pseudo-assembly code. SIZE BAR is size of
ORIG FRAME BAR, register names are pure IR symbols.
the local frame of one ancestor or to the local frame of the current procedure. It
also includes cases where VS of the target location is TOP (i.e., unknown).
We propose a run-time-check-based solution to represent such accesses in the
IR. We define all the possible ancestor stack frames in the call graph as arguments
to this procedure. Further, at the indirect stack access, a run-time check is inserted
in the IR to dynamically translate the access to the local frame or to one of the
ancestor stack frames.
Line 14 in Fig 3.7 represents this case. Suppose edx is data-dependent and
hence its VS is TOP. Line 14 in Fig 3.8 shows the run-time check inserted based on
this value. Depending on this check, we either access the local frame (Line 15) or
the incoming argument (Line 17).
We have neglected the return address buffer in our calculations for ease of un-
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derstanding. It is easily considered in our model by adding the return buffer size to
each ancestor’s local frame size. In the case of dynamically linked libraries (DLLs),
the procedure body is not available; hence the above method for handling the argu-
ments cannot be applied. In order to make sure that the external procedures access
arguments as before, the LLVM code generator is minimally modified to allocate
the abstract frame, ORIG FRAME, at the bottom of the stack in each procedure in the
rewritten binary. Since external procedures are not aware of the call hierarchy inside
a program, their interprocedural references are usually limited to only the parent
frame. When the prototypes of these external procedures are available (such as for
standard library calls), this stack maintenance restriction is avoided altogether by
employing the solution presented for any other procedure.
3.4 Translating memory locations to symbols
Section 3.3 presented methods for deconstructing the physical stack frame into indi-
vidual abstract frames, one per procedure. Even though this representation allows
unrestricted modification of the stack frame, accesses to local variables appear as
explicit memory references to locations within this array, which are not amenable to
standard dataflow analysis. In this section, we propose our methods for translating
these memory operations to symbol operations in the IR.
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1. store eax, ebx[esi] 
 
2. load 8[esp], edx 
….. 
3. store ecx, 8[esp] 
…. 
4. load 8[esp], edi 
 
5. load ebx[esi], edx   
1. store eax, ebx[esi]  
 load 8[esp],sym 
2. mov sym, edx 
….. 
3. mov  ecx, sym 
…. 
4. mov sym, edi 
store sym, 8[esp] 
5. load ebx[esi], edx 
….. 
1. store eax, 8[esp] 
2. load 8[esp], edx 
3. load ebx[esi],edx 
…… 
4. store eax,ebx[esp] 
5. load 8[esp], ecx 




a) b) c) 
Figure 3.9: Symbol promotion. Second operand in the instruction is the destination
of the instruction.
3.4.1 Motivation for partitions
As discussed in Section 3.1, maintaining data-flow consistency of the underlying
memory locations across the whole program is imperative while promoting memory
accesses to symbolic accesses. Fig 3.9(a) shows a small example with three direct
accesses to location (esp+8) at Lines 2,3,4; the remaining two are unbounded indi-
rect accesses. The simplest method for maintaining the data-flow consistency across
the program is to load the data from the memory location into the symbol just after
each aliasing definition, store the symbol back to the memory location just before
each aliasing use and promote each candidate stack access to a symbolic access, as
shown in Fig 3.9(b). The load inserted just after the aliasing definition is referred
to as a Promoting Load and the store just before the aliasing use is referred to as
a Promoting Store (shown as bold in Fig 3.9(b)). Although this method ensures
correct data flow propagation, it results in a large number of promoting loads and
stores which might overshadow the benefit of symbol promotion.
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Fig 3.9(c) illustrates this unprofitable case. In this example, suppose VS of
ebx is TOP. Consequently, the instructions at Line 3, 4 and 6 are aliasing indirect
accesses to the stack location (esp+8). In order to promote the direct memory
accesses at instructions 1, 2 and 5, we need to insert Promoting Stores just be-
fore instruction 3 and instruction 6 and a Promoting Load just after instruction
4. Hence, promoting three direct memory operations entails the insertion of three
extra memory operations, nullifying the benefit.
We propose a novel partition-based symbol promotion algorithm where we
divide the program into a set of non-overlapping promotional lifetimes for each
memory location. It serves as a fine-grained framework where the symbol promo-
tion decision can be made independently for each lifetime (a partition) instead of the
entire program at once. Not doing symbol promotion in a partition does not affect
the correctness of the data-flow in the program. The symbol promotion can be selec-
tively performed in only those partitions where it is provably beneficial. Fig 3.9(c)
shows an intuitive division of the current example into two safe partitions.
3.4.2 Reaching definition framework
We define a new reaching definition analysis on memory locations for computing the
partitions. This is different from the standard reaching definitions on symbols well-
known in compiler theory. For each memory location loc, this analysis computes
the set of instructions defining the memory location loc that reach each program
point. The set of definitions includes stores to the memory location loc using direct
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Statement s gen[s] kill[s]
d:store x,mem[reg] if([sp+addr]∈VS(mem+reg)) if([sp+addr]∈VS(mem+reg))
d defs(addr) - d
else { } else { }
d: store y,addr[sp] d defs(addr) - d
d: z = load mem[reg] {} {}
d: z = load addr[sp] {} {}
Memory location loc : [sp+ addr]
mem: Non-constant access
addr: Constant
defs(addr): Set of instructions defining the memory location [sp+addr]
in[n]: Set of definitions that reach the begining of node n
out[n]: Set of definitions that reach the end of node n
pred[n]: Predecessor nodes of node n
in[n] = ∪i|i∈pred[n]{(out[p])}
out[n] = gen[n] ∪ (in[n]− kill[n])
Figure 3.10: The reaching definition description. Definitions are propagated across
the control flow of program.
addressing mode as well as possibly aliasing stores.
Fig 3.10 formulates the reaching definition in terms of VS of the memory ac-
cesses. These reaching definitions are propagated across the control flow of the
program, similar to the standard compiler dataflow propagation, allowing the parti-
tions to be formed across basic blocks. The interprocedural version of VSA implicitly
takes into consideration a local pointer passed to a procedure through an argument.
3.4.3 Symbol promotion algorithm
The candidates for symbol promotion in a procedure P, represented by a set LOCS,
are computed as follows:
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M: Set of memory accesses in P
DM: Statically determinable memory accesses,
⋃
d∈M{d|‖V S(addrd)‖ = 1}
LOCS: Statically determined stack locations in P,
⋃
d∈DM{m|m ∈ V S(d)}
Mathematically, for a stack location loc, a single partition constitutes three
sets of memory accesses: DirectAcc, BeginSet and EndSet. DirectAcc contains stat-
ically determinable accesses to the location loc and constitutes the potential candi-
dates for symbol promotion. BeginSet constitutes the indirect stores that may-alias
with loc and have a control flow path to at least one element of the set DirectAcc.
EndSet consists of all the aliasing accesses such that there is a control flow path
from some element of BeginSet to these accesses. Intuitively, program points just
after the elements in BeginSet represent the locations for inserting Promoting Loads.
Similarly, program points just before the elements of EndSet are the locations for
inserting Promoting Stores.
Algorithm 1 provides a formal description of the method for computing par-
titions for a memory location loc. We begin with an empty partition. We analyze
a store instruction, say ds. If ds is a direct addressing mode instruction then it is
added to the DirectAcc set; otherwise it is added to BeginSet (Line 9-12). Load
instructions using direct addressing where ds is one of the reaching definitions are
added to the DirectAcc set of the partition (Line 16-18). The remaining reaching
definitions at these load instructions are added to the analysis list (Line 19-20). If
ds uses a direct addressing mode, indirect load and store instructions with ds as
one of the reaching definitions are added to the EndSet (Line 24-26). For indirect
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1 L: Set of loads in P; S: Set of stores in P
2 DL:
⋃
l∈L{l|{loc} = V S(addrl)} //Direct Loads
3 IL:
⋃
l∈L{l|{loc} ⊂ V S(addrl)} //Indirect Aliasing Loads
4 DS:
⋃
s∈S{s|{loc} = V S(addrs)} //Direct Stores
5 IS:
⋃
s∈S{s|{loc} ⊂ V S(addrs)} //Indirect Aliasing Stores
6 Processed: Set of elements processed
7 while DS != ∅‖IS != ∅ do
8 define new Partition P, define new list ActiveList
9 if DS != ∅ then
10 s = DS.begin; add s to P.DirectAcc
11 else
12 s = IS.begin; add s to P.BeginSet
13 add s to ActiveList
14 while ActiveList.size!=0 do
15 s = ActiveList.top; Add s to Processed
16 for dl ∈ DL do
17 if s ∈ in[dl] then
18 add dl to P.DirectAcc
19 for s′ ∈ in[dl] do
20 add s’ to ActiveList if s’/∈ Processed
21 remove dl from DL
22 if s ∈ IS then
23 continue /* No need to store symbol back */
24 for il ∈ {IL,IS} do
25 if s ∈ in[il] then
26 add il to P.EndSet
27 for s′ ∈ in[il] do
28 add s’ to ActiveList if s’/∈ Processed
29 remove il from IL if il ∈ IL
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for computing partitions for a location loc in a
procedure P
stores, the symbol need not be stored back to the memory (Line 22-23). As with
the direct loads, the rest of the reaching definitions are added to the analysis list
(Line 27-29). This analysis is applied repeatedly until the analysis list is empty. At
that point, we have one independent partition. We repeatedly obtain new partitions
until there are no more direct stores or indirect stores to analyze.
We implement a simple benefit-cost model to determine whether the symbol
promotion should be carried out for a particular partition. In a partition, the size
of DirectAcc set is the number of memory accesses replaced by symbol accesses. We
define Freqi as the statically determined execution frequency at program point i.















We calculate the net benefit of each partition as Benefit - Cost. Symbol promotion
is carried out in a partition only if the net benefit is positive.
3.5 Results
Table 3.1 lists all the benchmarks which have been successfully evaluated with the
SecondWrite prototype. It includes SPEC2006 benchmark suite, benchmarks from
other suites and a real world program, Apache server. Benchmarks on Linux are
compiled with gcc v4.4.1 (O0 (No optimization) and O3 (Full optimization) flags)
without any symbolic or debug information. Windows benchmarks are compiled
with Microsoft Visual Studio compiler (O0 (No optimization) and O2 (Maximum
optimization) flags). Only the C and C++ programs are included for Windows
since Visual Studio does not compile Fortran. The benchmarks are compiled for
x86-32 ISA and results are obtained for SPEC2006 ref datasets on a 2.4GHz 8-
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gcc-O0 8 78.7 86.9
gcc-O3 8 86.9 93.5
gcc-O0 20 77.3 85.6
gcc-O3 15 72.4 71.7
gcc-O0 23 62.1 87.5
gcc-O3 10 34.5 47.5
gcc-O0 26 87.2 95.9
gcc-O3 17 93.7 76.2
gcc-O0 28 75.2 97.2
gcc-O3 28 66.3 82.2
gcc-O0 23 99 98.5
gcc-O3 21 99.1 93.9
gcc-O0 138 40.7 42.8
gcc-O3 89 33.9 48.3
gcc-O0 20 79.5 99.6
gcc-O3 20 84.5 94.5
gcc-O0 94 90.5 90.5
gcc-O3 66 80.4 75.8
gcc-O0 129 72.1 86.2
gcc-O3 60 77.1 92.3
gcc-O0 106 77 82.5
gcc-O3 51 68.9 88.5
gcc-O0 192 64.7 81.9
gcc-O3 164 73.3 76.2
gcc-O0 130 58.2 83.4
gcc-O3 103 36.2 38.7
gcc-O0 268 72.8 78.5
gcc-O3 199 65.1 67.5
gcc-O0 55 97.2 97.2
gcc-O3 55 57.3 82.2
gcc-O0 2691 64.61 65.8
gcc-O3 2052 84.6 60.1
gcc-O0 331 84.3 84.3
gcc-O3 295 79.6 77.5
gcc-O0 1548 85.7 88
gcc-O3 1249 72.3 75.3
gcc-O0 885 65.9 79
gcc-O3 775 61.1 70
gcc-O0 752 70.9 75.5
gcc-O3 625 70.9 69.8
gcc-O0 1126 76.4 75
gcc-O3 598 87.6 74.5
gcc-O0 1482 72.3 74.4
gcc-O3 1283 65.1 68.2
gcc-O0 887 61.3 66.5
gcc-O3 766 56.6 67.9
gcc-O0 1971 47.6 54.54
gcc-O3 1861 53.5 57.8
gcc-O0 2063 71.4 70.8
gcc-O3 1601 60.1 66.2
gcc-O0 2594 78.6 81.4
gcc-O3 2391 62.16 65.7
gcc-O0 1686 76.4 74.1
gcc-O3 1459 33.1 30.7
gcc-O0 5206 66.1 72.2
gcc-O3 4897 63.1 66.2
VS-O0 21 67.1 73.1
VS-O2 19 95.5 66.1
VS-O0 26 53.5 80.5
VS-O2 14 31.4 32.2
VS-O0 26 78.6 85.5
VS-O2 25 74.6 77.3
VS-O0 24 93.9 90.9
VS-O2 22 81.9 79.3
VS-O0 128 37.5 56.1
VS-O2 136 35.4 36.2
VS-O0 133 80.1 81.1
VS-O2 121 70.1 76.9
VS-O0 85 69.1 57.8
VS-O2 67 70.9 65.4
VS-O0 188 76.39 66.1
VS-O2 144 63.31 75.91
VS-O0 128 37.5 56.1
VS-O2 107 59.5 48.3
VS-O0 264 53.5 80.5
VS-O2 241 66.1 67.1
VS-O0 2281 63.1 67.2
VS-O2 2061 59.1 60.3
VS-O0 267 76.9 79.94
VS-O2 263 69.9 80.82
VS-O0 546 58.9 67.3
VS-O2 476 54.71 51.02
VS-O0 1826 54.4 58.17
VS-O2 1696 55.2 60.1
VS-O0 2589 63.3 43.5
VS-O2 2382 57 29.1
VS-O0 5109 62.1 57.1
VS-O2 4872 64.5 67.1
gcc-O0 2459 63.2 68.1
gcc-O3 2046 75.1 79.2
TOTALS 2 Million AVG 67.84867 71.733333
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Linux
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Linux
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Linux
dealII Spec2006 C++ 96382 Linux
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Linux
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Linux
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Figure 3.11: Variation of analysis time with lines of code. Outlier program dealII
has been omitted for the ease of presentation.
core Intel Nehalem machine running Ubuntu. The performance analysis of Apache
server is carried out using ab tool [12]. Analyzing executables compiled by a new
compiler causes several engineering challenges with our evolving prototype such as
presence of yet unsupported x86 features like SSE and other advanced instructions.
However, successful experimentation with distinct compilers such as gcc and Visual
Studio demonstrates the lack of any fundamental problem in this regard. In future
work, we aim to expand our support base by evaluating executables compiled by
other compilers such as Intel compiler and LLVM. Unless mentioned explicitly, the
benchmarks in figures are the ones compiled by gcc.
Fig 3.11 plots the variation in the time taken by SecondWrite, with increasing
lines of code, to recover an intermediate representation from an executable. This
constitutes the time spent in disassembling the executable and other analyses includ-
ing abstract stack recovery and symbol promotion. Fig 3.11 highlights the nearly
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linear scalability of our framework. The analysis time for large programs such as
gcc, containing 250,000 lines of code, is around eight minutes. A particular SPEC
benchmark dealII takes around 35 minutes, forming an outlier to the linear model. It
employs templates excessively which causes the compiler to create multiple versions
of the same procedure for different template parameters. This extensively slows
down several interprocedural analyses resulting in a huge overall analysis time.
3.5.1 Static characteristics
Our symbol promotion techniques promote the stack memory locations to symbols
and direct stack memory accesses to symbol accesses in the IR. On average, 67%
of stack locations are promoted to symbols resulting in promotion of 72% of direct
stack accesses for the programs listed in Table 3.1. For the remaining memory
operations, the net benefit for promotion didn’t meet the corresponding threshold.
Theoretically, our framework can achieve 100% symbol promotion if the promotion
threshold is ignored, but this leads to high overhead in the rewritten binaries due to
Promoting Loads and Promoting Stores. The development of more advanced alias
analysis would improve results of our symbol promotion without adversely affecting
the performance.
Fig 3.12 relates the above promoted symbolic references to the original source-
level artifacts. We enumerated the symbolic references in the input program using
debug information (employed only for counting the references) and compared how




































































































































Figure 3.12: Percentage of original symbolic accesses recovered in IR.
Program Version # Proc with # Proc with run-
Physical stack time Checks
gcc gcc-O0,VS-O0 117 0
gcc gcc-O3, VS-Ox 117 10
tonto gcc-O0, gccO3 20 0
Table 3.2: Corner cases of our analysis.
are able to restore 66% of the original symbolic references.
Fig 3.13 presents an insightful result regarding our partition algorithm (Alg 1).
Our partitioning algorithm creates fine-grained promotional lifetimes for each mem-
ory location. On average, around 76% of the memory locations have one partition,
18% have two to five, and 6% have five or more partitions. This is not unexpected
since large procedures are relatively rare.
Table 3.2 lists the programs which hit corner cases during the deconstruction
of physical stack. The analysis of the original source-code revealed that a phys-


















































































































































1 2 to 5 5 to 10 >10Number of Partitions
Figure 3.13: Partition algorithm visualization
are inserted in some procedures which accept a variable number of arguments us-
ing the va arg mechanism. Most of the procedures using va arg do not require
runtime checks. This result establishes our earlier hypothesis that scenarios requir-
ing run-time checks are extremely rare and consequently, have negligible overhead.
Nonetheless, not handling these scenarios prohibits obtaining a functional IR and
hence, are imperative for any translation system.
3.5.2 Un-optimized input binaries
Fig 3.14 shows the normalized run-time of each rewritten binary compared to an
input binary produced using gcc with no optimization (-O0 flag). Fig 3.15 shows the
corresponding run-time for binaries produced using Visual Studio compiler with no
optimization (-O0 flag). We obtain an average improvement of 40% in execution time



























































































































































Figure 3.14: Normalized runtime of rewritten binary as compared to its correspond-
ing input version (=1.0) compiled by gcc.
an improvement of over 65% in some cases (bwaves). In fact, as shown in Fig 3.16,
our tool brings down the normalized runtime of unoptimized input binaries from 2.2
to close to the runtime (1.25) of gcc-optimized binaries.
3.5.3 Optimized input binaries
Fig 3.14 shows the normalized execution time of each rewritten binary compared to
an input binary produced using gcc with the highest-available level of optimization
(-O3 flag). In this case, we obtain an average improvement of 6.5% in execution
time. It is interesting that we were able to obtain this improvement over already
optimized binaries without any custom optimization of our own. One of our rewrit-
ten binaries (hmmer) had a 38% speedup vs the input binary. Although gcc -O3 is
known to produce good code, it missed the creation of few predicated instructions
































































































Figure 3.15: Normalized runtime of rewritten binary as compared to its correspond-
ing input version (=1.0) compiled by Visual Studio.
corresponding run-time for binaries produced using Visual Studio compiler with full
optimization flag (-O2). As evident, our framework was able to retain the perfor-
mance of these binaries, with a small overhead of 2.7% on average.
3.5.4 Impact of symbol promotion
Next, we substantiate the impact of symbol promotion on the run-time of rewrit-
ten binaries. Fig 3.17 and Fig 3.18 show the normalized improvement in execution
time obtained by applying only LLVM optimizations and by applying our symbol
promotion techniques. It shows that symbol promotion is responsible for improving
the average performance of rewritten binary from 30% to 40% in the case of unop-
timized binaries (produced by gcc) and from 1% to 6.5% in the case of optimized





















































































































































Unoptimized Input binary Rewritten binary
Figure 3.16: Normalized runtime of rewritten binary as compared to optimized
version (=1.0) compiled by gcc.
observed a small slowdown with symbol promotion in bzip2 O3.
It is important to note that these results only measure the impact of symbol
promotion. The impact of our method to convert physical frames to abstract frames
is not measured above. However, we can infer that number since without obtaining
abstract frames, none of the existing LLVM passes would run at all, leading to zero
run-time improvement.
3.5.5 Symbolic Execution
KLEE is efficiently designed to obtain a high code coverage on source programs. We
run KLEE in our framework on a set of 50 alphabetically-chosen Coreutils executa-
bles and achieve a code coverage of 73% on average compared to 76% obtained by































































































































































LLVM Opt LLVM Opt + Symbol Promotion
Figure 3.17: Impact of symbol promotion on runtime of rewritten binary v/s unop-
timized input binary (=1.0).
same amount of time (30 minutes/benchmark) in both cases.
Recall from Section 3.1.1.1 that symbol promotion enables our framework to
efficiently reason about symbolic memory accesses. However, most of the Coreutils
programs do not contain symbolic array accesses, consequently, these programs are
not likely to benefit from our analyses. Instead, a set of programs [42] with known
symbolic accesses were chosen to demonstrate the effectiveness of our analysis. Each
application was run with KLEE without symbol promotion for five minutes. Then,
the applications were run with symbol promotion with the exact same workload. As
evident from Table 3.3, our analysis is highly effective in reducing the time spent
by STP solvers in query processing.
KLEE has been shown to detect various bugs in a particular version of Core-
utils (6.10). Our framework enables the detection of these bugs from their corre-






























































































































































LLVM Opt LLVM Opt + Symbol Promotion
Figure 3.18: Impact of symbol promotion on runtime of rewritten binary v/s opti-
mized input binary (=1.0).
Binary No Promotion With Promotion
Time(s) STP Time(s) Time(s) STP Time(s)
htget 300 186 37 27
cut 300 252 111 76
split 300 225 157 88
Table 3.3: Improvement in constraints processing with symbol promotion.
enables us to remedy the above detected bugs directly from executables. We ana-
lyzed the dump for one of the Coreutil executable (mkdir), fixed the corresponding
behavior in IR and obtained a rewritten bug-free executable.
3.5.6 Automatic Parallelization
Kotha et al [93] presented a method for automatic parallelization for binaries. Here,
we substantiate the impact of symbol promotion on their methods for a subset of
PolyBench and Stream suite. Fig 3.19 shows that symbol promotion increases the
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Without symbol promotion With symbol promotion
Figure 3.20: Number of induction vari-
ables recognized
We further investigate why symbol promotion helped automatic parallelization
significantly. In order to parallelize loops using an affine automatic parallelizer,
it is essential to recognize induction variables. We observe that for x86 binaries,
many induction variables are often present on the stack instead of registers; the
compiler’s induction variable recognizer based on symbols fails to recognize them.
Further, for affine loops of nesting depth greater than two, induction variables of
outer loops are generally placed on the stack. This results in parallelization of only
inner loops even though outer-loop parallelization is legal. Parallelizing inner loops
implies that there is a significant overhead due to synchronization and hence the
speedup is low. On the other hand, symbol promotion promotes the stack allocated-
induction variables corresponding to outer loops also to symbols; consequently, these
induction variables get recognized and it allows the parallelizer to do parallelization
on more beneficial outer loops. Detailed statistics of the number of outer loops for
which induction variables are recognized with and without symbol promotion are
presented in Fig 3.20.
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Chapter 4: Symbolic Analysis for executables
4.1 Introduction
Analyzing and optimizing programs from their executables has received a lot of
attention recently in the research community. The additional advantages offered by
binary-level tools over traditional source-code level frameworks is the prime reason
for this great interest. Binary-level tools can be employed to analyze executables
produced by any compiler, can be applied in the absence of source code (legacy
binaries) and can be used by an end-user for custom security analysis and platform-
specific optimizations.
A typical source-code level framework employs various static analyses for an-
alyzing and optimizing programs. Symbolic analysis [76, 31, 77, 32] is an important
source-code level static analysis technique which represents the values of program
variables through symbolic expressions. A symbolic analysis tool interprets pro-
grams in an abstract symbolic domain, maps each operation in its concrete domain
to a corresponding operation in the symbolic domain and discovers the program
properties using abstract characteristics. Symbolic analysis methods have been used
regularly in traditional optimizing compilers. For example, optimizations like com-
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mon subexpression elimination and global value numbering determine an equivalence
of two symbolic expressions and remove the redundant computations [7]. Symbolic
analysis has also emerged as an advanced technique to support the detection of
parallelism in programs. Various parallelizing compilers [76, 31, 77] have employed
powerful symbolic analysis frameworks to resolve data-dependency queries and to
enable critical optimizations like array privatization for effective parallelization of
programs.
However, the symbolic analysis frameworks employed in existing compilers op-
erate only on the program variables. These frameworks handle memory accesses and
memory locations in a very conservative manner. This is not suitable for executa-
bles since executables do not contain explicit program variables and store many of
their variables in memory locations. This problem is exacerbated in the x86 ISA
since its register set is very small, and hence most locations are memory-allocated.
Hence, existing symbolic analysis methods have limited effectiveness when applied
to executables.
There have been a very few methods for employing symbolic analysis for ex-
ecutables. Debray et al [58] suggested an alias analyses technique based on an
underlying symbolic analysis framework. Amme et al [8] proposed a similar sym-
bolic analysis framework for data dependence analysis of assembly code. However,
both these techniques suffer from a major limitation. They restrict their analysis
to registers only; they do not track symbolic values corresponding to the contents
of the memory locations. Consequently, they lose a great deal of precision at each
memory access. This severely limits their ability to effectively adapt various source
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level analyses for executables.
Just as source-code symbolic analysis tools provide information about the sym-
bolic values of programs variables, an executable-level symbolic analysis framework
should provide information about the symbolic values of the contents of memory
locations. We present a novel symbolic analysis framework for executables which
computes a set of symbolic expressions, a Symbolic Value Set, that each data object
(not just registers but also memory locations) can hold at each program point. The
Symbolic Value Set is an abstraction for representing the possible values of each
data object in terms of other program expressions.
This novel symbolic analysis framework has multiple applications. First, it
improves the efficacy of various analysis like alias analysis and optimizations like re-
dundancy elimination for executables. This results in a more aggressive optimization
of executables. Second, it is useful for simplifying or speeding up subsequent binary
analysis. For example, various bug testing tools employ advanced constraint solvers
for detecting errors in a program. It has been shown that the time for various such
decision procedures to return a satisfying answer for a query can be cut in half by
using program optimization to simplify the query first [34]. Third, it improves the
performance of various advanced transformations for executables. Recently, various
researchers have suggested techniques for performing automatic parallelization from
executables [162, 93]. None of these binary parallelization methods can currently
apply advanced symbolic decisions like symbolic difference [76], which have been
proved to be very effective in source-level parallelization methods. The proposed
symbolic analysis framework will further improve the efficiency of all these paral-
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lelization efforts by exposing more data independences which cannot be captured
by their existing methods.
Further, our framework does not use any symbolic, relocation, or debug infor-
mation since these are usually absent in deployed executables.
4.2 Related Work
In this section, we discuss related work pertaining to (i) Symbolic analysis, (ii)
Symbolic execution, (iii) Value numbering, and (iv) Binary Analysis.
Symbolic Analysis:There has been an extensive body of work employing
symbolic analysis for analyzing and optimizing programs. Various techniques broadly
differ in the symbolic abstraction which is maintained as part of their analysis.
Cousot [52] proposed an early method of using abstract interpretation to discover
the linear relationships between variables. Patterson [113] and Harrison [78] present
methods for computing value ranges of program variables and employ it for improv-
ing static branch prediction [113]. Rugina et al [124] employ symbolic constraint
solvers to determine the bounds of each variable in terms of its symbolic values at
the entry point of the program. Padua et al [144] developed a system for com-
puting symbolic values of expressions using a demand-driven backward substitution
analysis on Gated-SSA form.
Symbolic analysis has been used extensively in the parallelization community
to support the detection of parallelism and the optimization of programs. Haghighat
et al [76](Parafrase-2) present a symbolic analysis framework for computing a closed
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form expression of induction variables as well as for analyzing program properties
that are essential in effective detection and exploitation of parallelization. Blume
et al [31](Polaris) present a symbolic range propagation mechanism to determine
the relationship between any two arbitrary symbolic expressions by maintaining a
set of symbolic range constraints for each program variable. They further employ
their symbolic ranges to improve data dependence queries. The SUIF compiler [77]
employs symbolic analysis to represent array indices in a symbolic form of loop in-
dex variables to apply array dependence tests. Fahringer et al [67] present a unified
symbolic evaluation framework, combining both data and control flow, for determin-
ing the symbolic expressions of variables as algebraic functions over program input
data.
All the above methods are source-code symbolic analysis techniques and obtain
symbolic expressions for only the variables. They lose a great deal of precision when
applied to binary executables directly due to the presence of memory accesses. On
the other hand, we present a symbolic analysis framework for executables which
tracks memory locations as well, and does not lose precision in the presence of
memory accesses.
Symbolic execution: There has been a great deal of work on symbolic ex-
ecution in the field of model checking [39, 38, 127]. The only similarity between
symbolic execution and symbolic analysis is that both use symbolic constraints to
represent values, other than that, they are not very related. Our symbolic analysis
is an abstract interpretation method which determines a set of symbolic expressions
for each object. On the other hand, symbolic execution generates and maintains
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symbolic constraints per program path and does not generalize constraints to all
paths. Symbolic execution relies on constraint solvers to determine the feasibility
of each path and is employed mainly for bug testing of programs.
Value numbering: Various algorithms have been suggested to discover the
equivalence of expressions in a program. Since the equivalence problem is unde-
cidable, compilers typically implement algorithms that solve a restricted problem
of Herbrand equivalence. Most Global Value numbering algorithms are based on
an early algorithm by Kildall [88], where equivalences are discovered using abstract
interpretation on the lattice of Herbrand equivalences. Although the algorithm
is precise, it has exponential cost in compile time. Later methods, including the
algorithms by Alpern, Wegman and Zadeck (AWZ) [7] and Rosen, Wegman and
Zadeck (RWZ) [123], suggest more efficient algorithms for discovering Herbrand
equivalences based on the SSA form of the program. Gulwani et al [71, 72] present
a random interpretation-based GVN algorithm that discovers as many Herbrand
equivalences as the abstract interpretation algorithm of Kildall [88], while retaining
the polynomial-time complexity of more efficient algorithms like AWZ [7]. Van-
Drunen et al [150] present a value-based partial redundancy algorithm, which effec-
tively made value numbering a path sensitive algorithm. Bodik et al [32] combined
value numbering with backward symbolic propagation and path sensitive data-flow
analysis to propose a strong optimization framework.
However, all these value numbering algorithms are based on variables alone and
none of these variables propagate value numbers across memory locations. Hence,
these algorithms have limited application in the case of executables. In contrast,
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our value numbering algorithm is implemented over a symbolic analysis framework
which tracks symbolic values for memory locations as well, thereby exposing more
equivalence in executables.
Binary analysis and optimization: There has been an extensive body
of work on analyzing executables. The work that is closely related to our work
are alias-analysis algorithms proposed by Debray et al [58], dependence analysis
proposed by Amme [8] and Value Set Analysis method proposed by Gogul et al [21].
Debray [58] developed an alias-analysis algorithm for executables where the basic
goal is to find an over-approximation of the set of values that each register can hold
at each program point. Amme at al [8] also present a similar mechanism for deriving
a set of values for each register but presented methods to avoid the loss of precision
at program join points. However, the biggest limitation of both these methods is
that they do not track memory locations and hence, lose a great deal of precision
at each memory access.
Gogul et al [21] present Value Set Analysis that finds an over-approximation
of the set of constant and memory address ranges that each abstract data object
can hold at each program point. However symbolic analysis is a different problem
from VSA - symbolic analysis derives symbolic expressions (rather than constants
and memory address ranges) which each abstract data object can hold, enabling the
applicability of our frameworks for detecting equivalences as well as for symbolic
analysis to detect program parallelization. There have been other binary analysis
tools like BitBlaze [136], Jakstab [89], BAP [36], UQBT [49] and none of them
perform customized symbolic analysis for executables.
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There are various binary analysis tools [121, 28, 95] which analyze executables
in the presence of additional information like symbol tables or debugging informa-
tion. Such information is usually absent in deployed executables and our methods do
not make any assumption about the presence of such extra information. In addition,
none of them deal with the problem of symbolic analysis.
Recently, there has been some amount of work on parallelizing executables.
Kotha et al [93] present a method to automatically parallelize executables using a
binary rewriter. They adapt source-level affine parallelization methods for executa-
bles. Yardimci and Franz [162] present non-affine automatic parallelism in a binary
rewriter. Our symbolic analysis methods will further improve the efficiency of all
these parallelization efforts by improving data dependence queries, thereby exposing
more parallelism in programs.
4.3 Contribution
In this section, we discuss various analyses and optimizations which can be efficiently
represented in our framework.
4.3.1 Redundancy elimination
The problem of determining the equivalence of two computations is undecidable
in general. Consequently, compilers typically solve a restricted problem, where
expressions are considered equivalent if and only if they are computed using the
same operator applied on equivalent operands. This form of equivalence, where the
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  b = a+2; 
   
  c = a + 12; 
   
  d = b + 10; 
   
  
Symbolic Relations: 
c = a+12 
d = a+12 
Allocations: 
a: -4(%ebp)      b:-8(%ebp)    c: -12(%ebp)    d: -16(%ebp) 
         
1     mov    -4(%ebp), %eax              //Load a 
2     add    $2, %eax                        //Compute a+2 
3     mov    %eax, -8(%ebp)              //Store b 
 
4     mov    -4(%ebp), %eax              //Load a 
5     add    $12, %eax                     //Compute a+12 
6     mov    %eax, -12(%ebp)            //Store c 
 
7     mov    -8(%ebp), %eax              //Load b 
8     add    $10, %eax                     //Computer b+10 
9     mov    %eax, -16(%ebp)           //Store d 
 
(a)    (b) 
Figure 4.1: (a) A sample C code (b) Corresponding assembly code, the second
operand in the instruction is the destination
operators are treated as uninterpreted functions, is called Herbrand equivalence [73].
Value numbering optimization determines when two computations in a program
are Herbrand equivalent and eliminates one of them using a semantic preserving
transformation. Various advanced redundancy elimination algorithms have been
proposed which add semantic interpretation of various operators, thereby coupling
symbolic analysis with the value numbering optimization; resulting in the discovery
of more equivalent computations than defined by Herbrand equivalence [32].
However, all these techniques operate only on variables and treat memory
accesses very conservatively. Although, they are effective in discovering equivalences
in source code, not maintaining symbolic abstractions for memory locations renders
them ineffective for discovering equivalences in the executables.
Fig 4.1(a) shows a small source code example and corresponding relations
between various computations determined through symbolic analysis. The obtained
symbolic relations expose the equivalence between the computations for variables
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Program    Expression     Value 
Point                               Number 
 
Line 1          x1                  v1 
Line 2          x1 + 2            v2 
Line 4          x2                  v3 
Line 5          x2 + 12          v4 
Line 7          x3                  v5 
Line 8         x3 + 10           v6 
Program    Expression     Value 
Point                               Number 
 
Line 1          tmp                  v1 
Line 2          tmp + 2            v2 
Line 4          tmp                   v1 
Line 5          tmp + 12          v3 
Line 7          tmp + 2            v2      
Line 8          tmp + 12          v3 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.2: (a) Value numbering obtained without propagation through memory
locations (b) Value numbering with propagation through memory locations
c and d and existing symbolic analysis based value numbering methods [32] are
sufficient in removing the redundant computation (for variable d).
Unfortunately, when source-level symbolic analysis methods are applied to ex-
ecutables, they cannot prove the equivalence between computations c and d in the
example in Fig 4.1(a). Fig 4.1(b) shows a sample code which might arise when the
code example in Fig 4.1(a) is converted to an executable. Fig 4.2(a) shows the sym-
bolic relations and their corresponding value numbers when source-level symbolic
analysis techniques are applied to the assembly code in Fig 4.1(b). Here, variables
a, b, c and d are allocated to memory locations. Since symbolic analysis does not
propagate symbolic expressions across memory locations, a new symbol is defined
for each of the memory load instructions. The value numbers in Fig 4.2(a) depict
that the equivalence of computations at Line 5 (variable c) and Line 8 (variable d)
cannot be established.
The representation of symbolic abstraction for memory locations can eliminate
this limitation as shown in Fig 4.2(b). Suppose, the variable a (memory location
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-4(%ebp)) has value tmp in the enviroment of symbolic abstraction. The represen-
tation of symbolic abstraction for memory locations implies that the variable %eax
at Line1 and Line 4 are assigned the value tmp in this environment. Similarily, the
memory location -8(%ebp) at Line 3 and the variable %eax at Line 7 are assigned
value tmp+2. Propagation of these symbolic values expose the equivalency between
computations at Line 5 (variable c) and Line 8 (variable d).
The above example shows that maintaining symbolic abstraction for memory
locations in executables has multiple advantages. It helps in more exposing more
equivalent computations and it also results in a more effective redundancy elimina-
tion of memory access instructions. The value numbers in Fig 4.2(b) establish an
equivalence between the load instructions at Line 2 and Line 7 and results in elimi-
nation of the latter, thereby improving a well studied optimization (load redundancy
elimination) for executables [130].
4.3.2 Program Parallelization
Compilers employ various program analysis techniques to exploit concurrency on
multiple processors. The notion of data dependence captures the most important
properties of a program for efficient parallel execution on multicores and parallel
machines. The dependence structure of a program defines the necessary constraints
on the order of execution of program components. Various dependence analyses
like array subscript analysis [157], distance vectors [25], integer programming based
tests [118] and GCD tests [142, 26] have been suggested for determining the depen-
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 T2 = T1 + 1; 
  for i = 0,N 
       m =  2*i ; 
       j  =  m + T1; 
       k =  m + T2; 
       A(j) = A(k) 
 
   
  
Symbolic Relations 
j =  T1 + 2i 
k = T1 + 2i + 1 
A: A_mem 
m: 4[%esp], j: 8[%esp], k: 12[%esp], N:  16[%esp] 
i: eax, T1: ebx, T2: ecx 
          
1          mov %ebx,%ecx 
2          add 1,%ecx         //T2 = T1+1 
             
3 mov 0,%eax            //Initializing i 
L1: 
4 mov %eax, %edx    //Calculating m 
5 mul 2,%edx            
6          mov %edx, 4[%esp] 
 
7 mov 4[%esp], %edx     //Calculating j 
8 add %ebx,%edx              
9          mov %edx, 8[%esp] 
 
10 mov 4[%esp], %edx     //Calculating k 
11 add %ecx,%edx              
12        mov %edx, 12[%esp] 
 
13 mov 12(%esp), %edx  //Array move 
14 movl A_mem[%edx], %esi 
15        mov       8[%esp], %edx 
16        mov      %esi, A_mem[%edx] 
 
17 addl $1, %eax                //Increment i 
18 cmpl %eax, 16(%esp)       //compare N and i 
19 jl L1 
(a)    (b) 
Figure 4.3: (a) A sample C code (b) Corresponding assembly code, the second
operand in the instruction is the destination
dence structure of a program and for determining parallel tasks.
However, these data dependence tests are more effective if the array subscript
expressions are represented as affine expressions directly in terms of loop indices and
loop invariants, rather than indirectly via other locations. As discussed in various
parallelizing compilers like Parafrase [76], SUIF [77], Polaris [31], a large percentage
of parallelization benchmarks have array references with symbolic terms other than
loop induction variables and have symbolic loop bounds.
Symbolic analysis has been suggested as an important technique for improving
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the data dependence decisions taken by a compiler in such scenarios. It is a very
effective technique which represents array subscripts and loop bounds as a sym-
bolic expression, describing its value in terms of constants, loop-invariant symbolic
constants and loop indices. Standard dependence tests can then be employed to
resolve data dependence queries [77, 31]. Advanced symbolic analysis based tests
like symbolic difference [76] have also been proposed to determine the dependence
structure when standard dependence tests fail due to the lack of information about
certain variables at compile time. Symbolic analysis also enables various transfor-
mations like induction variable substitution and array privatization which further
aid in exposing the dependence structure of a program [76, 77, 31].
Fig 4.3(a) shows a small loop example where symbolic analysis is imperative
for establishing the absence of a loop carried dependency. The symbolic relations in
Fig 4.3(a) (obtained by applying symbolic analysis) show that access A(j) is equiv-
alent to A(T1+2*i) whereas access A(k) is equivalent to A(T1+2*i+1). Various
data dependence tests on these array reference expressions can reveal that these ac-
cesses will always refer to a disjoint set of locations (if T1 is even, then T1+2*i will
always have even values; whereas T1+2*i+1 will have odd values, and vice versa).
Consequently, the loop is Fig 4.3(a) is determined to be parallelizable from source
code.
Unfortunately, source-level symbolic analysis might not be able to obtain such
affine expressions for array subscripts from an executable. Fig 4.3(b) displays a
possible assembly code version of the loop in Fig 4.3(a). Here, variables m, j and k





Line5 (%edx) (m)   = 2*%eax  
Line 7(%edx)        = x1 
Line8 (%edx)        = x1+%ebx  
Line 10 %edx       = x2 
Line11 (%edx)      = x2+%ebx + 1 
Line 13(%edx)      = x3 
Line14(%edx) (k)    = x3  
Line 15(%edx)       = x4 
Line16(%edx) (j)   = x4  
Symbolic Relations: 
 
Line5 (%edx) (m) = 2*%eax  
Line 7(%edx)       = 2*%eax 
Line8 (%edx)       = 2*eax+%ebx  
Line 10 %edx      = 2*%eax  
Line11 (%edx)     = 2*%eax+%ebx + 1 
Line 13(%edx)     = 2*%eax + %ebx +1 
Line14(%edx) (k)  =  2*%eax + %ebx +1 
Line 15(%edx)     = 2*%eax+%ebx  
Line16(%edx) (j)   = 2*%eax+%ebx  
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.4: (a) Symbolic expressions obtained with no memory propagations (b)
Symbolic expressions with memory propagation
maintain symbolic abstractions only for variables. Hence, new symbols are created
to represent each of the loaded values in the environment of symbolic abstraction.
Symbolic expressions in Fig 4.4(a) corresponding to the assembly code in Fig 4.3(b)
depict that no determinable relation can be obtained between variables j (%edx
at Line 16) and k (%edx at Line 14). Consequently, data dependence analysis
conservatively assumes the presence of a loop carried dependence, which limits the
parallelizability of this loop.
On the other hand, maintaining symbolic abstractions for underlying mem-
ory locations enables the discovery of such affine expressions from executables also.
Fig 4.4(b) shows the obtained symbolic expressions when abstractions are also main-
tained for memory locations. The symbolic expressions for j (%edx at Line 14) and
k (%edx at Line 16) are affine expressions (2*%eax + %ebx and 2*%eax + %ebx+1
respectively) in terms of loop indices and invariants. Consequently, standard data
depenendence can reveal the lack of a loop carried dependence resulting in paral-
lelization of this loop.
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There has been a recent surge in research methods exploring parallelization
of executables [93, 162]. However, executables-level parallelization is still in in-
fancy stage as compared to source-level parallelization. Our framework will enable
the application of an important source-level analysis framework to the executables,
thereby improving the data dependence decisions capability of all such executable
level parallelization techniques.
4.3.3 Alias analysis
Alias analysis has been extensively studied for source code. Recently, there has been
a surge of interest in extending pointer and alias analysis techniques to low-level
code. Early alias analysis techniques by Debray [58] and Amme et al [8] maintained
internal abstraction for only the variables. Consequently, they lost a great deal of
precision at memory accesses. Gogul et al [21] presented a novel Value Set Analysis
(VSA) framework which eliminated this limitation. VSA is a combined numeric
and pointer analysis which determines an over-approximation of the set of memory
addresses as well as the set of integer values that each data object (a register or a
memory location) can hold at each program point.
Although VSA is a very powerful alias analysis framework for executables, the
symbolic abstraction, as maintained in our technique, can aid the VSA abstraction
in resolving aliasing queries in some scenarios. Fig 4.5 depicts an example of such
a scenario. In Fig 4.5, suppose the variable %ebx at Line 1 has value > in the VSA




1. mov %ebx, 8(%esp)   //mov %ebx to 8[%esp] 
 
2. mov (%ebx), %ecx      //load from memory location 
      //pointed to by  %ebx 
 
3. mov 8(%esp),%edx    //load from 8[%esp] 
 
4. mov 4(%edx),%eax    //load from memory location  
      //pointed to by (%edx+4)  
Figure 4.5: A sample assembly code, second operand in the instruction is the
destination
set of values of %ebx; hence it is the universal set (>). The VSA abstraction for
the memory location 8[%esp] ( and variable %edx) at Line 3 also has value >.
Consequently, the alias relation between memory accesses at Line 2 and Line 4 can
only be established as may-alias, since >+ 4 ≡ > in the VSA abstraction.
However, this result can be improved through our symbolic analysis framework,
where we maintain symbolic value sets corresponding to each data object. In Fig 4.5,
suppose the variable %ebx is defined to have value sym ( 6= >) in the environment
of symbolic abstraction. The representation of symbolic abstraction for the memory
location 8[%esp] results in the variable %edx at Line 3 also having value sym.
Comparing the memory locations at Line 2 and Line 4 in the symbolic abstract
enviroment reveals that these two instructions access distinct memory locations,
since sym 6= sym+4. Consequently, the alias relation can be established as no-alias
instead of may-alias in previous case.
We do not envision our technique as a replacement to existing alias analysis
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EXISTING SECONDWRITE FRAMEWORK 
Figure 4.6: Organization of the system
frameworks; instead we view it as an additional abstract environment for solving
aliasing queries. This is driven by a simple observation that alias analyses are com-
posable. Multiple analysis techniques can be combined to yield a better overall
analysis than any of its components. An aliasing query involving two memory ref-
erences can be resolved if any of the multiple alias analysis methods can resolve
the query. The VSA abstraction, combined with the symbolic abstraction, pro-
vides a stronger alias analysis framework for executables than any existing aliasing
framework.
4.4 Overview
Fig 4.6 presents an overview of the our binary analysis framework. Our framework
is built over existing SecondWrite framework as presented in [93, 111]. SecondWrite
translates the input x86 binary code to the intermediate format of the LLVM Com-
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piler [96]. LLVM, which stands for Low-Level Virtual Machine, is a well-known,
open-source compiler developed at the University of Illinois; it is now maintained
by Apple Inc. This conversion back to a compiler intermediate representation (IR)
is not a necessity for the work we present; any binary system can use our analy-
sis. However, using LLVM IR enables us to use LLVM′s rich infrastructure, such
as control-flow analysis, dataflow analysis, and optimization passes, so that we did
not have to write our own for the system. LLVM IR obtained above can be passed
through our analysis system to obtained an optimized IR which can be passed to
further binary analysis tools. In addition, LLVM’s x86 code generator can be used
to obtained a rewritten binary.
SecondWrite implements various mechanisms to obtain an intermediate rep-
resentation which contains features like procedure arguments, return values, types
and high-level control flow. SecondWrite also employs extra mechanisms to safely
handle indirect calls and indirect branches [135]. It employs alias analysis frame-
works present in LLVM to discover all the possible target procedures at an indirect
call-site, given by the points-to set of the operand in indirect call instruction. An
edge is added from the indirect call-site to all its possible target procedures. Indirect
branches are mostly present due to jump tables in the binary. Procedure boundary
determination techniques are devised to limit the possible branch targets within the
current procedure and extra control flow edges are added corresponding to the pos-
sible targets determined by alias analysis. If one of the target is outside procedure
boundary, it is handled as an indirect call.
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4.4.1 Memory abstraction
There are two prerequisites for implementing a symbolic analysis for executables that
can track symbolic information for memory locations. First, a memory abstraction
is needed to represent a large number of runtime addresses by a smaller and finite set
of abstract locations. Second, executables regularly employ the indirect-addressing
mode for accessing memory locations.1 A mechanism is needed to determine the set
of memory locations which can be accessed by any direct or indirect memory access
instruction.
We employ the concept of abstract memory regions and abstract locations (a-
locs), defined by Value Set Analysis (VSA) [21, 22], to build a memory abstraction
for symbolic analysis. The address space of a program is divided into several non-
overlapping memory regions. For a program, the set of memory regions consists of
one abstract region per procedure for its stack frame, one abstract region per heap
allocation and a global region. Each memory region is further abstracted through
a set of a-locs. Intuitively, a-locs correspond to program variables in each memory
region. An a-loc is characterized by two attributes: its relative offset in the region
with respect to other a-locs and its size.
Having defined a-locs as above, VSA computes an over-approximation of the
set of integers and the set of memory addresses (collectively referred to as a value-
set) that each register and each a-loc holds at a particular program point. VSA
1For our purposes, a memory reference uses direct addressing if the address being accessed is a
constant that is part of the instruction, or has a constant offset from the stack pointer. Otherwise it
uses an indirect addressing mode, in which case the location being accessed is statically unknown.
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Sym := Sym+ T |T
T := T ∗ F |F
F := l|n
l := [IR Variables]
n := [Int]
Figure 4.7: Grammar for symbolic expressions. + and * are standard arithmetic
operators, Int is the set of all integers, IR Variables are symbols in the obtained
intermediate representation
employs advanced affine relation analysis and loop bound analysis to conservatively
bound the memory locations accessed by any instruction. Hence, this algorithm can
be used to determine the set of all possible memory locations referred to by all the
direct and indirect memory access instructions. More details about this algorithm
can be found in [21].
4.5 Symbolic Abstraction
There are a variety of choices to represent the abstraction for symbolic domain
values. Fig 4.7 presents the grammar for representing the symbolic expressions in
our abstraction. As evident from Fig 4.7, symbolic expressions are numeric algebraic
polynomials containing sums of product terms of variables.
Symbolic Value Set: The objects in our abstract symbolic domain are Sym-
bolic Value Sets – a finite set of canonical symbolic expressions defined by the Gram-
mar in Fig 4.7. A Symbolic Value Set represents a conservative over-approximation
of the the set of symbolic values that each data object (IR variables and a-locs)
holds at a particular program point.
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Various operations are defined on this symbolic expression as described below.
In general, sym terms below refer to symbolic expressions, not individual symbols.
(a) Create Symbolic Expression : Sym(var):
Associates a new symbolic expression with a program variable var, in the symbolic
abstraction domain.
(b) Canonicalize Operator : Can(sym):
Rearranges the symbolic terms present in the symbolic expression sym in a unique
canonical form (such as a lexicographical order determined by the pointers of vari-
ables in IR).
(c) Addition Operator : sym1 + sym2:
Computes a symbolic expression by adding sym2 to sym1 and returns the canoni-
calized version of the result.
(d) Multiply Operator : sym1 ∗ sym2:
Computes a symbolic expression by applying the arithmetic multiplication operator
between sym1 and sym2 and returns the canonicalized version of the result.
Indirect memory references in executables can update any memory location
which aliases with the address of the indirect reference. Symbolic Value Set ab-
straction, which contains a set of symbolic expressions, is sufficient to represent
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the possible initializations at multiple locations. In order to limit the exponential
growth of symbolic expressions, we employ a limit on the cardinality of symbolic
value set, at the cost of some precision. The following operations are defined on
symbolic value sets:
(a) Union Operation: SymV alSet1 ∪ SymV alSet2
This operator computes the join of two symbolic value sets SymV alSet1 and SymV alSet2
(b) Add Operator : SymV alSet1 ⊕ SymV alSet2
This operator computes a new symbolic value set by adding each symbolic expres-
sion present in SymV alSet2 to each symbolic expression present in SymV alSet1.
Mathematically, this operation can be represented as
SymV alSet1 ⊕ SymV alSet2 = {sym1 + sym2 |
sym1 ∈ SymV alSet1,
sym2 ∈ SymV alSet2}
(4.1)
(c) Multiply Operator : SymV alSet1 ⊗ SymV alSet2
This operator computes a new symbolic value set by applying the multiplication op-
erator between each symbolic expression present in SymV alSet1 and SymV alSet2.
Mathematically, this operation can be represented as
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SymV alSet1 ⊗ SymV alSet2 = {sym1 ∗ sym2 |
sym1 ∈ SymV alSet1,
sym2 ∈ SymV alSet2}
(4.2)
(d) Widen: ∇SymV alSet1
This operations implements the inherent widening operation in our symbolic
abstraction environment. As mentioned above, the abstract symbolic domain has
infinite ascending chains. In order to limit the exponential growth of symbolic
expressions, widening needs to be implemented at some nodes of the analysis. If
the required cardinality increases beyond a limit, we invalidate the current symbolic
value set.





4.6 Symbolic Value Analysis
This section describes the Symbolic Value Analysis. Symbolic Value Analysis is
a flow-sensitive, context insensitive analysis which computes a conservative over-
approximation of a set of values that each data object (variables and a-locs) can
hold at each program point. The values are represented in an abstract symbolic
domain presented in Section 4.5.
4.6.1 Intraprocedural Analysis
This subsection describes the intraprocedural version of symbolic value analysis.
The inter-procedural version will be described in the next subsection. Symbolic
value analysis is defined as an abstract interpretation over the control flow graph of
a procedure. Symbolic value analysis effectively computes a Symbolic Map at each
program point, which is a representation of a mapping between the data objects
and corresponding symbolic value sets.
Our method assumes that the symbols corresponding to the binary code’s
registers have been converted to single-static assignment (SSA) form in the binary
tool’s intermediate representation (IR) before running our analysis. SSA form is
widely used in many compilers and binary analyzers, including SecondWrite, for
doing data flow analysis. Since in SSA form each variable is assigned exactly once,
a single symbolic map is sufficient to maintain flow-sensitive symbolic value sets for
variables. However, memory locations are usually not implemented in SSA format
in IR. Consequently, a symbolic map is maintained at each program point to repre-
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sent flow-sensitive symbolic value sets for memory locations. Hence, symbolic value
analysis effectively computes the following symbolic maps:
SR: Map between variables (corresponding to registers in the input binary, and
variables in the IR) and their corresponding symbolic value sets
SMe: Map between a-locs and their corresponding symbolic value sets before a
program point e
Similar to any data-flow analysis, symbolic value analysis is applied iteratively
by traversing the CFG of a procedure in a topological order. The symbolic maps
SR and SMe are initialized as empty sets at the beginning of the analysis. The
iteration is continued until the maps reach a fixed point.
A symbolic map may contain at most one entry for each distinct data object.
A lookup in the map SR corresponding to a variable var not in the map, results in
a single entry symbolic value set containing a new symbolic expression Sym(var).
Correspondingly, a lookup for an a-loc not in the map SMe returns >.
The algorithm is implemented on the intermediate representation of the ex-
ecutable, but we present our algorithm on C-like pseudo instructions for ease of
understanding. Each instruction in the intermediate representation implements a
transfer function which translates the symbolic maps defined at its input to the
symbolic maps at its output.
The following definitions are introduced to ease the presentation.
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Ri: IR (SSA) variables
e : A program point
SM ′e: Map between a-locs and their corresponding symbolic value sets after pro-
gram point e
SR(r): Mapping of data object r (variable) in map SR
SMe(r): Mapping of data object r (a-loc) in map SMe
VSe(r): Set of memory addresses that data object r (variable or a-loc) can hold at
a program point e (obtained by Value Set Analysis)
(r, SV ): Pairing between a data object r and a symbolic value set SV
VSA includes a concept of fully accessed and partially accessed a-locs. In order
to understand partial a-locs, consider that value set of a particular data object r at
a program point e, VSe(r), contains a list of memory addresses that the data object
r can hold at current program point e. If this object is dereferenced in a memory
access instruction of size s, the a-locs, that are of size s and whose starting addresses
are in set VSe(r), represents the fully accessed a-locs. The partially accessed a-locs
consists (i) a-locs whose starting addresses are in VSe(r) but are not of size s and
(ii) a-locs whose addresses are in VSe(r) but whose starting addresses and size do
not meet the condition to be fully accessed a-locs. As per the notation in VSA [21],
this operation is mathematically represented as:
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{F, P} = ∗(VSe(r), s)
In above representation, F represents the fully accessed a-locs and P represent
the partially accessed a-locs. As the name suggests, only some portion of a partial
a-loc is updated or referenced in a memory access instruction. Partially accessed
a-locs are problematic since their symbolic expressions are hard to derive after they
are written to; hence, they are treated conservatively in our analysis, as will be
explained below.
Table 4.1 shows the mathematical forms of transfer functions for each instruc-
tion. Each row in this table represents the transfer function corresponding to an
instruction. Below, each of these transfer functions is discussed in detail
1. Assignment : e : R1 := R2
This is the basic operation of symbolic analysis where symbolic analysis behaves
similarly to the concrete evaluation. As presented in Row 1 in Table 4.1, any exist-
ing entry in the symbolic map SR corresponding to the variable R1 (computed in
an earlier iteration) is removed from the map and the symbolic value set of variable
R2 is assigned to variable R1.
2. Arithmetic Operation:e : R3 := R2OP R1
In such scenarios, the symbolic value analysis evaluates the symbolic values accord-
ing to the underlying mathematical operator. The evaluation is defined for addition,
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Name Operation Transfer Function
1. Assignment e : R1 := R2
SR = {SR− SR(R1)} ∪ {(R1, SR(R2))}
2. Arithmetic Operation e : R3 := R2OP R1
if OP = +
tmp = ∇(SR(R2)⊕ SR(R1))
if OP = ∗
tmp = ∇(SR(R2)⊗ SR(R1))
else
//Create a new symbolic expression
tmp = Sym(R3)
SR = {SR− SR(R3)} ∪ {(R3, tmp)}
3. Memory Load e : R1 := ∗(R2)
{F, P} = ∗(VSe(R2), s)







SR = {SR− SR(R1)} ∪ {(R1, tmp)}
4. Memory Store e : ∗(R2) := R1
{F, P} = ∗(VSe(R2), s)
if |F | = 1 & |P | = 0 &
Func is not recursive&
F has no heap a-locs
//Strong Update
SM ′e = {{SMe − SMe(v)} ∪ {(v, SR(R1))}
| v ∈ F}
else
//Weak Update
SM ′e = {{SMe − SMe(y) | y ∈ {F ∪ P}} ∪
{(v,∇(SR(R1) ∪ SMe(v))) | v ∈ F} ∪
{(p,>) | p ∈ P}}
5. SSA Phi Function e : Rn+1 = φ(R1, R2, ..., Rn)




Table 4.1: Transfer functions for each instruction in a procedure Func. Here, s
denotes the size of dereference in a memory access instruction.
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subtraction and multiplication operators. In case of addition, the underlying Add(⊕)
operator is employed and the underlying Multiplication(⊗) operator is employed
for evaluating the values in the case of multiplication operation. Subtraction oper-
ation is handled analogous to the addition operation by reversing the sign of each
coefficient in the symbolic expressions of second operand, R1. Hence, we only men-
tion addition operation to simplify the presentation. Since the remaining arithmetic
and logical operations are not represented, a new symbolic expression is introduced
to represent the result of the computation as presented in Row 2 in Table 4.1.
The introduction of a new symbolic expression is governed by a balance be-
tween the precision and analysis cost. The canonical symbolic expression term needs
to include other arithmetic and logical expressions to represent the remaining oper-
ations. The current canonical expression is chosen to limit the analysis cost of extra
operations.
3. Memory Load e : R1 := ∗(R2)
The propagation of symbolic values in memory loads relies on employing the un-
derlying Value Set Analysis. VSA provides a set of fully accessed and partially
accessed a-locs that the object R2 can hold at current program point e correspond-
ing to current dereference size s. If the current memory instruction does not access
any partial a-loc, the symbolic value of variable R1 is computed by unioning the
symbolic values corresponding to each of the possible a-loc. Otherwise, it is assigned
>.
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4. Memory store e : ∗(R2) := R1
The propagation of symbolic values during memory stores also employs Value set
analysis. The propagation of symbolic values is governed by current memory store
accessing a single a-loc or multiple a-locs. If the current memory store only updates
a single fully accessed a-loc (referred to as a strong update), the existing symbolic
values of the destination memory location is replaced by the symbolic set. The
memory stores which update a partial a-loc or update multiple a-locs are referred
to as weak updates. In such cases, the new symbolic values are unioned with the
existing ones to obtain the updated symbolic value set of fully accessed a-locs. The
partially accessed a-locs are assigned symbolic >.
As explained in VSA [21], memory region corresponding to the stack frame of a
recursive procedure or corresponding to heap allocations potentially represent more
than one concrete a-loc. Hence, the assignments to their a-locs are also modeled by
weak updates.
5. SSA Phi Function: e : Rn+1 = φ(R1, R2, ..., Rn) At join points in the control
flow of a procedure, the symbolic value sets from all the predecessors are unioned
to obtain a new symbolic value set.
As per any flow-sensitive data-flow analysis, the symbolic map at a join point
in control flow graph is determined by unioning the symbolic maps from all the
predecessors. Existing symbolic frameworks have a property that every variable has
only one abstract symbolic value at a certain program point [76]. A new abstract
value is created for a variable at a join point if the variable has different abstract
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symbolic values on different incoming edges. In contrast, our framework avoids this
loss of precision at join points by unioning the abstract values from all the paths
to obtain a symbolic value set for each data object. This increased precision results
in a more precise dependence analysis and in more effective resolution of aliasing
queries.
4.6.2 Interprocedural propagation
This subsection describes the interprocedural aspect of symbolic value analysis. In-
terprocedural analysis requires the correct handling of symbolic values at callsites
and return points.
Existing binary analysis tools implement various methods to recognize proce-
dure arguments and procedure returns independent of the calling conventions [164,
21, 111]. Various advanced data flow analysis have been suggested to recognize
register arguments, register returns and stack based arguments. SecondWrite also
implements various analyses to recognize the arguments. Once the arguments are
recognized, an intermediate representation is formed where formal arguments and
procedure returns are represented as a part of procedure definition and actual ar-
guments and actual returns are explicitly represented as a part of a call instruction
in the IR.
The symbolic value set of a formal argument for a procedure P is computed by
unioning the symbolic value sets of corresponding actual arguments across all the
call-sites for procedure P. Since binary programs always contain the entire program,
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such whole-program analysis is always possible. Mathematically, the initialization
of formal fi of procedure P, where aci represents the corresponding actual argument
at a callsite c, is represented as




In order to propagate the symbolic values of memory locations, the memory
symbolic maps from each call site need to be unioned to determine the symbolic map
at entry point Pentry of a procedure P , similar to the symbolic map propagation at





Similarly, at a return site, symbolic value set of return variable is evaluated
from the internal symbolic map for variables. Symbolic map, just after a call in-
struction C, is computed by unioning the symbolic maps at all the return points in






Since VSA is an interprocedural analysis, it implicitly results in correct inter-
procedural propagation of symbolic values of underlying memory location. At each
memory load or store instruction, VSA provides a set of possible a-locs (belonging
to any procedure) which can be accessed by this instruction. The initialization of
symbolic maps at the entry point of a callee procedure ensures that all the required
symbolic values are propagated from the caller procedures to the callee procedure
and are available at memory loads. Similarly, the join of symbolic maps at exit
point in the caller procedures propagates the symbolic values modification from the
callee procedure back to the caller procedures.
As presented in Section 4.4, we employ the alias analysis frameworks present
in LLVM to discover all the possible target procedures at an indirect call-site and
insert an edge from the indirect call-site to all its possible target procedures in the
IR. This representation ensures that the interprocedural propagation as presented
above is sufficient to propagate the information correctly at indirect callsites. The
union in equation 4.6 is computed across all these possible target procedures P.
The externally called procedures are handled in one of the following three
ways. First, procedures which are known not to affect the memory regions (e.g.
puts, sin) are modeled as identity transformers (a NOP). External procedures like
malloc, which create a memory region, are also modeled as identity transformers
since we already handle these procedures by defining a memory abstraction HeapRgn
corresponding to each allocation site. External procedures like free, which destroy
a memory region, are conservatively modeled as NOP by our analysis. Next, unsafe
but known external procedures (e.g. memcpy) are handled by widening the symbolic
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value set of all a-locs in the memory regions possibly accessed by the procedure.
Unknown external procedures (which include user defined libraries) are handled by
widening the symbolic value set of registers and all a-locs in all the memory regions.
Recursive procedures: The analysis presented in Table 4.1 handles stores in
recursive procedures as weak updates. However, in some cases default propagation
of symbolic abstraction interprocedurally for recursive procedures might result in
indefinite ascending chains. The widening operator in our analysis implicitly imple-
ments a fixed-point algorithm and prevents such exponential explosion of symbolic
expressions.
4.7 Dependence Analysis
The effectiveness of parallelizing compilers is highly dependent on the accuracy and
the preciseness of data dependence for array references in loop nests. As explained
in Section 4.3, the dependence tests for parallelization require a closed form (affine)
expression for array indices [76] in terms of loop index variables. The symbolic
analysis presented in Section 4.6 discovers such affine expressions for array indices
from executables, even if some of these indices are allocated to memory locations.
The widening operator in the symbolic abstraction might result in some loop
index variables to have value >. In order to obtain a closed form expression for such
loop index variables and for the array indices which are based on these variables,
symbolic analysis is applied on the loop body for two consecutive iterations resulting
in a system of recurrence relations, similar to the method suggested by [76]. These
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recurrent relations are solved to obtain value of expressions at different loop iter-
ations as a function of loop index variables. For example, a variable i with initial
value 0 and which is incremented by value 2 in each loop iteration is identified as
a recurrence relation {0, 2, +}.
Existing source-level symbolic frameworks [76] obtain these recurrence rela-
tions for only the variables while our framework will obtain this recurrence relations
for IR variables as well as for a-locs. Since a loop-index variable might be allocated
to a memory location in an executable, our framework recognizes recurrence expres-
sions for memory-allocated loop index variables also, which cannot be recognized by
applying existing source-level frameworks to executables.
Existing parallelizing compilers based on symbolic analysis frameworks [76,
31, 77] collect the required information (recurrence relations and affine expressions)
by symbolic analysis and perform dependence testing using a variety of techniques.
Various common dependence techniques, as presented in [69, 77], employ recurrence
relations and affine expressions between array indices to characterize the dependence
structure in two aspects. First, they try to disprove the loop carried dependence
between pairs of subscripted references to the same array variable. Second, if de-
pendence exists, they try to characterize the dependence by determining the actual
distance in terms of number of loop iterations (referred to as distance vector) be-
tween two accesses to the same memory location.
Since our symbolic value set contains multiple symbolic values, instead of a
single abstract symbolic value, it entails some modifications to both these aspects of
dependence tests. First, instead of testing the existence of dependence between two
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references using their unique abstract symbolic value, the dependence tests need to
be performed for each pair of abstract symbolic values belonging to the symbolic
sets. Two references are considered dependent if the dependence exists for even one
pair of abstract symbolic values. Mathematically, if S1 and S2 denote the symbolic
value set of data objects corresponding to two references d1 and d2, the test for





Next, if the above dependence tests fails to disprove the dependence, then for
loop-carried dependences the distance vector, DistVec, is calculated by unioning the
distance vectors determined from each pairs of abstract values.
DistV ec(d1, d2) =
⋃
e1∈S1,e2∈S2
{DistV ec(e1, e2)} (4.8)
Traditional source-level frameworks represent a single distance vector for two
accesses while the above test gives a union of distance vectors for any two accesses.
Multiple distance vectors arise when array are referenced through pointer accesses,
which can arise in an executable. A parallelization technique can define its own
operation to combine this union of distance vector for determining parallel tasks.
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1 Input: Control flow graph G
2 Output:
3 ValNum: Map between an assignment instruction I, where I ∈ G, and its value
number
4 Local Definitions:
5 SymHash: Map between a symbolic value set and its value number
6 SymValSet(X): Symbolic value set of a variable X
7 CurValueNum = 0
8 Instruction I : X = (Operation,Operands)
9 for each instruction I in reverse post-order traversal of G do
10 CurExpr = SymValSet(X)
11 if SymHash.HasEntry(CurExpr) then
12 Temp = SymHash[CurExpr]
13 else
14 Temp = CurValueNum;
15 CurValueNum++;
16 SymHash[CurExpr]= Temp
17 ValNum[I] = Temp
Algorithm 2: Value numbering on symbolic expressions
4.8 Value Numbering
As explained through an example in Fig 4.1 in Section 4.3, value numbering on
memory based symbolic analysis frameworks exposes more equivalences than defined
by traditional GVN algorithms. In this section, we present the details of our value
numbering algorithm for recognizing equivalent computations.
Symbolic Value Analysis, as presented in Section 4.6, computes a set of sym-
bolic expressions that each data object can hold at each program point. In order to
employ this analysis for removing redundant computations, an abstract interpreta-
tion based algorithm is implemented on the lattice of symbolic expressions. This is
in contrast with Kildall’s value numbering algorithms [88] which expose equivalence
by implementing an abstract interpretation on the lattice of Herbrand equivalences.
Algorithm 2 describes our algorithm for determining the value numbers. The
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process mimics the pessimistic version of the GVN algorithm presented in [123],
although the optimistic value numbering algorithm can also be adopted [7]. Al-
gorithm 2 improves over traditional GVN in three aspects. First, the equivalence
relation is determined on underlying symbolic expressions rather than program vari-
ables, consequently, our value numbering discovers more equivalences than GVN
where variable assignment is the only algebraic simplification. Second, memory load
instructions are also considered for discovering equivalent computations whereas
traditional GVN only considers arithmetic and logical assignment operations of the
form X = f(A,B) to determine the equivalence. Third, the propagation of sym-
bolic expressions among underlying memory locations results in a more precise flow
of symbolic values.
The presence of non-singleton symbolic value sets for the computations might
complicate the discovery of equivalent computations in some scenarios. If two com-
putations have the same symbolic value set of cardinality greater than one, then the
representation cannot establish their equivalence. This is the case even if they take
the same value in reality.
Fig 4.8 shows a small example exhibiting this problem. In this example, vari-
able eax and ebx are Herbrand equivalent, reflected by the traditional value num-
bering in Fig 4.8 (right side of block B3 ). However, without improvement, the
representation so far of our symbolic analysis (which incorporates memory loca-
tions) will not be able to prove this equivalence. According to the symbolic value
propagation mechanism as presented in Section 4.6, the symbolic value set of the
memory location ( 8[esp]) at the entry point of basic block B3 is a two element set
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8[esp]        esi
1.ecx        8[esp]
2.eax        ecx + 8
…..
3.ebx        ecx + 8





VN(eax): v2 : v1+8
VN(ebx): v2 : v1+8
B1 B2
B3





Figure 4.8: An example CFG showing the limitations of symbolic expressions for
value numbering
{sym1, sym2}. Consequently, the symbolic value sets of computation 2 and 3 in
basic block B3 are also of cardinality two with elements {sym1+8, sym2+8}. These
two computations cannot be considered equivalent in the environment of symbolic
abstraction since it is not possible to statically prove that these computations would
refer to the same symbolic expression at runtime.
In order to discover all such equivalences while maintaining the inherent ad-
vantages of symbolic value sets, a new kind of operation is introduced to represent
the memory loads. If the symbolic value set of a memory load, Mi, has cardinal-
ity greater than one, a new operator φMi is introduced to represent this operation.
Fig 4.9 shows the introduction of this operator for the example in Fig 4.8. This
operator behaves as an uninterpreted operator in the symbolic analysis framework.
Being an uninterpreted operator, a new symbolic expression is defined to represent
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8[esp]        esi
1.ecx        
2.eax        ecx + 8
…..
3.ebx        ecx + 8
8[esp]       ediB1 B2
B3









Figure 4.9: Introduction of Phi for removing the limitations of symbolic expressions
for value numbering
the result of this computation. As shown in Fig 4.9, the presence of this uninter-
preted operator as part of symbolic analysis exposes the Herbrand equivalence.
The introduction of this new operator φMi ensures that the symbolic analysis
framework retains its inherent advantages of exposing more equivalences due to
the tracking of memory locations and semantic interpretation of operators and also
discovers all the Herbrand equivalences which can be discovered by traditional value
numbering.
As explained in Section 4.7, a symbolic value set is more precise than a single
symbolic expression for data dependence analysis. In order to avoid losing this ad-
vantage, symbolic maps still hold a mapping between these uninterpreted operators
and their symbolic value sets. For data dependency tests, the symbolic values of
φMi are recursively evaluated until we get rid of all such φMi operators. This in-
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ternal mapping and demand driven evaluation of symbolic value sets ensures that
introduction of this new uninterpreted operator does not adversely impact the data
dependence decisions.
Similar problem also arises for variables at join points (regular SSA phi). In
such scenarios, we employ the mechanism proposed by [7] to represent phi as an
uninterpreted operator.
4.9 Results
The symbolic analysis framework is implemented on LLVM IR as part of the Second-
Write framework presented in Section 4.4. The evaluation is performed on several
benchmarks from the SPEC2006 and OMP2001 suites and a real world program
(apache server), as listed in Table 4.2. Benchmarks are compiled with gcc v4.3.1
with O3 flags (Full optimization) and results are obtained on a 2.4GHz 8-core Intel
Nehalem machine running Ubuntu.
4.9.1 Static characteristics
Table 4.2 shows the running time and storage requirements of our symbolic analysis
framework on various benchmarks. The numerical value of Limit, the maximum size
of a symbolic value set, was kept to 5 in these experiments. The analysis time and
the required storage is largely a function of number of procedures in the benchmark.
The analysis time is typically low, within one minute, for most of the benchmarks
except for some intensive benchmarks like gcc and dealII.
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Application Source Lang LOC # Proc Time(s) Mem
(MB)
bwaves Spec2006 F 715 22 4.25 24.47
lbm Spec2006 C 939 30 0.8 1.03
equake OMP2001 C 1607 25 0.64 3.62
mcf Spec2006 C 1695 36 0.31 2.85
art OMP2001 C 1914 32 0.36 2.74
wupwise OMP2001 F 2468 43 1.37 5.68
libquantum Spec2006 C 2743 73 1.30 6.30
leslie3d Spec2006 F 3024 32 8.24 23.72
namd Spec2006 C++ 4077 193 19.46 111.53
astar Spec2006 C++ 4377 111 1.49 8.39
bzip2 Spec2006 C 5896 51 4.8 90.27
milc Spec2006 C 9784 172 41.16 19.68
sjeng Spec2006 C 10628 121 9.93 34.98
sphinx Spec2006 C 13683 210 7.11 31.19
zeusmp Spec2006 F 19068 68 37.85 285.48
omnetpp Spec2006 C++ 20393 3980 21.66 58.24
hmmer Spec2006 C 20973 242 12.13 36.52
soplex Spec2006 C++ 28592 1523 21.21 144.14
h264 Spec2006 C 36495 462 29.56 220.53
cactus Spec2006 C 60452 962 25.65 185.05
gromacs Spec2006 C/F 65182 674 47.82 252.33
dealII Spec2006 C++ 96382 15619 114.30 240.18
calculix Spec2006 C/F 105683 771 192.99 404.32
povray Spec2006 C++ 108339 3678 71.01 242.61
perlbench Spec2006 C 126367 2183 94.18 210.37
gobmk Spec2006 C 157883 4188 60.66 242.19
gcc Spec2006 C 236269 6426 280.37 490.68
xalan Spec2006 C++ 267318 30,062 264.97 183.75
gzip Compress C 10671 98 1.42 20.06
tar Compress C 20518 343 9.58 18.85
ssh Web clinet C 73335 887 40.57 22.55
lynx Browser C 135876 2106 140.08 73.01
apache WebServer C 232931 2026 37.98 232.12

































































































































































1 2 to Limit TOP
Figure 4.10: Symbolic Value Set Visualization
Fig 4.10 presents an insightful result regarding the functioning of the symbolic
analysis. It divides the objects into various categories according to the size of their
symbolic value set in our abstract domain. On average, around 64% of objects can
be abstracted with a single symbolic expression in our symbolic domain, 16% of
objects need multiple expressions and 20% of objects cannot be represented with
finite symbolic abstraction (>, referred as TOP ). Maintaining a symbolic value set
instead of a single symbolic expression allows us to maintain this extra precision for
16% of data objects.
In order to understand the importance of tracking memory locations, we obtain
the fraction of symbolic expressions that containing at least one symbolic alphabet
propagated through a memory location, out of symbolic expressions for all IR vari-
ables. Fig 4.11 shows that 35% of symbolic expressions contain alphabets propagated





























































































































































Figure 4.11: Percentage of symbolic expressions that containing at least one symbolic
alphabet propagated through a memory location, out of symbolic expressions for all
IR variables
analysis would have introduced a new alphabet in all these expressions according to
the rules in Table 4.1. This validates our central contribution that tracking memory
locations is essential for effective symbolic analysis on executables.
Fig 4.12 highlights another interesting aspect of our symbolic analysis frame-
work. It presents the percentage of data objects which are represented as TOP (>)
in the symbolic abstraction for different choices of the maximum size of a symbolic
value set (LIMIT ). This result shows that percentage of unrepresentable data ob-
jects reach a stable point and does not decrease further with increase in LIMIT,
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Figure 4.12: Variation of TOP (>) data objects with varying size of symbolic value
set
4.9.2 Value numbering
We implemented the value numbering algorithm as presented in Section 4.8 for
determining equivalent computations and for eliminating redundant computations
from the executables. Fig 4.13 compares the number of equivalent computations
determined in three cases: one when no symbolic analysis is performed, second when
symbolic analysis is employed only for variables (obtained by neglecting the transfer
functions for memory load and memory store in Table 4.1) and third, when memory
based symbolic analysis is employed to determine equivalence. Hence, the second
case is similar to existing source-level methods of symbolic analysis since it tracks
only variables. The third case represents our contribution since it tracks memory
















































































































































































Without memory-based symbolic analysis With memory-based symbolic analysis
Figure 4.13: Normalized improvement in detection of equivalent computations (No
Symbolic analysis = 1.0)
based symbolic analysis is able to expose around 40% more equivalent computations
in executables than base value numbering (when no symbolic analysis is applied).
This figure also shows that symbolic analysis based only on variables is not sufficient
in exposing more equivalences in executables and exposes only 3% more equivalences
than discoverable when no symbolic analysis is applied. This validates our central
contribution – that tracking memory locations is essential to get good results for
symbolic analysis on executables.
Fig 4.14 compares the static counts of redundant instructions removed in the
three scenarios above and shows that memory-based symbolic analysis improves the
removal of redundant computations by around 32%. The removal of redundant
computations will improve the efficiency and efficacy of any subsequent binary anal-















































































































































































Without memory-based symbolic analysis With memory-based symbolic analysis
Figure 4.14: Normalized improvement in removal of redundant instruction (No
symbolic analysis=1.0)
employed in a binary rewriter.
4.9.3 Program parallelization
Next, we substantiate the impact of symbolic analysis on dependence tests for the
purpose of program parallelization. As presented in Section 4.7, various paralleliza-
tion methods first try to disprove dependence between pairs of subscripted references
to the same array variable and next try to characterize the dependence by determin-
ing the distance vector between two accesses to the same memory location in terms
of number of loop iterations. The dependence tests are considered to be successful
when a precise answer can be obtained for any of the above tests.
We implemented various common dependency tests like ZIV tests (Zero induc-
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Application Suite # Tests #Success #Success %
(Without mem (With mem Imp
based sym based sym
analysis) analysis)
2mm Polybench 18 14 18 28.5
3mm Polybench 26 20 26 30.0
atax Polybench 6 3 4 33.3
bicg Polybench 13 6 10 66.7
covariance Polybench 19 16 19 18.7
doitgen Polybench 25 10 23 130.0
gemm Polybench 14 12 14 16.67
gemver Polybench 26 22 26 18.18
gesummv Polybench 13 9 12 33.3
jacobi Polybench 27 13 13 0
ft NAS 127 37 43 16.2
lu NAS 4866 1438 2078 44.5
bt NAS 2866 1844 2237 21.3
sp NAS 3317 2287 2815 23.1
AVG 34.3
Table 4.3: Parallelization benchmarks
tion variable), SIV test (Single induction variable), and MIV test (Multiple induction
variables) as presented in [69]. We measured the number of array references where
any of the dependence tests was able to eliminate dependence, or was able to provide
a precise answer to the distance between dependencies.
We have tested our framework on executables of benchmarks from the Polyhe-
dral Benchmark suite [115] and the NAS benchmark suite [108]. Table 4.3 describes
the usage and success frequency of dependence tests for each of the benchmarks. It
lists the number of times the test was applied in each benchmark and the number
of times the test was able to give a precise answer in two situations: using the mem-
ory based symbolic analysis and using only variable based symbolic analysis. Since
dependence tests rely on affine expressions for loop indices, none of the dependence
tests succeed when no symbolic analysis is applied. Hence, we omit the results for
the case of no symbolic analysis. This table shows that the memory based symbolic
analysis framework improves the precision of standard dependence tests on executa-
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bles by 34% on average. The improvement in the precision of dependence tests will
further enhance the ability of binary-level parallelizers.
Existing binary-based parallelization techniques [93, 162] implement custom
methods to recognize induction variables from binaries. These techniques are or-
thogonal to our method, consequently, we have not compared our techniques with
these methods. Nonetheless, our symbolic analysis framework can obviate the need
for any custom induction variable recognition method for binary-parallelization.
4.9.4 Alias analysis
As mentioned in Section 4.3.3, although Value Set Analysis (VSA) is a powerful
alias analysis algorithm for executables, there are a few scenarios where the symbolic
abstraction can aid VSA abstraction in resolving aliasing queries. We identified a
few scenarios where VSA yields imprecise answer to aliasing queries. One example
of such a scenario is allocation of arrays with statically unknown size since VSA
does not declare memory abstractions for such arrays. The underlying reason is
that their algorithm relies on an Aggregate Structure Identification algorithm [120]
which requires constant static bounds of arrays to represent array access constraints
for constraint solvers. Another common example is accessing an element of an array
with an input dependant index.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our symbolic analysis, we compare
it with VSA in only those portions of binary code where VSA results in imprecise































Figure 4.15: Alias analysis results
code, we implemented a custom data flow analysis that identifies whether the mem-
ory address accessed in a memory access instruction is input dependent (statically
unknown, hence > in VSA). The analysis begins by defining the variables resulting
from known I/O external function (e.g. fread) as input dependant. This informa-
tion is then propagated interprocedurally accross the whole program in a method
similar to program slicing method presented by Horwitz et. al. [83]. The above
data-flow analysis is implemented on the source code to identify the code locations
where VSA yields imprecise answers to aliasing queries. The symbolic analysis and
VSA results are compared in the corresponding code locations in the executables.
Fig 4.15 lists a few sample benchmarks for our custom data flow analysis
identified a significant number of code locations. For each benchmark, Fig 4.15
presents the percentage of aliasing queries which symbolic analysis was able to re-
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solve (must-alias or no-alias); among queries for which VSA provided an imprecise
answer (may-alias). As evident from the figure, our method can resolve between
10% and 65% of aliasing queries that could not be resolved using VSA alone. This
result establishes that symbolic analysis can aid VSA in improving the precision of
aliasing decisions in executables. In the above examples, we found no imrovement
in the resolution of aliasing queries when we switched off the transfer functions for
memory loads and stores – this shows the importance of tracking memory locations
for improved alias analysis as well.
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Chapter 5: Improving memory abstraction
5.1 Precise Memory Model
Executable specific artifacts such as indirect call transfer instructions (CTI) com-
plicate the task of recovering a precise memory abstraction while maintaining the
functionality in IR. A memory abstraction involves associating each stack memory
reference to a set of variables on the memory stack. This is useful since most pro-
gram analysis techniques require variables rather than memory locations. In order
to recover such an abstraction, we need to determine the value of stack pointer at
each program point in a procedure relative to its value at the entry point. This
is usually accomplished by analyzing each stack modification instruction, including
CTIs which can possibly modify the stack pointer due to several reasons such as
cleanup of arguments passed on the stack.
However, the modification in the value of stack pointer cannot be easily de-
termined in all scenarios. For example, in case of an indirect CTI, the stack modi-
fication is deterministic only if all its statically determined possible targets modify
the stack pointer by the same value. However, such targets might modify the stack
pointer by different values, or a call to an external function with an unknown pro-
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totype might have a statically indeterminable impact on the value of stack pointer.
Existing frameworks such as IDAPro [84] and CodeSurfer/X86 [21] require that the
return from a CTI should always modify the stack pointer by a deterministic con-
stant value. In above mentioned scenarios, CodeSurfer/X86 recovers an imprecise
memory abstraction that does not associate stack memory references to variables on
stack, hurting the analyzability of IR. In contrast, IDAPro aims to recover a precise
memory abstraction; but when it cannot, it makes unsafe assumptions yielding a
non-functional IR.
We present techniques for recovering a precise memory model and functional
IR in such scenarios. Our mechanism formulates a set of constraints using control
flow constructs in the caller procedure to compute the value of stack modification
at a call-site. The constraints are solvable in most scenarios. When the constraints
cannot be solved, it embeds run-time checks to maintain the functionality of IR.
This enhanced memory model improves the precision of several analysis techniques
for executables.
5.2 Motivation
In this section, we demonstrate the limitation of existing frameworks in obtain-
ing a functional IR with a precise memory model and the relative importance of
considering the underlying memory model for symbolic abstraction.
A source program has an abstract stack representation where the local vari-
ables are assumed to be present on the stack but their precise layout is not specified.
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In contrast, an executable has a fixed physical stack layout.
To recreate an IR, the physical stack must be deconstructed to individual
abstract frames, one per procedure. Since, each frame comprises variables from the
source code, a memory model is defined as precise if each such frame can be divided
into abstract locations analogous to the original variables.
Previous methods [21] have approached this problem in two steps. First, all
the instructions in a procedure which can modify the stack pointer are analyzed to
compute the maximum size to which the stack can grow in a single invocation of the
procedure among all its control-flow paths. Next, each such abstract frame is further
abstracted through a set of a-locs. An a-loc is characterized by two attributes:
its relative offset in the region with respect to other a-locs and its size. The a-loc
representation requires the determination of the value of the stack pointer at each
program point in a procedure relative to its value at the entry point.
As highlighted in Section 5.1, this is usually accomplished by tracking each
update to the stack pointer. However, several artifacts might result in a non-
deterministic stack modification, invalidating the inherent assumption in previous
frameworks [21]. Next, we analyze such scenarios in more detail. We characterize
the impact of a CTI I on the value of stack pointer by introducing the following
definition:
StackDiff(I) = Stack Pointer after I - Stack Pointer before I.
The term StackDiff can be applied to either the CTI or a corresponding called
procedure, and represents the stack modification amount in either case. StackDiff
of a CTI can be positive if the called procedure cleans up its arguments, or zero
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if it does not. In theory, it can be negative if the procedure leaves some local
allocations on the stack, although we have not observed this in compiled code.
Several approaches have been suggested to calculate the value of StackDiff by
symbolically evaluating all the stack modification instructions in a procedure [21].
As per these methods, StackDiff at an indirect CTI is deterministic if all possible
targets have the same value of StackDiff. Thereafter, the stack pointer in the
caller procedure is adjusted by StackDiff amount. This adjustment is imperative
for maintaining the correctness of data-flow in caller procedure.
However, StackDiff cannot be determined statically in all scenarios. For
example, possible targets of an indirect CTI might have different StackDiff, or
an external function with an unknown prototype might have a statically unknown
StackDiff. In such scenarios, existing frameworks either result in an imprecise
memory abstraction or fail to maintain the correctness. As per CodeSurfer/X86,
“if it cannot determine that the change is a constant, it issues an error report”
(Section 4.2) [21]. Hence, the corresponding frame cannot be represented through
a-locs, resulting in an imprecise memory model. IDAPro applies a constraint-
based mechanism to compute the values of StackDiff independent of the called
procedures. However, when the underlying method fails to determine a unique
solution, it compromises the correctness by accepting one feasible solution (which
could be wrong) out of an infinite number of possible outcomes [133].
Fig 5.1 illustrates an example of such a scenario. In Fig 5.1, a local region
of size 24 is allocated in a procedure, consequently, the memory access at Line 2
results in the discovery of an a-loc at offset 16. Suppose the possible targets of the
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 main:         
1    sub 24, $esp              //Local Allocation 
2    mov $10, 8(%esp)      //Access (%esp+8) 
3    call *%eax                // An Indirect call 
4    mov $20, 12(%esp)   //Access   
                //(%esp+12+UNKNOWN) 
        …… 
Figure 5.1: An example demonstrating the imprecision in the presence of indirect
calls, second operand in the instruction is the destination
indirect CTI at line 3 have different StackDiff values. Consequently, esp after Line
3 has an unknown offset relative to its value at the entry point of the procedure.
Hence, no a-loc can be identified at Line 4. On the other hand, if StackDiff value
is calculated wrongly, it results in an incorrect data-flow at Line 4.
Our hybrid mechanism maintains the precision as well as functionality. Our
static mechanism enables abstraction through a set of a-locs and dynamic mech-
anism guarantees the correctness when StackDiff cannot be computed.
5.3 Recovering precise memory abstraction
In this section, we discuss our hybrid static-dynamic solution to obtain a functional
representation with a precise memory model. We first present a symbolic constraint
mechanism to determine the value of StackDiff for each CTI where it is unknown.
Next, we discuss our solution for maintaining the functionality even when StackDiff
at some CTIs cannot be solved. Our analysis employs the prototypes of well-known
library functions, similar to to the IDAPro’s FLIRT database [84], for determining
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their StackDiff value. We assume that existing methods [21] are able to determine
the value of StackDiff for each procedure, which holds true under the assumptions
of standard compilation model.
5.3.1 Static Computation
A CTI I can result in an unknown StackDiff in three cases, which we collectively
refer to as Unknown CTIs.
Case 1: I is a direct CTI to an external procedure with unknown prototype.
Case 2: I is an indirect CTI with unresolved targets.
Case 3: I is an indirect CTI and its targets have different StackDiff.
In such scenarios, our symbolic constraints based mechanism employs several
boundary conditions imposed by the control flow inside the corresponding caller
procedure to determine StackDiff. The proposed constraint formulation does not
require us to determine the precise set of targets of an indirect CTI, which itself is
an extremely challenging problem.
We define symbolic values XI and SI for representing StackDiff and local stack
height at a CTI I. Every stack modification instruction in a procedure is analyzed
to derive an expression of SI in terms of the XIs. The resulting expressions are
transformed into a linear system of equations that can be solved to calculate the
value of XIs.
Fig 5.2 presents the rules for generating symbolic constraints and equations
in a particular procedure P. It presents rules for analyzing each stack modification
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Unknown Symbolic Values : XI , where XI = StackDiff of procedure call I
Initial/Helper Variables :
Targ(T): Set of procedures targeted by call target address T
StackDiff(f): StackDiff of procedure f
Y SET(F) = ∪f∈FStackDiff(f)
BeginP = Entry point of procedure P; PredBB = Predecessors of basic block BB;
BeginBB,EndBB = Entry point,terminator of basic block BB
SI = Stack height after instruction I;
SBB = Stack height at beginning of basic block BB;
PrevI = the previous instruction to I (I 6= BeginBB)
SI’ = if (I 6= BeginBB) then SPrevI else SBB
R : A register, Size(R): Size of register R, N: A constant
Initial Conditions : SBeginP = 0
Data flow rules :
For every instruction I:
I = push R ⇒ SI = SI’ + size(R)
I = pop R ⇒ SI = SI’ - size(R)
I = add esp, N ⇒ SI = SI’ - N
I = sub esp, N ⇒ SI = SI’ + N
I = jmp L ⇒ SBeginL = SI’
I = call Y ⇒
if (Y SET(Targ(Y)) contains a single constant C)
SI = SI’ + C
else
SI = SI’ + XI
default (if not an invalidation condition) ⇒ SI = SI’
Boundary Conditions :
1. ∀ BB: ∀ Pred ∈ PredBB, SBeginBB = SEndPred
2. I = ret : Constraint SI’ = 0
Invalidation Conditions :
1. I = esp ← ... /* Any assignment except in data-flow rules*/
2. I accesses return address
Figure 5.2: Data flow rules used to determine stack modifications in a procedure P
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instruction, a set of initialization and boundary conditions for solving the symbolic
equations and a set of conditions which invalidate our symbolic constraints for the
current procedure.
In an x86 program, several instructions can modify the value of stack pointer.
The local frame in a procedure is usually allocated by subtracting a constant value
from esp. Similarly, the local frame is deallocated by adding a constant amount to
esp. Push and pop instructions implicitly modify the stack pointer by the size of
amount pushed onto the stack. The rules in Fig 5.2 incorporate the deterministic
modification at each CTI. An indeterministic modification is modeled symbolically
as XI. The dataflow rules in Fig 5.2 obtain an expression for SI considering each
such stack modification instruction.
In order to solve the symbolic equations obtained through dataflow rules,
Fig 5.2 generates two constraints based on the control flow in procedure P. These con-
ditions hold true for every executable following the standard compilation model [21]:
→ ∀Pred ∈ PredBB, SBeginBB = SEndPred: This condition implies that at a merge
point in the control flow of a procedure, the stack height at the end of every
predecessor basic block must be equal. Otherwise, any subsequent stack access
might access different stack locations depending on the path taken at run time,
resulting in an indeterminate behavior.
→ SI’ = 0 ∀ ret ∈ P: In an x86 program, a return instruction loads an ad-
dress from the location pointed by esp and sets the program counter to the
loaded value. Since the return address is pushed by the caller procedure and
122
a compiled program usually does not access the return address directly, esp
can refer to the return address only if stack height SI’ is zero. Thereafter
the return instruction may optionally specify an operand to clean up some
incoming arguments, so StackDiff could be positive or zero.
Fig 5.2 also formulates the following conditions which invalidate the assump-
tions behind our boundary conditions. In such situations, we discontinue our static
mechanism and rely on our dynamic mechanism to maintain the correctness of IR.
→ I = esp ← ... : Any assignment to esp other than those in data-flow rules
implies a local frame allocation of variable size. In such a scenario, the bound-
ary conditions fail to obtain a solution for XI. However, this condition arises
in extremely rare circumstances of variable size arrays on stack frame.1
→ I accesses return address: In a usual compiled code, StackDiff is either zero
or positive. In theory, procedures could have a negative StackDiff, implying
that the procedure leaves some local allocations on the stack. In such scenarios,
esp would not point to the return address at the point of return. Hence, a
return must be implemented by explicitly accessing the return address from
the middle of the stack. This invalidates the assumption behind our boundary
condition 2 and we resort to run-time checks.
The resulting symbolic equations are solved by employing a custom linear
solver that categorizes the equations into disjoint groups based on the variables
1Code produced by popular compilers contains x86 idioms like leave instruction which implic-
itly assign a previously stored value to esp. Such idioms are currently handled explicitly in our
framework.
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used in every equation. A group is solved only if the number of equations is equal
to the number of unknowns. We keep propagating calculated values to other groups
until no more calculated values are present. Once we obtain a solution of XI for
each I in a procedure, we can obtain a safe abstraction of abstract memory regions
into a set of a-locs using the methods in [21, 74].
5.3.2 Dynamic Mechanism
As mentioned above, the above method does not guarantee a solution for all the
scenarios. For example, the above method fails to determine the value of StackDiff
in basic blocks containing multiple CTIs each with an unknown XI value. Below,
we discuss our dynamic mechanism to handle all the three cases of Unknown CTIs
presented in Section 5.3.1.
Case 1: Since this case represents control transfer to an external procedure, the
body of the called procedure cannot be modified. Such scenarios are handled by
employing a trampoline mechanism to call the external procedure. The trampoline
dynamically computes the shift in stack pointer value before and after the call using
inline assembly instructions.
Case 2 and Case 3: Recall from Section 4.4 that an indirect CTI is translated to
the corresponding location in IR using a switch statement inside a call translator
procedure. In such scenarios, StackDiff is declared as an explicit return variable
in the prototype of call translator procedure. The definition of the call translator is
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of procedures with unknown CTIs. The static represents
cases when constraint solvers succed
statement.
5.4 Results
Fig 5.3 and Fig 5.4 present the statistics regarding our hybrid mechanism for ob-
taining precise memory model and functional IR. We only present statistics for
benchmarks containing non-negligible Unknown CTIs (negligible defined as ≤ 10 or
number of procedures containing Unknown CTI ≤ 1%). Of 33 programs in Table 4.2,
11 had non-negligible unknown CTIs. Fig 5.3 presents the fraction of procedures
containing Unknown CTI in each of these benchmarks. It divides this fraction into
scenarios where the static mechanism was able to determine the value of StackDiff
and where the dynamic mechanism was required to maintain the functionality. Case































































Figure 5.4: Additional alocs added as a result of constraint solvers, normalized to
original number of alocs
procedures. We never hit the invalidation conditions stipulated in Fig 5.2, further
justifying the assumptions behind our constraint formulation.
Fig 5.4 illustrates the additional a-locs derived as a result of successful con-
straint solutions, normalized with respect to original a-locs of type Stack. As ev-
ident, we were able to obtain 10% more a-locs in C benchmarks and 30% more
a-locs in C++ benchmarks on average. This result reinforces the relative impor-
tance of our mechanism in C++ benchmarks. This enhanced a-locs abstraction is
employed in our symbolic value analysis framework.
Fig 5.5 captures the enhancement in the precision of Symbolic Value Anal-
ysis with the presence of additional a-locs derived by the constraint mechanism.
According to the rules in Table 4.1, a load instruction accessing an unknown mem-








































































Figure 5.5: Variables requiring a new symbolic alphabet in presence of additional
a-locs
decrease in the number of load instructions requiring a new alphabet while employ-
ing additional a-locs. The presence of additional a-locs enhances the precision of
symbolic value analysis by 10% to 50% in several programs.
127
Chapter 6: Information flow security of executables
6.1 Introduction
The rapid rise in cyberattacks has exposed serious security vulnerabilities in soft-
ware systems. Information flow violations collectively comprise one of the most
critical vulnerabilities in this regard. Such violations subject the programs to se-
vere security attacks like format-string attacks [132], directory-traversal attacks [56],
cross-site scripting, SQL-injection [143] and also result in the leakage of confidential
and sensitive information to untrusted parties [147].
Research has led to a number of approaches proposed to mitigate the suscep-
tibility arising due to information flow violations in programs. The most popular of
these methods model the violations as violations to an information flow policy, and
enforce the policy through a tracking mechanism [110, 119, 64, 50, 87, 163]. The
inherent idea is to mark the untrusted (or confidential) information in a program as
tainted, propagate the tainted labels through the program’s data and control flow
and enforce the required policy by raising an alarm at every illegal use of the tainted
information.
Despite significant research efforts, existing approaches fall short with regards
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to several desired characteristics of security techniques: practicality, defined as the
ability to handle off-the shelf programs without any performance overhead; pre-
cision, defined as the ability to uncover policy violations without excessive false
positives; scalability, defined as the applicability to large real-world programs; and
extensibility, defined as the ease of handling multiple security policies and the ability
to counter rapidly-evolving threats.
Regarding practicality, several existing information flow tracking systems are
constrained by their underlying frameworks. A significant number of previous infor-
mation flow systems either leverage dynamic binary frameworks or statically analyze
the applications written in high-level languages like C, C++. Both the approaches
have limited applications in real-world scenarios, as discussed next.
Information-flow tracking based on dynamic frameworks [110, 119, 64, 50]
experiences high runtime overhead unless the tracking mechanism is implemented
in hardware [56]. Further, dynamic frameworks only detect the violations arising in
a single execution path. Therefore, static techniques seem to present an appealing
alternative.
However, most static information flow systems detect violations from programs
written in high-level languages [143, 132]. These methods have limited applicability
in many real-world scenarios where the source-code of third-party and proprietary
executables is not available to end-users who want to protect their systems. Further,
it is a well known fact that compilers are a source of vulnerabilities in programs [21]
and source-code analysis is insufficient in detecting the violations arising due to
compiler-introduced bugs.
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There has only been limited work in uncovering vulnerabilities in executables
using static mechanisms, and these have their own drawbacks. The existing static
mechanisms for detecting vulnerabilities in executables fail to combine precision and
scalability. Such frameworks [53, 155, 61] ignore memory and aliasing issues, result-
ing in an imprecise analysis and limited vulnerability detection. As demonstrated
by existing source code mechanisms [101], a precise points-to analysis is imperative
for achieving a low false positive rate. Analyzing memory accesses is even more
essential for executables than source code since executables mainly contain memory
locations instead of explicit program variables. The paucity of registers in x86 ISA
further underscores this requirement. Hence, ignoring aliasing issues limits the ca-
pability of existing tools for executables to reliably expose vulnerabilities without
plaguing the results with false alarms.
However, analyzing memory accesses in an elementary manner in executa-
bles might adversely impact the scalability of the system. As observed in several
source-level frameworks, an exhaustive analysis of memory accesses constrains the
scalability of the underlying system [79, 143]. Hence, previous source-level infor-
mation flow systems [143, 53, 132] balance precision and scalability in the presence
of pointer operations by employing innovative frameworks such as thin slicing [143]
and type inference mechanisms [132]. However, no counterpart methods of such
frameworks have been proposed for executables, resulting in severe precision and
scalability challenges for static executable analysis systems.
Further, several existing information flow frameworks lack extensibility since
the underlying single-bit taint tracking mechanism cannot be extended to detect var-
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ious advanced information flow violations. Even though single bit taint mechanisms
are more efficient in terms of memory usage, they lack the ability to enforce multiple
policies concurrently, which limits its capability to protect against the attacks that
exploit multiple vulnerabilities in an orchestrated manner [139]. As presented by
Chang et al. [43], single-bit frameworks cannot expose file-disclosure vulnerabilities.
We present DemandFlow, a novel information flow mechanism for executables
to address the above limitations of practicality, precision, scalability and extensibil-
ity. DemandFlow eliminates a major limitation of existing static information flow
frameworks for executables by employing precise mechanisms for propagating in-
formation across memory locations. In addition, DemandFlow boosts scalability by
propagating information across only those program variables and memory locations
which are critical for the flow of information regarding a particular policy. Instead of
analyzing the whole program, DemandFlow proposes a novel demand-driven analy-
sis tailored to an actual policy.
Several demand-driven mechanisms have been proposed for popular compiler
analyses like pointer analysis and interprocedural data flow analysis [79, 59]. One of
our major contributions is the application of such popular compiler scalability con-
cepts to address the precision and scalability challenge in information flow analysis
of executables.
DemandFlow also provides an easily extensible mechanism for detecting several
kind of vulnerabilities. We note that information flow tracking is a special case
of program data-flow analysis. Hence, instead of propagating a single-bit taint
information, DemandFlow computes an information abstraction which can be easily
131
extended to represent several different policies. The analysis cost for maintaining
an information abstraction, instead of a single-bit taint information, is ameliorated
by the ensuing simplification while enforcing multiple policies simultaneously in a
program. Further, our information abstraction enables the attribution of violation
of a policy to the culprit information source.
DemandFlow is used as an analysis tool, similar to how static analysis mech-
anisms are used, complementing other bug-finding tools and dynamic information
flow trackers. The primary contributions of our work are the following:
→ Precise Static Analysis: DemandFlow employs a powerful static analy-
sis mechanism that precisely handles memory aliasing issues in executables.
Previous static information flow systems for executables ignore aliasing issues
resulting in an imprecise analysis.
→ Demand-driven Framework: DemandFlow achieves scalability while rea-
soning about memory accesses by tailoring the analysis to a particular infor-
mation flow policy. Instead of doing an exhaustive analysis over the complete
program, it computes the set of program objects critical for preserving the
flow of information with respect to a particular information flow policy and
propagates information for only such program objects.
→ Diverse Evaluation: We apply DemandFlow on several information flow
violations such as format string attacks, directory traversal attacks, and in-
formation flow leakage. DemandFlow uncovers six previously undiscovered
format string and directory traversal vulnerabilities in popular ftp and inter-
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net relay chat programs. It also exposes an unknown information (password)
leakage vulnerability on KeePassX, a popular password manager application.
DemandFlow reliably detects previously known vulnerabilities in a variety
of real-world programs at a low false positive rate of approximately 1 per
20,000 lines of code. DemandFlow is scalable and analyzes large programs
such as MySQL (1.7 million lines of code) in around 7 minutes. The scalabil-
ity is further demonstrated by evaluating DemandFlow on all the programs in
SPEC2006 suite.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the re-
lated research work. Section 6.3 presents an overview of DemandFlow framework.
Section 6.4 provides background about memory abstraction and information flow
policies. Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 describe our demand-driven information flow
mechanism. Section 6.7 discusses some practical limitations of DemandFlow, fol-
lowed by the evaluations in Section 6.8.
6.2 Related Work
6.2.1 Static Information Flow Techniques
Language Based Techniques There has been a plenty of work in information flow
tracking at compile-time for programs written in custom type-safe programming
languages [125, 106]. Sabelfeld and Myers [125] present a comprehensive survey of
this approach. This approach guarantees information flow security, but is limited to
the programs written in specific languages. On the other hand, DemandFlow can
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be applied to binary programs compiled from any language.
Source-code analysis Several tools have been suggested to track information-
flow through source-code analysis. Livshits and Lam [101] propose a query language
which can be used to represent taint-style vulnerabilities. Tripp et. al. [143] present
an improved and scalable static taint analysis framework for JAVA programs utiliz-
ing an advanced pointer analysis and thin-slicing algorithm. Shankar et. al. [132]
propose a type qualifier based approach for detecting format string vulnerabilities
in C programs. Ashcraft et. al. [17] propose various compiler annotations and belief
inference techniques to statically detect security holes in C programs.
Jovanovic et. al [86] present Pixy for statically detecting vulnerabilities in
web applications. Xie et. al [158] statically expose vulnerabilities in scripting lan-
guages using precise information about memory locations. Balzarotti et. al [23]
propose a framework to validate the functionality of taint sanitization functions in
web applications.
All the above proposed approaches detect security vulnerabilities using source
code and cannot be directly applied to executables. The precision of these ap-
proaches is driven by the underlying advanced pointer mechanisms, for which no
counterpart mechanisms exist in executables, until now.
Executable-code analysis There has been a very limited amount of work
on detecting information flow violations by statically analyzing the executable code.
Major works in this approach are the vulnerability detection mechanism suggested
by Cova et. al. [53], privacy leak detection [61] and integer flow vulnerabilities [155].
A major limitation of all these methods are that they ignore memory and aliasing is-
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sues in their analysis, resulting in an imprecise vulnerability detection. As presented
by Livshits and Lam [101], a precise points-to analysis is imperative for achieving a
low false positive rate in any static framework.
An industrial tool, Veracode [13], uncovers vulnerabilities in executables. To
the best of our knowledge, the techniques used by Veracode are proprietary and have
not been published anywhere. Hence, the two could not be compared. Further,
unlike DemandFlow, Veracode requires the presence of debug information, which
is not present in deployed executables. A large number of other static executable
analysis tools such as IDAPro [2], Divine [21], and several more, do not aim to
uncover information flow vulnerabilities.
6.2.2 Dynamic Information Flow Techniques
There has been a large number of research tools for tracking information flow at
runtime. Here, we only discuss some of the most popular and related dynamic
techniques.
Schwartz et. al. [129] present an extensive survey discussing various dynamic
taint mechanisms and their respective limitations. Newsome and Song [110] devel-
oped an early taint analysis mechanism to detect buffer overflow through runtime
binary translation. However, they observed a huge slowdown of 37x. Several dif-
ferent approaches have been suggested to amortize the cost of taint propagation.
Frameworks like LIFT [119], GIFT [94], Dytan [50] and tools proposed by Chang
et. al. [43], Xu et. al. [160] and Jee et al. [85] aim to mitigate this overhead through
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software techniques. TaintDroid [64] utilizes the optimizations present in the under-
lying virtual machine while Saxena et. al. [128] employ binary instrumentation to
counter this overhead. As demonstrated by several frameworks [56, 147], in spite of
these optimizations, dynamic methods still experience huge runtime overhead unless
the tracking mechanism is implemented in hardware. On the other hand, Demand-
Flow detects vulnerabilities through static analysis and hence, does not result in
any runtime overhead. Unlike our information abstraction which enables attribu-
tion, most of the dynamic frameworks employ single-bit taint tracking mechanisms.
Maintaining an attribution mechanism in dynamic frameworks will further add to
their overhead.
Several dynamic frameworks aim to mitigate their overhead using static schemes.
However, such static schemes are completely different from DemandFlow. Frame-
works like Chang et. al. [43] employ source code slicing mechanism to detect safe
program locations while approaches like Xu et. al. [160] and Jee et al. [85] miti-
gate overhead by optimizing the actual taint instrumentation code in a local region.
In contrast, DemandFlow presents a novel static framework on executables which
computes fine-grained demand-driven program locations over the whole program.
Several systems have been proposed to apply information-flow analysis for
detecting malicious software. For example, Panorama [163] and TaintDroid [64]
provide a complete system-wide information flow system to distinguish malware
and benign software. These methods propose new policies for detecting malicious
activities while DemandFlow enables the enforcement of user-defined policies in
applications.
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Chang et. al. [43] were the first to recognize that taint tracking is a special
case of data-flow analysis. However, they rely on availability of source-code and
unlike DemandFlow, do not maintain an information abstraction.
6.2.3 Demand-driven Analysis
Demand-driven algorithms are popular in several compiler analyses. Heintze and
Tardieu [79] present a demand driven approach for pointer analysis to tailor the com-
putation to only a set of specific queries. Duesterwald et al. [59] propose demand-
driven algorithms for interprocedural data-flow analysis. Our idea of demand-driven
security analysis of executables is inspired by these compiler concepts.
Guyer et al. [75] propose a complementary client-driven approach of adapting
the analysis to a particular set of queries. It dynamically varies the precision of
analysis by employing flow-sensitivity or context-sensitivity depending on the re-
quirement, but still computes an exhaustive solution. This idea can be combined
with our demand-driven mechanism to obtain the benefits of both.
6.3 Overview of the system
Fig 6.1 presents an overview of the DemandFlow system. DemandFlow is built over
the existing SecondWrite framework as presented in [10]. SecondWrite translates the
input x86 binary code (including stripped executables) to the intermediate format of
the LLVM Compiler [96]. SecondWrite implements various mechanisms to obtain an
























Figure 6.1: Organization of the system.
return values, types and high-level control flow. The recovered IR represents the
symbols corresponding to the binary code’s registers in a single-static assignment
(SSA) form. SSA form is widely used in many binary analyzers. Existing binary
analysis tools implement various methods to recognize procedure arguments and
procedure returns [21]. SecondWrite also implements various analyses to recognize
the arguments. Once the arguments are recognized, formal arguments and returns
are represented as a part of a procedure definition and actual arguments and returns
are explicitly represented as a part of a call instruction in the IR.
This conversion to a compiler IR is not a necessity for our work. In fact, any
existing static binary framework, for example those proposed by Balakrishnan and
Reps [21] or Debray et al. [58], can also be employed for our analysis. Section 6.7
discusses various practical issues regarding the underlying binary framework. The
LLVM IR obtained is passed through the demand-driven information flow frame-
work.
An information flow policy, corresponding to each vulnerability, is formulated
by specifying the initialization and enforcement conditions. Our Demand Object
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Computation block in Fig 4.6 employs these initialization conditions to compute
the required set of data objects (registers and memory locations) imperative for
implementing the policy. Next, Demand-driven information flow analysis computes
a set of information flow expressions only for the set of data objects computed
by Demand Object Computation block. These information flow expressions are
employed at the specified enforcement locations to detect policy violations. Multiple




The memory abstraction for DemandFlow is defined by building on the concept
of abstract memory regions and abstract locations (a-locs), defined by Value Set
Analysis (VSA) [21]. VSA divides the address space of a program into several non-
overlapping memory regions. Three kind of memory regions are defined: the set
of memory regions associated with procedure stack frames in the program (Stack),
the memory region associated with global data of the program (Global) and the
memory regions associated with heap-allocations sites (HeapRgn). Each memory
region is further abstracted through a set of a-locs. Intuitively, a-locs correspond
to the program variables in each region. An a-loc is characterized by two attributes:
its relative offset in the region with respect to other a-locs and its size.
Having defined a-locs as above, VSA computes an over-approximation of
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the set of integers and the set of memory addresses (collectively referred to as a
Value-Set) that each register and each a-loc holds at a particular program point.
VSA employs affine relation and loop bound analysis to conservatively bound the
memory locations accessed by any instruction. Hence, this algorithm can be used
to determine the set of all possible memory locations referred to by all the direct
and indirect memory access instructions. More details about this algorithm can be
found in [21].
6.4.2 Information Flow Policy
Several information flow tracking systems express an information flow policy using
the concept of labels [110, 119, 64]. Depending on the policy, labels can either
refer to the input coming from an untrusted source or to an internal confidential
information. There are four dimensions that characterize a policy: label description,
label initializations, label propagation and label checks.
Label description, LB, specifies the underlying labels and optionally a union
operator, Operator, governing merging of the labels at information join points in
the program. Label initializations, LBInit, correspond to the sources which intro-
duce labels into the program. Label propagation, governs the flow of these labels
through the operations in a program. Label checks, LBCheck, denote the sensitive
(or untrusted) program locations where an information flow violation might arise if
an untrusted (or confidential) information reaches such locations.
The analysis framework, as presented in Sec 6.6, implements the underlying
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label propagation mechanism. Consequently, an information flow policy is specified
in our framework via the remaining three dimensions:
Policy ≡ { {LB, Operator}, LBInit, LBCheck}
The above specification of information flow policy can also be defined using an
information policy lattice I with domain of values specified as a set DI and a meet
operator ∧I , where DI corresponds to the set of labels LB and ∧I corresponds to
the meet operator Operator. This framework provides a generic and programmable
framework for specifying several kinds of information flow policies such as format
string vulnerability, directory traversal attacks or information leakage. We describe
the policy specification using the example of format-string vulnerability.
Format string flaws arise due to an unsafe implementation of variable-argument
procedures in C library. In case of a variable-argument procedure like printf, a
format string argument specifies the number and type of other arguments. How-
ever, there is no runtime routine to verify that the procedure was actually called
with the arguments specified by the format string. As detailed in [54], an attacker
can corrupt the format string and thereby take control of the program by modifying
relevant memory locations.
In order to expose a format string vulnerability, a tool needs to detect the
flow of information from an untrusted source to the format string argument of
a variable argument procedure. All program inputs that can be controlled by an
attacker are treated as tainted values and the tainted information is propagated
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through the program. The presence of a tainted value in the format string argument
of any variable argument procedure signifies the presence of a vulnerability. This
can be formally described as
DI(LB) := {tainted,untainted}
∧I(Operator) := {tainted ∧I untainted ≡ tainted}
(6.1)
6.5 Demand Driven Set
In an exhaustive analysis, the information is propagated over the complete flow
of a program. However, such an exhaustive analysis might implicitly propagate
information along data objects which do not impact the current policy enforcement
decision. Recall from Section 6.1, this redundant propagation of information flow
in a program limits the scalability of an analysis and forces the analysis to make
imprecise decision to maintain scalability.
Next, we present our analysis to compute the set of data objects necessary
to enforce a particular information flow policy. This required set of data objects











SR : Set of required variables
SM : Set of required a-locs
Sets SR and SM are collectively referred to as Demand Set. We refer to an
element of set Demand Set as a Demand Object. Set SM consists of a-locs from all
three memory regions Stack, Global and HeapRgn mentioned in Section 6.4.1. We
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employ the logical inference form1 for representing the deduction rules for computing
the sets SR and SM.
Fig 6.2 presents the rules for computing Demand Set. The rules are applicable
to operations in the IR, but we present C-like pseudo instructions for ease of un-
derstanding. The rules constitute a backward analysis, where the instructions are
traversed in a demand-driven backward dataflow order.
At the beginning of the analysis, set SM is initialized as an empty set while set
SR is initialized with the variables employed at program locations of possible infor-
mation flow violations, which includes all elements in set LBCheck. For example, in
case of a format string vulnerability, set LBCheck comprises format string arguments
at all the format string callsites in a program.
Given an initial set of elements in Demand Set, the rules presented in Fig 6.2
analyze each program operation to update Demand Set accordingly. In case of an
assignment operation, if the destination is already a Demand Object, the source
operand is also added to the set. In case of arithmetic and logical operations, both
the source operands are added to set SR, is it already contains the destination.
The memory load and store operations employ Value Set Analysis (VSA) [21]
to update Demand Set. In case of a memory load operation, the a-locs present in
the value set of the source operand are added to set SM only if the loaded value is
already a Demand Object. Similarly, a value employed in a memory store operation
is considered a Demand Object, if any of the possibly accessed a-loc is an element
1The expression Premise #1 Premise #2 .. Premise #n
Conclusion
states that whenever the given set of premises
have been obtained, the specified conclusion can be taken for granted as well.
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Helper Variables
VS(R): Value Set of object R; R → z : a-loc z ∈ VS(R)
OP : Arithmetic, Logical and Casting operators
ARGT : Set of parameters of procedure T
RETT : Set of variables at actual return-sites in procedure T
FORMi : Variable for ith formal parameter of a procedure
ACTi : Variable for ith actual parameter at a callsite
F: An internal procedure; X: An external procedure
Initialization












R1 ∈ SR R2→ z
z ∈ SM
I:*R1=R2






















R1 ∈ SR ACTi → z
z ∈ SM
Figure 6.2: Deduction rules for computing Demand Set. Rules constitute a backward
analysis, where a conclusion before an instruction is derived based on the premise
after the instruction.
of set SM.
Interprocedural rules in Fig 6.2 depend on whether the called procedure is an
internal or an external procedure. The distinction is required due to the absence
of procedure body of externally called procedures. In case of a call to an internal
procedure, an actual argument value at the call site is added to set SR if the
corresponding formal argument to the procedure is already present in set SR. A
return value also results in a similar update of set SR. If the actual return value at
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the call-site is present in SR, then all the return variables in the procedure definition
are also considered as Demand Objects.
A call to an external procedure is handled in one of the following two ways. If
the prototype of the called procedure is available, then the call is modeled by adding
all actual arguments and their underlying a-locs to Demand Set if the return value
is a Demand Object. Otherwise, a call to a procedure with unknown prototype is
modeled as NOP to avoid excessive loss of precision.
The Demand Set, comprising SR and SM, captures all the variables and memory
locations which can possibly impact the value of the elements in set LBCheck. This
reduced set is employed to compute the information flow in the program.
6.6 Demand Driven Information Flow Analysis
Our demand-driven information flow analysis, Symbolic Information Analysis, is
a flow-sensitive, context insensitive analysis which computes a conservative over-
approximation of a set of sources of information reaching each demand driven data
object (variables and memory locations) at each program point. This analysis em-
ploys Demand Set computed through the mechanism in Section 6.5.
6.6.1 Information Abstraction
Symbolic information analysis represents the values in an abstract domain defined
by the Symbolic Information Grammar presented in Fig 6.3. The sentences gen-
erated by the Symbolic Information Grammar constitute the underlying symbolic
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INF := INF ∪ TjT
T := [IR Symbols]
Figure 6.3: Symbolic Information Grammar:Grammar for information flow ab-
straction. ∪ is the union operator, IR Symbols are symbols in the obtained interme-
diate representation corresponding to the registers in the input executable, interme-
diate computations and calls to external library procedures.
information abstraction. An element of this grammar represents an object in our
abstract domain and is represented as SymInf.
SymInf = An element of Symbolic Information Grammar
The analysis computes a SymInf object for each element of Demand Set. As
evident from Fig 6.3, each SymInf object is a logical union of symbols in the inter-
mediate representation (IR). IR symbols comprise the symbols in the intermediate
representation corresponding to calls to external library procedures, local computa-
tions or any other information source such as a protected file or a secure memory
location. SymInf abstraction captures a conservative over-approximation of the set
of sources from which information can flow to a particular element of Demand Set.
SymInf abstraction has two advantages over the standard single bit taint ab-
straction. First, this abstraction enables the attribution of each policy violation to
the corresponding culprit information source or a set of sources. There can be mul-
tiple sources of external information in a program and some of these sources might
not result in a violation. The ability to attribute a violation to the actual informa-
tion source is imperative if the framework is employed for rectifying the violations,
in addition to the detection of violations. Second, this abstraction efficiently solves
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the challenge of time of detection/time of attack gap [129] faced by several existing
information flow frameworks [137]. Single-bit taint analysis raises a warning when
tainted values are used in an unsafe manner. However, there is no guarantee that
the program integrity has not been violated before this point. Several frameworks
such as BitBlaze [137] circumvent the problem of too-little taint information by per-
forming post hoc instruction trace analysis on the execution traces to determine the
time of attack. SymInf abstraction obviates the need of any such post hoc analysis.
6.6.2 Analysis
The analysis computes flow-sensitive SymInf abstraction for all elements of Demand
Set with respect to a particular information flow policy. A flow-sensitive analysis
needs to compute the abstraction at each program point. Since we assume that the
IR supports SSA form for variables, a single symbolic map is sufficient to maintain
flow-sensitive SymInf abstraction for variables. Since memory locations are usually
not implemented in SSA format, a map is maintained at each program point to
represent flow-sensitive abstraction for memory locations. Hence, the analysis effec-
tively computes the following maps, which collectively constitute the information
flow abstraction for Demand Set.
IR: SymInf for elements in SR
IMe: SymInf for elements in SM after program point e
Fig 6.4 presents the rules for computing the abstraction. The rules presented
in Fig 6.2 compute Demand Set using a backward propagation mechanism while the
147
rules presented in Fig 6.4 forward propagate the information abstraction over the
elements of Demand Set.
These rules analyze each program operation to update the information ab-
straction maps accordingly. In case of assignment and arithmetic operations, the
abstraction is computed for the destination only if the source operands are present
in Demand Set. The information flow abstraction is represented by the union (∪)
of abstract values of individual source operands. Analogous to the rules in Fig 6.2,
VSA is employed to compute the abstract values for memory load and store op-
erations. In case of a memory load operation, the value is computed by unioning
abstract values of all the individual a-locs possibly accessed by this operation.
Similarly, a memory store operation is modeled by updating the value of all possi-
bly accessed a-locs with abstract values of the stored operand. As per standard
compiler representation, this corresponds to weak-updates.
A call to an internal procedure is handled by forward propagating the SymInf
abstraction from an actual argument at the callsite to the corresponding formal
argument of procedure definition when both the arguments are Demand Objects.
Similarly, the value for the required return variables at a callsite is computed using
corresponding actual return values in procedure body.
A call to an externally called procedure is handled in a conservative manner.
This rule models the flow of information from all sources available to this call to all
possible destinations. As evident from the Fig 6.4, this rule also results in addition
of a new information source, IR symbol of called procedure, to SymInf abstraction.
First, all the possible sources of information to this particular call are deter-
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Helper Variables
VS(R): Value Set of object R; R → z : a-loc z ∈ VS(R)
IM’e: SymInf for SM before program point e
ARGT : Set of parameters of procedure T
RETT : Set of variables at actual return-sites in procedure T
FORMi : Variable for ith formal parameter of a procedure
ACTi : Variable for ith actual parameter at a callsite
F: An internal procedure; X: An external procedure
Initialization
IR ← { }; IMe ← { } ∀e
Rules
I: R1=R2
R1 ∈ SR R2 ∈ SR
IR(R1)← IR(R2)








R1 ∈ SR R2 ∈ SR
IR(R1)← IR(R1) ∪ IR(R2)
R1 ∈ SR R3 ∈ SR
IR(R1)← IR(R1) ∪ IR(R3)
I: R1=*R2
R1 ∈ SR R2→ z z ∈ SM
IR(R1)← IR(R1) ∪ IM’I(z)
I: *R1=R2
R1→ z z ∈ SM R2 ∈ SR












FORMi ∈ SR ACTi ∈ SR
IR(FORMi)← IR(FORMi) ∪ IR(ACTi)
∀i∈RETF
R1 ∈ SR i ∈ SR

















let TMP= ∪i∈ARGX {IR(ACTi) ∪z∈VS(ACTi) IM’I(z)}
∀i∈ARGX
R1 ∈ SR ACTi ∈ SR
IR(R1)← IR(R1) ∪ TMP ∪ X
∀i∈ARGX
R1 ∈ SR ACTi ∈ SR ACTi → z z ∈ SM
IMI(z)← IMI(z) ∪ TMP ∪ X
Figure 6.4: Rules for Symbolic Information Analysis.
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mined. This includes the actual argument values as well as a-locs accessed by
these arguments. Next, the values of return variable as well as all possibly accessed
a-locs are updated to reflect the flow of information from all these sources. The IR
symbol corresponding to the actual called procedure is also added to the abstract
values of return as well as above a-locs. The precision of analysis can be improved
by adding the actual semantic model corresponding to popular external procedures
such as sprintf.
Our analysis handles well-known information cancellation idioms like xor a
value with itself [129]. Fig 6.4 handles information flow for all arithmetic, logical or
casting operators. The negation operator is implicitly handled using the assignment
rule. In order to limit the exponential growth of information sources, a widening
operator is employed to impose a limit on the cardinality of each SymInf object,
defined as L, at the cost of some precision. L, was kept to 20 in our framework.
6.6.3 Policy Enforcement
SymInf abstraction can be represented using a lattice framework, referred to as
symbolic lattice V. We introduce the following definitions to aid the understanding:
S: Set of all sentences generated by Symbolic Information Grammar (Fig 6.3)
SL : Subset of S with cardinality limit of L,
⋃
p∈S{p|‖p‖ ≤ L}
S’L : SL∪ S
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The domain of values of lattice V is the modified set of sentences, S’L, described
above. The empty set φ represents the unique largest element, >, and set S is





Section 6.4.2 formulated an information flow policy through a lattice I = {DI,∧I},
referred to as policy lattice. The symbolic lattice described above can be mapped
to obtain the policy lattice. The labels derived by the resulting policy lattice can
be employed at the program locations given by LBCheck (Section 6.4.2) to detect a
violation.
Given a policy lattice I, let us define a function φI which maps the domain of
values in symbolic lattice V to the domain of values in lattice I.
φI : DV → DI (6.3)
Each element, S, of set DV is a sentence generated by the grammar in Fig 6.3. Each
sentence, in turn, comprises of IR symbols (terminal symbols of this grammar).
Let T(S) denote the set of IR symbols in a sentence S.
LBInit (Section 6.4.2) specifies the sources through which the information flow
labels enter the program. For example, IR symbols corresponding to the library
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procedures that introduce untrusted values in the program. As per the rules in
Fig 6.4, these IR symbols are part of SymInf abstraction computed by the analysis.
IR symbols in a program can be divided in two categories based on whether
LBInit maps such symbols to a label or not. Based on these categories, a function







If IR symbol r has an entry in LBInit, LBMAP returns the corresponding label,
otherwise it returns the element > in lattice I. For example, in the case of format
string vulnerability, the external procedures that do not represent any information
source are mapped to the lattice element untainted. This does not impact the
precision of the analysis, since the relation > ∧ x = x holds true in any lattice.
Having defined LBMAP as above, we can define function φI . It maps each con-
stituting IR symbol in DV to a lattice element in DI and merges the lattice elements







Henceforth, a tainted label at any location specified in LBCheck signifies a
vulnerability. For example, in case of format string vulnerability, tainted label
for format string arguments flags a warning. Given an information flow policy, we
can always define a corresponding function φI which maps the symbolic lattice to
policy lattice. The existence of such a mapping provides an extensible and generic
framework for specifying any information flow policy.
As presented by Chang et al. [43], single-bit taint frameworks cannot expose
several vulnerabilities, like file-disclosure vulnerabilities, which require multiple-bit
information to be tracked simultaneously. The mapping presented above enables
DemandFlow to reliably expose such vulnerabilities.
6.7 Discussion
We now consider some practical issues of DemandFlow.
6.7.1 Indirect calls and branches
The underlying binary system employed for DemandFlow, SecondWrite, implements
various mechanisms [135] to address code discovery problems and to handle indirect
control transfers. Here, we briefly summarize their mechanism.
A key challenge in binary frameworks is discovering which portions of the code
section in an input executable are definitely code. Smithson et al. [135] proposed
speculative disassembly, coupled with binary characterization, to efficiently address
this problem. SecondWrite speculatively disassembles the unknown portions of the
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code segments as if they are code. However, it also retains the unchanged code
segments in the IR to guarantee the correctness of data references in case the dis-
assembled region was actually data.
SecondWrite employs binary characterization to limit such unknown portions
of code. It leverages the restriction that an indirect control transfer instruction
(CTI) requires an absolute address operand, and that these address operands must
appear within the code or data segments. The code and data segments are scanned
for values that lie within the range of code segment. The resulting values are guar-
anteed to contain, at a minimum, all of the indirect CTI targets.
The indirect CTIs are handled by appropriately translating the original target
to the corresponding location in IR through a translator procedure. Each recognized
procedure (through speculative disassembly) is initially considered a possible target
of the translator, which is pruned further using alias analysis. The arguments for
each possible target procedure are unioned to find the set of arguments to be passed
to the translator; a stub inside the translator populates the arguments according to
the actual target.
This method is not sufficient for discovering indirect branch targets where
addresses are calculated in binary. Hence, various procedure boundary determina-
tion techniques, like ending the boundary at beginning of next procedure, are also
proposed [135] to limit the possible targets.
The above mechanism of handling indirect control transfers is not a necessity




Here, we present some limitations of DemandFlow.
Implicit flows As evident from Fig 6.4, DemandFlow only performs explicit
information flow, that is information-flow based on data computations, and is not
capable of detecting vulnerabilities or illegal flows arising due to implicit information
flow, that is program’s flow of control. As is well accepted by the community [92],
handling implicit flows results in a large number of false positives. Hence, most
of the practical static information flow tools, excluding the tools that enforce non-
interference through language-based techniques, ignore implicit flows. In the future,
we plan to expand DemandFlow to handle implicit flows also.
Limitations of static executable analysisAs discussed at a recent Dagstuhl
Seminar [91], static analysis of executables provides a variety of benefits over dy-
namic mechanisms. However, several executable artifacts like indirect calls pose
a significant challenge to the scalability of sound static analyses. It was decided
that the verification of a browser is a laudable long-term goal of static executable
analyses.
Since DemandFlow is based on static analysis of executables, our evaluation
is limited to the applications which can be reliably handled through any static
mechanism. Our theoretical frameworks have no inherent scalability limitations.
The evaluations are presented for large server and client programs like apache, lynx
and MySQL; continuous progress in improving the scalability of static techniques
in general will broaden the application of our framework to even larger applications
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like Chrome.
Dynamically generated code Static analysis tools have a limitation that
the code analyzed might not be the code which actually executes. A small percentage
of programs include self-modifying code, few packed executables unpack themselves
at runtime and browsers like Chrome employ just-in time compilation mechanism
to dynamically generate a portion of code. It is impossible for any analysis tool
to statically reason about the code generated at runtime. Various methods [156]
statically detect the presence of runtime code generation in a program. Such a tool
can be integrated in our front-end, to at least warn the user.
Obfuscated code SecondWrite has not been tested against binaries with
hand-coded assembly or with obfuscated control flow. We will investigate such
programs in the future.
6.8 Results
In this section, we evaluate DemandFlow on a set of real-world programs listed
in Fig 6.5 and a wide set of compute-bound programs including the complete
SPEC2006 benchmarks suite. DemandFlow’s versatility is demonstrated by extend-
ing the underlying analysis for three different information flow violations - format
string vulnerability, directory traversal attack and information flow leakage. Sec-
tion 6.8.1, 6.8.2 and 6.8.3 discuss the uncovered vulnerabilities, false alarms statis-
tics and scalability for these programs respectively. Since SPEC2006 benchmarks
have no known vulnerabilities, their false alarms aspects are discussed separately in
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Application LOC Vulnerability Type
mingetty 1.08 500 - -
csplit 8.17 1,060 NEW Format String
muh 2.05c 2857 CVE-2000-0857 Format String
pfingerd 0.7.8 4689 NISR16122002B Format String
gzip 1.2.4 5830 CVE-2005-1228 Directory Trav
ez-ipup3.0.10 6,335 CVE-2004-0980 Format String
gif2png 2.5.2 9354 CVE-2010-4695 Directory Trav
wu-ftpd 2.6.0 17576 CVE-2000-0573 Format String
tar 1.13.19 20518 CVE-2001-1267 Directory Trav
KeePassX0.4.3 26089 - -
yafc 1.1.1 32,241 NEW Directory Trav
tnftp 2010 34,762 - -
gftp 2.0.19 42,390 - -
irc2 2011 44,837 NEW Directory Trav
wget 1.13 46,611 - -
sudo 1.8 53,144 CVE-2012-0809 Format String
openssh 6.0p 73335 - -
opensshd 6.0p 73335 - -
ayttm 0.6.3 80,013 NEW Format String
curl 7.30.0 122,248 NEW Directory Trav
BitchX 1.1 133,728 NEW Format String
lynx 2.8.7 135,876 - -
apache 2.2.17 232,778 - -
MySQL 5.6.11 1,741,774 - -
Figure 6.5: Vulnerabilities discovered in real-world programs.
Appendix 6.8.5. Section 6.8.4 highlights DemandFlow’s extensibility by extending
the framework for detecting information-flow leakage. The programs are compiled
with gcc v4.4.1 without any symbolic or debug information. Results are obtained
on a 2.4GHz 8-core Intel Nehalem machine running Ubuntu. The underlying dis-
assembly mechanism (Section 6.7.1) employed in SecondWrite results in 100% code
coverage in the above set of programs.
DemandFlow is highly scalable and analyzes each of the the programs in Fig 6.5
in less than a minute, except MySQL (1.7 million LOC) which took seven minutes.
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The results on compute intensive SPEC benchmarks (Appendix 6.8.5) demonstrate
a moderate storage requirement of under 100 MB.
Fig 6.5 includes commonly-used server programs (pfingerd, muh, wu-ftpd, openssh,
apache), popular client programs (ez-update, yafc, tnftp, gftp, wget, openssh, curl,
lynx ), internet relay chat clients (irc2, ayttm, BitchX ) and several utility programs
(mingetty, gif2png, csplit, tar, gzip, sudo, KeePassX ). These are widely deployed
applications and their integrity is essential for a smooth functioning of the system.
6.8.1 Vulnerabilities
In this section, we discuss DemandFlow’s ability to uncover standard vulnerabilities
such as format string and directory traversal attacks. As explained in Section 6.4.2,
format string flaws arise due to an unsafe implementation of variable-argument pro-
cedures in C. A directory traversal vulnerability typically arises when a filename
supplied by an user is employed in a file-access procedure without sufficient valida-
tion. A malicious user can malform the name by including a .. (dot dot) within the
response, thereby gaining an ability to ascend outside the authorized directory. This
vulnerability can be uncovered in a similar manner, by assigning a tainted label to
the inputs coming from an untrusted channel and raising an alarm at any use of a
tainted value as a filename argument to any file-access function.
Fig 6.5 shows that DemandFlow uncovers six previously unknown vulnerabili-
ties, apart from detecting all previously known vulnerabilities in this set of programs.
Next, we discuss the characteristics of these zero-day vulnerabilities.
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(a) Source code snippet                            (b) Executable code snippet 
 





     case 'b': 
        //Unsafe Initialization 
       suffix = optarg;   
       break;}   




    suffix,  //Format string Arg 
    num);   
0x8056160:  Fixed location for optarg;  
0x80561ac: Memory address of suffix 
 
(Address)         (Instruction) 
main: 
……. 
804afb4:        mov    0x8056160,%eax   //Load from optarg 
804afb9:        mov    %eax,0x80561ac    //Store to suffix  




804a18e:      mov    0x80561ac,%eax    //Load from suffix 
....... 
804a1c6:       mov    %eax,0x4(%esp)     //Initialize format arg 
804a1ca:       mov    %edx,(%esp) 
804a1cd:       call   8048ec0 <sprintf@plt>  
Figure 6.6: Code snipped from csplit showing the format string vulnerability. Second
operand is the destination in executable code.
csplit : csplit is a well-known GNU Coreutil program. DemandFlow detected a
possible format string vulnerability in this utility. Fig 6.6 shows the corresponding
source-code snippet as well as executable code snippet. csplit declares a global
variable suffix, which is initialized in procedure main using an input argument
(optarg). Next, suffix is employed directly as a format string argument in a
call to sprintf. DemandFlow flagged this unsafe information flow from an external
source to a format string argument. We notified the Coreutil developers about this
vulnerability. They pointed to an implicit sanitization procedure, but are validating
its behavior for this new vulnerability.
Fig 6.6(b), the global variable suffix is allocated to a memory location in the
executable. DemandFlow would not have uncovered this unsafe flow if the infor-
mation is not propagated across memory locations. This example underscores the
importance of our precise memory analysis for exposing information flow vulnera-
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bilities in executables.
ayttm: ayttm is vulnerable to a previously unknown format string attack. In
ayttm, a procedure http connect populates a variable inputline by receiving data
from network using a call to external procedure recv. Then, inputline is assigned
to a variable debug buff using snprintf, which is further used as a format string
argument in a printf call. This vulnerability has been confirmed by the developers.
BitchX : DemandFlow exposes a format string vulnerability in napster plugin
in BitchX. The behavior is similar to the vulnerability in csplit, where an input
argument value is employed as a format string argument in a call to vsnprintf.
yafc, irc2, curl : DemandFlow exposes directory traversal vulnerabilities in
each of these three programs. The underlying behavior of the uncovered vulnerabil-
ities is similar in all these programs. These programs employ getenv to derive the
name of the current directory and prepend the resulting value to derive the name
of a file. This resulting filename is employed to open a file using a fopen call with-
out any sanitization. As per several existing attacks [1], an attacker might corrupt
the environment variables, Hence, employing environment variables for deriving a
filename renders the application susceptible to directory traversal attacks. We have
notified the respective developers.
In all these programs, maintaining the actual information source as part of
SymInf abstraction, instead of a single bit taint information, directly exposes the
corresponding unsafe source without any post-hoc analysis. This eases the task of
































































































































Figure 6.7: Format string vulnerability detection.
Next, we establish the importance of reasoning about memory accesses for
vulnerability detection. In order to simulate the functionality of previous tools [53],
which do not track memory locations, the analysis presented in Section 6.6 is mod-
ified to compute SymInf abstraction for only the variables. This is accomplished by
disabling the rules in Fig 6.4 for memory access instructions and by computing only
IR. The resulting analysis fails to unmask even a single vulnerability in the programs
listed in Fig 6.5. This demonstrates the importance of a precise memory analysis
for implementing a robust information flow mechanism in executables.
6.8.2 False Positives
Fig 6.7 presents the false positives reported by DemandFlow for each of the programs
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Figure 6.8: Directory traversal attacks.
statistics with the false positive reports generated by existing source-level static
analysis tools (Oink [4], CQual [132] and others [75]) we ran against the same
programs2. DemandFlow reports similar false alarms as existing source-level tools
for the programs listed in Fig 6.5.
Fig 6.8 presents the corresponding statistics obtained for the directory traver-
sal vulnerability. Even though DemandFlow reports eight false positives for lynx
and ayttm, it translates to less than 0.1 false alarms per 1000 lines of code. To the
best of our knowledge, no existing source-level static analysis tool has reported di-
rectory traversal vulnerability statistics for the above set of programs, consequently,
the results could not be compared.
The false positive rate (FP/Total Reports) is 79.1% for above programs which
2The programs with no corresponding results by source-tools are conservatively assumed to



















































































































































Figure 6.9: Size of Demand Set (SR and SM) normalized (=1.0) to all variables
and a-locs respetively.
is slightly better than 84% false positive rate [43] reported by source-tools like Oink
and CQual [4, 132]. In total, only around 50 false positives were reported in programs
coming from more than 5 million lines of code. Corresponding statistics for SPEC
benchmarks are presented in Appendix 6.8.5.
6.8.3 Scalability
Recall from Section 6.3, our demand driven analysis enhances DemandFlow’s scal-
ability. Here, we quantify this enhancement.
Fig 6.9 presents the size of Demand Set, SR and SM, as determined using the
rules in Fig 6.2, for detecting format string vulnerability. The sizes of SR and SM
are normalized against the total number of variables and a-locs in the program





















Figure 6.10: Scalability of demand driven and exhaustive analysis with increasing
lines of code.
overall analysis requirement. This enables DemandFlow to only analyze around
20% of total objects, on average, without sacrificing the precision. KeePassX, being
a C++ program, does not have many format string calls. Hence, it has relatively
small SR and SM set.
Fig 6.10 highlights the ensuing enhancement in DemandFlow’s scalability as
a result of employing a Demand Set. It plots the variation in the time taken to
analyze the programs in a demand-driven manner with increasing lines of code and
compares it with an exhaustive analysis over the complete program. The exhaustive
analysis is implemented by discarding the Demand Set and applying the rules in
Fig 6.4 for all program objects. Fig 6.10 includes the programs listed in Fig 6.5 as
well as programs from complete SPEC2006 benchmark suite. As evident, demand-
driven analysis is approximately 10x more scalable than the exhaustive analysis.
For example, the time to analyze gcc, a large SPEC2006 benchmark with 250,000
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lines of code, reduces to less than a minute as compared to more than 11 minutes in
exhaustive analysis. This scalability becomes more evident in programs like MySQL
where demand mechanism was able to finish the analysis in 7 minutes (not shown
in the graph) as compared to more than an hour of exhaustive analysis.
6.8.4 Information Flow Leakage
6.8.4.1 KeePassX
We employ DemandFlow to understand the flow of password information in KeeP-
assX [3], a popular open-source password manager utility. It stores the passwords
in an encrypted database, protected by a master password.
KeePassX decrypts the stored passwords using a special unlock procedure.
The callsites to procedure unlock are marked as confidential locations while all the
unknown external procedure callsites (writing to file, mapping with keyboard symbol,
console output) are marked as untrusted locations. The resulting analysis reveals
various program points where confidential information flows into untrusted channels.
These locations include methods for keyboard symbol conversion for auto-typing the
password to a desired location and writing to a file for exporting the databases.
The information flow for auto-typing a password involves possibly unsafe op-
erations. The auto-typing to a desired location is accomplished through a hot-key
mechanism. On pressing the hot key, the utility looks up the correct entry in the
database and executes its auto-type sequence. However, the manual analysis of
the code revealed that KeePassX only compares the title of the current window
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while searching for the correct entry. This results in a previously unknown infor-
mation leakage in this application. A malicious webpage, whose title matches the
title of an entry present in the database, will be able to obtain the corresponding
username/password information. We tested this mechanism by creating a dummy
webpage with the same title as a secure entry, and we were able to transfer the
corresponding login information to the dummy webpage.
6.8.4.2 thttpd
thttpd is a small web-server application. Previous dynamic information flow tracking
methods have demonstrated the leakage of password information due to thttpd’s
inherent authentication mechanism [147]. Here, we demonstrate the presence of
this leakage using DemandFlow.
thttpd stores the authentication information in an internal database. Any con-
nection request is first validated by comparing the username and password specified
by the user with the internal database. We assign the global variable corresponding
to the database file with the confidential label. The network procedures used by
httpd for connecting to the user (e.g. send authenticate) are marked as untrusted
program locations. The mapping of the symbolic lattice onto the lattice described
above reveals that arguments to untrusted procedures, both at program locations
where the authentication is valid and invalid, contain confidential labels.
The comparison of the above result with the previous method [147] highlights
an inherent limitation of static information flow systems over dynamic systems.
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App Lang LOC # Proc Time Mem FP FP
(s) (MB) Fmt Dir
Str Trav
bwaves F 715 22 0.1 .15 0 0
lbm C 939 30 0.1 0.17 0 0
mcf C 1695 36 0.1 0.2 0 0
libq C 2743 73 0.8 0.5 0 0
leslie3d F 3024 32 1.0 2.5 0 0
namd C++ 4077 193 0.5 0.50 0 1
astar C++ 4377 111 1.5 0.25 0 0
bzip2 C 5896 51 1.2 1 0 0
milc C 9784 172 1.2 1.56 0 0
sjeng C 10628 121 1.4 2.6 0 2
sphinx C 13683 210 1.3 3.5 0 0
zeusmp F 19068 68 3.1 3.75 0 0
omnetpp C++ 20393 3980 22.9 87.5 0 0
hmmer C 20973 242 1.5 3.72 0 0
soplex C++ 28592 1523 1.5 10.3 0 0
h264 C 36495 462 4.2 26.4 0 0
cactus C 60452 962 3.1 8.3 0 1
gromacs C/F 65182 674 9.6 46.1 1 0
dealII C++ 96382 15619 1.2 3.1 0 0
calculix C/F 105683 771 20.1 70.7 0 0
tonto F 108330 4086 3.5 5.8 0 0
povray C++ 108339 3678 1.8 3.1 0 0
perlbench C 126367 2183 24.6 59.7 0 0
gobmk C 157883 4188 12.9 30.2 0 2
gcc C 236269 6426 62.4 110.5 0 0
xalan C++ 267318 14441 4.5 9.82 0 0
Figure 6.11: Spec Benchmarks
RIFLE [147], being a dynamic method, assigns an individual label to each different
username and password. The experiments, as presented by Vachharajani et al. [147],
demonstrate that in the case of an unauthorized user access, the reply consists of
the labels of all the usernames since the whole file is scanned. In the case of an
authorized access, the reply contains the labels of usernames upto the authorized
username in the database and the password of the current user.
On the other hand, a static framework like DemandFlow does not have any
access to data and can only track the leakage of statically visible information in a
program. It is not possible to assign the labels corresponding to individual elements
in the database, the label can be applied at the granularity of the complete database.





























Format String Directory Traversal
Figure 6.12: Vulnerability detection in Coreutils
as compared to RIFLE.
6.8.5 Spec Benchmarks and Coreutils
In this section, we demonstrate DemandFlow’s scalability by applying the analysis
on the complete SPEC benchmark suite. SPEC benchmarks suite contain several
large real-world applications and comprise a diverse set of real and environment
intensive applications.
Fig 6.11 lists the running time, storage requirements and possible vulnerabil-
ities reported by DemandFlow for each of the programs in SPEC benchmark suite.
As evident from the table, the analysis time is typically low, under a minutes all

























Figure 6.13: Time for analyzing Coreutils
100 MB, well within the memory available on modern systems. Similar to KeeP-
assX example, the time and storage requirements are typically lower for C++ and
Fortran programs due to relatively smaller number of format string calls. A limited
overall storage requirement validates the computation of information flow expres-
sions instead of a single-bit taint information, as employed by most information-flow
frameworks. DemandFlow raises only one false alarm regarding format-string vul-
nerability and only a few misleading instances of directory traversal vulnerability
for the complete set of the benchmarks. This translates to an extremely low false-
positive rate of .007 per 1000 lines of code (7/106).
The statistics presented in Fig 6.12 demonstrate that DemandFlow reports
three instances of format-string vulnerability in complete Coreutils suite. One on
these three instances is a possible true positive (csplit in Fig 6.5). Further, it only
169
reports 15 false samples for directory traversal vulnerability. This translates to a low
false-alarm rate of 0.107 per 1000 lines of code (18/140,000). and all 89 programs in
the latest stable version of GNU Coreutils (Version 8.10) while Coreutils and form
the core user-level environment installed on many Unix systems.
Fig 6.13 plots the running time for analyzing GNU Coreutils. The time spent
ranges from 0.5 seconds for smaller applications like test to 7 seconds for larger ones
like shasum.
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Chapter 7: Cache Locking
7.1 Introduction
Modern embedded systems employ several memory technologies to meet stringent
run-time and power consumption constraints. SRAM and DRAM are the two most
common memories used for storing program code and data. Due to the relative cost
and performance of these memories, a large amount of DRAM is often complemented
with a small-size on-chip SRAM. The proper use of SRAM in embedded systems is
imperative in meeting run-time and energy constraints.
SRAM is most commonly managed in the form of a hardware-cache. A cache
dynamically stores a subset of the frequently used data or instructions following a
fixed replacement policy.
Various different approaches have been suggested to enable software involve-
ment in the management of on-chip memory. One approach involves the addition
of lightweight software-controlled memory like Scratchpad memory (SPM) which
rely on explicit compiler support for data allocation. Another approach involves
explicit modifications to the cache memory structure and availability of program-
mer level cache control instructions to enable direct software involvement in cache
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replacement decisions.
On similar lines, several embedded systems like Intel’s XScale and ARM’s
latest cortex processors provide the facility of locking one or more lines in the cache
- this feature is called cache locking. An address, once locked in the cache, always
results in a hit on subsequent accesses unless an unlocking operation is explicitly
carried out. Thus, the software can influence the replacement decision made by the
cache and thereby alleviate the potential mistakes resulting from cache hardware
management. As an example, suppose a soon-to-be-accessed element is susceptible
to replacement according to the underlying cache replacement policy in favor of an
element that will not be accessed soon, locking this element in the cache will result
in a better cache performance.
However, current methods regarding instruction cache locking are geared to-
wards improving real-time predictability of applications [117, 116, 68, 151]. These
methods employ instruction cache locking for adapting the cache to multi-task real
time systems.
We presented the first method in literature [9] employing instruction cache
locking as a mechanism for improving the average-case run-time of general embed-
ded applications, thus widening its applicability beyond hard real time systems.
Our scheme is implemented inside a binary rewriter; hence is applicable to binaries
compiled using any compiler or software development toolchains and to programs
whose source code is not available e.g. legacy code or third party software. Cache
locking technique can be applied to both instruction and data caches but in this
work, we limit ourselves to the problem of instruction cache locking.
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Liang and Mitra [98] extended our earlier work [9] and presented an optimal
algorithm for static instruction cache locking. However, both these methods only
explore static cache locking, where instructions are locked once before the start of
the program and remain locked during the entire execution of the program.
In this work, we extend our earlier instruction cache locking mechanism and
propose a novel dynamic cache locking algorithm, where the addresses locked in the
cache are updated dynamically during the execution of a program. Our mechanism
identifies the program points with significant shift in program locality and employs
a cost-driven model to compute the set of lines which should be locked at each
such program point. The input program is instrumented to achieve the locking
of required lines at each program point. This mechanism accounts for changing
program requirements at runtime and dynamically modifies the cache content.
We also demonstrate that an optimal solution to dynamic instruction cache
locking can be obtained in polynomial time, contrary to the previously held belief [9]
about instruction cache locking being a NP-complete problem. However, as we will
discuss in later sections, such an algorithm cannot be implemented practically with
current support for instruction cache locking. Hence, we propose a heuristic based
approach for deriving a solution for dynamic cache locking.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. Section 7.2 describes the un-
derlying cache locking interface. Section 7.3 overviews related work and lists the
advantages of our method. Section 7.4 presents a small example to depict the benefit
of instruction cache locking. Section 7.5 formalizes the cache locking problem and
its complexity. Section 7.6 presents our solution for static cache locking while Sec-
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tion 7.7 presents the dynamic counterpart. Section 7.8 presents an overview of our
implementation framework. Section 7.9 presents our method’s results for different
cache and architecture configurations on a variety of benchmarks.
7.2 Cache Locking Interface
There are two most common kind of locking mechanisms present in modern embed-
ded systems - way locking and line locking. Way locking is a coarse grain approach to
cache locking where locking is available at the granularity of ways of a set-associative
cache. Locking a particular way in cache implies the way is locked in each set of the
set-associative cache. This kind of locking is present in ARM’s cortex processors [15]
and ARM11 family of processors [14].
Line locking is a more fine-grained approach to cache locking. In this interface,
the locking mechanism is available at the granularity of single cache line as opposed
to single way in way locking. In this interface, it is possible to have a different number
of locked lines in different sets of the cache. Intel’s XScale [159], ARM9 family and
BlackFin 5xx family processors [30] support this kind of locking mechanism.
In this work, we explore the line locking interface present on embedded sys-
tems. These platforms provide special co-processor-based lock instructions for lock-
ing an address specified as their argument in the cache. In such processors, way
0 of the cache can’t be locked; we respect this constraint in deriving our results.
However, we emphasize that our method does not require any such constraint and
can be applied for locking lines in all the ways of any set.
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7.3 Related Work
There are many existing methods targeting improvement of on-chip memory perfor-
mance through software involvement. Research in this direction can be broadly cate-
gorized in two approaches: (i) approaches involving an additional software-controlled
memory apart from, or instead of, the cache; and (ii) approaches involving direct
modifications of the cache memory structure.
The first category of methods involve modifications to the memory hierarchy by
introducing additional software-controlled memories like Scratchpad memory (SPM)
and loop caches. Various different kind of methods have been suggested for managing
the data to be placed in SPM [134, 24, 112, 152, 153, 138, 18, 146]. A loop cache [70]
is a small instruction buffer which can be pre-loaded with frequently executed loops
and functions thus accelerating their access-time during program execution. SPMs
and loop caches are used in industry primarily where the run-time behavior of
applications is predictable; or to improve real-time performance. Caches are better
at tracking run-time behavior; hence are widely used in many non-real-time and
soft-real-time systems.
Even though cache locking tries to achieve the same goal of improving local
memory performance, its management strategy is inherently different from the al-
location problems for the above software-controlled memories such as SPM. There
are two reasons for that. First, when a cache locking method decides to lock an
line in the cache, other lines that conflict with it can no longer reside in cache in a
direct-mapped cache, or have reduced number of slots available in a set-associative
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cache. This opportunity cost does not occur, and is not modeled, by methods for
SPM allocation. In contrast, our cache locking method inherently models this cost.
Correctly modeling this opportunity cost is crucial – a SPM allocator oblivious to
this cost when used for locking could exclude heavily used lines from cache, leading
to poor run-time. Another reason that SPM allocators are not suitable for cache
locking is that a particular element can be placed at any location in SPM, whereas
the cache hardware decides the location of each element in a cache. This results
in entirely different kinds of constraints for the cache locking problem. The energy
model in terms of cache hits and misses suggested in [152] for cache-aware SPM allo-
cation is somewhat similar to the time model we present but their method addresses
a completely different problem.
In the second category, there are methods that involve modifications to the
cache hardware to equip software to dynamically modify cache replacement deci-
sions. Rudolph et al [44] introduce column caching, to provide software the ability
to dynamically partition the on-chip memory into scratchpad memory; Wang et
al [126] proposed the extension of each cache line with evict-me and kill-me bits;
along with a compile time locality analyzer to determine their values. These meth-
ods provide interesting ideas for improving cache performance but rely on hardware
modifications that are unavailable in any commercial processors. In contrast, our
method is a software-only scheme applicable to a variety of commercial processors.
Research has been carried out to exploit the cache features present in existing
hardwares - locking is one such kind of feature available in modern embedded sys-
tems. Hollander et al [29] suggested reuse-distance-based methods for generating
176
cache hints for memory access instructions, available in EPIC architectures, result-
ing in improved data cache performance. In contrast, we don’t target the hardware
with cache hints; rather we target cache locking hardwares.
Instruction cache locking has primarily been employed as a mechanism for
adapting the cache to multi-task real time systems. In multi-task systems, the
presence of caches leads to unpredictability and results in extreme over-estimation of
worst case execution time, as each access can result in a miss in the worst case [117].
I-cache locking has been employed in such scenarios to provide predictability; thus
improving the worst case estimation. The objective of the cache-content selection
problem in such scenarios is to improve the worst case system behavior according to
some of real-time schedulability metrics as described in [117, 116, 68, 151, 16, 40].
In contrast, our objective of cache-content selection is to improve average case run-
time of embedded applications which is completely different objective, requiring a
very different strategy.
There has been very little research on using cache locking for performance
improvement of general embedded applications. Hu et al [161] presented a method
for data cache locking in Itanium and XScale processors based on the length of the
reference window for each data-access instruction. In contrast, we present a locking
scheme for the instruction cache. Further, their method doesn’t involve finding
the optimal number of cache lines to be locked in the cache; rather they rely on
locking every possible line which can be locked in cache. The over-aggressive locking
might provide negative results and does not ensure that the locked cache would give
perform better than cache with no locking. Our method suitably addresses these
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limitations.
Earlier, we had presented the first method [9] in literature employing instruc-
tion cache locking as a mechanism for improving the average-case run-time of general
embedded applications. However, our previous work only explored a static solution
to cache locking. Liang and Mitra [98] extended our work and presented an optimal
strategy for static instruction cache locking. Later, Liu et al [100] also present a
method for employing instruction cache locking for improving average case perfor-
mance. However, their model does not model cache conflicts and is only applicable
to fully associative caches. Their method relies on techniques like code positions
to eliminate the conflicts. In contrast, our method directly models conflicts and is
applicable to a cache with any associativity.
In this work, we extend our previous work [9] and propose a dynamic solution
for cache locking, which accounts for changing program requirements at runtime
and updates the instructions locked in cache dynamically with program execution.
We summarize the benefits of our scheme: (i) ours is the first method for
employing instruction-cache locking as a mechanism for improving the average case
run-time of general embedded applications, thus widening its applicability beyond
hard real time systems. (ii) ours is the first dynamic method for instruction cache
locking, enabling better results than static schemes. (iii) we provide a profile-based
method and derive the cost-benefit from actual cache statistics; thus our method
is guaranteed to improve over the performance of cache without locking. (iv) our
method has been implemented inside a binary rewriter, widening its applicability to
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Figure 7.1: (a) Weighted CFG of a small part of a program. A, B, C and D are
instructions of 4 byte each (b) A hypothetical memory layout of the above instructions
(c) A dummy 16-byte direct mapped instruction cache. The alphabets at right hand
side of each cache line show the instructions which are mapped to the line according
to the cache mapping function (d) The execution trace of this part of the program
that determines the optimal number of cache lines to be locked - it does not lock
each possible cache line, as suggested by some previous methods. (vi) cache locking
is already available on existing hardwares and thus our method does not entail any
new hardware modifications, making our approach readily applicable.
7.4 Motivation
In this section, we present the potential benefits of instruction-cache locking in
improving cache efficiency via a small example. Figure 7.1 shows a weighted control-
flow graph (7.1(a)) and execution trace (7.1(d)) of a small part of a program; its
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hypothetical memory layout (7.1(b)) and a dummy cache configuration (7.1(c)).
The nodes and edges of the control-flow graph are labeled with their execution
frequencies as observed during a profile run of the program. The execution trace
(7.1(d)) of the program reveals that a single execution of node B is followed by
four instances of node C. This sequence of execution of node B followed by node
C is repeated 10 times during the execution of the program. For simplicity, we
assume that nodes A, B, C and D contain only a single instruction each. For ease
of explanation, the instruction cache is a tiny 16-byte direct mapped cache with
one word per line. The addresses are mapped to the cache lines according to the
standard modulo-based cache mapping function:




According to the above cache mapping function and the memory layout, in-
structions B and C share the same line in the cache. During the execution of the
above program, node B and node C alternately keep replacing each other in the
cache, resulting in a large number of cache misses. The second column in Fig-
ure 7.2(a) shows that this cache configuration leads to 22 misses for this sample
program.
Next, assume the presence of locking functionality inside the instruction cache.
If node C is locked into cache line 0 then C would not be replaced by node B during
the execution of the program. Node C would observe only one compulsory miss while



























Figure 7.2: (a)Number of misses observed for each node with and without locking
(b) Locking of node C in set 0 of cache
shows the number of misses observed by each node when node C is locked in cache
as shown in Figure 7.2(b). With cache locking, we observe only 13 misses, down
from 22 misses in cache without locking. This example highlights the potential of
I-cache locking as an effective mechanism for reducing cache misses.
7.5 Theoretical Analysis of Cache Locking
The cache-locking problem involves selecting the memory addresses which should be
locked in the cache during each time interval, and the program locations for locking
and unlocking, such that the total number of instruction cache misses over the
lifetime of the program is minimized. The solution to this problem is influenced by
the behavior of the cache mapping function. In a set-associative cache, an address is
mapped to the cache line according to the cache mapping function (7.1). For a given
memory address, this function returns the cache set where the address is mapped in
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the cache. A particular memory address always gets mapped to the same set in the
cache, given by the above function. Thus, given the full range of instruction-memory
addresses in the current program, the list of addresses which get mapped to a set
during the lifetime of the program can be accurately obtained for each cache set.
Once this mapping of addresses to the corresponding set is obtained, each cache set
can be independently analyzed to determine the memory addresses to be locked in
that set.
At each time instant T, the cache locking problem has two objectives (i) de-
termining the number of lines, L, which should be locked in this set (ii) selecting L
virtual cache lines out of total candidates which should be locked in the set.
In his seminal paper [27], Belady proposed an optimal offline replacement
policy for virtual memory pages, which has been subsequently widely applied for
cache analysis as well. Belady’s algorithm achieves the lowest possible cache miss
rate. Other faster algorithms [140] have also been proposed to achieve the optimal
cache miss rate. Collectively, the class of such algorithms is referred to as OPT
algorithm. We demonstrate that the OPT algorithm can be employed to provide an
optimal solution for cache locking problem in each cache set.
The OPT algorithm analyzes the cache accesses in the trace in the execution
order. The resulting replacement decisions can either be employed for improving
cache performance in future executions or for comparing different cache strategies.
Intuitively, given a trace of block accesses for the program, the OPT algorithm is based
on evicting the block which will be referenced furthest in the future. Consider an
address X that is referenced twice in a program trace at times t1 and t2, t2 ≥ t1.
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According to OPT algorithm, the decision for keeping X in the cache during the time
interval {t1,t2} is taken at t2 (and implemented at t1 in future executions). X is
not kept in the cache if the total number of elements already in the cache in time
interval {t1,t2} is equal to the cache capacity; otherwise it is kept in this interval.
We observe that the ability to lock an address in the cache provides a tangible
mechanism to implement the solution proposed by OPT algorithm. For example, in
order to keep an element X in the cache during the time interval {t1,t2}, X can be
locked in the cache at t1 and unlocked at t2. Consequently, cache locking mecha-
nism actuates the implementation of OPT algorithm. Based on this observation, we
state the following important lemma.
LEMMA: An optimal solution for cache locking can be derived in a polynomial
time, assuming perfect prior knowledge of memory accesses.
PROOF : OPT is a polynomial time algorithm for obtaining an optimal solution
for cache performance. In other words, the OPT algorithm minimizes the number of
misses in the cache. The Cache locking problem shares the same goal of minimizing
the number of misses in the cache. The capability of locking a line in cache enables
the implementation of each step of OPT algorithm in a constant time. Hence, OPT
is an optimal solution for the cache locking problem as well. The polynomial time
complexity of OPT results in a polynomial-time optimal algorithm for cache locking.
A perfect (or complete) knowledge of future memory accesses enables OPT algo-
rithm to make optimal replacement decisions. Extending this optimal replacement
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algorithm to the cache locking problem implicitly models the opportunity cost aris-
ing due to precluding the remaining elements from the cache during cache locking
since OPT considers every cache line as a possible candidate for locking.
However, the mechanism of inserting a cache locking instruction for locking
an element in the cache, as presented in Section 7.2, generates several pragmatic
challenges. The OPT algorithm provides a set of addresses which should be locked in
the cache at each program instant. A direct instrumentation of the program with
the instructions for locking these addresses changes the program layout, invalidating
the results provided by OPT algorithm. The other option is to leave a placeholder
before each instruction in the program. These placeholders can later be employed
for inserting cache locking instructions as per the results of OPT algorithm. The
remaining placeholders can be replaced by a NOP instruction. However, the presence
of large number of such NOP instructions results in a huge overhead in execution-time,
negating the improvement in memory performance due to cache locking.
Consequently, the cache locking mechanism present in current hardware leaves
us in a conundrum where the optimal algorithm cannot be implemented. Hence, we
propose two distinct solutions to overcome this practical challenge:
→ Static Cache Locking: We formulate a static solution to instruction cache
locking where instructions are locked once before the start of the program
and remain locked during the entire execution of the program. This solution
obviates any requirement of changing the program layout.
→ Dynamic Cache Locking: In this formulation, we obtain an hybrid be-
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tween static locking and OPT algorithm. Instead of inserting placeholders at
each point in the program, we insert placeholders only at judiciously chosen
program points. Such program points are chosen based on a possibility of
a large change in program locality. These placeholders are later replaced by
cache locking instructions or NOP as per the requirement.
Section 7.6 presents the solution for Static Cache Locking. Section 7.7 extends
this solution to obtain Dynamic Cache Locking.
7.6 Static Cache Locking
In this section, we formalize the cache locking problem as an optimization problem
and explain our cache locking algorithm in detail. We present a static solution to
instruction cache locking where instructions are locked once before the start of the
program and remain locked during the entire execution of the program.
Since elements in the cache are locked at the granularity of cache lines and not
individual memory addresses, addresses need to be analyzed in terms of cache lines.
In order to mathematically represent this situation, we introduce a new concept of
virtual cache line. Given an instruction address, addr, the Virtual Cache Line is
defined as




The remaining analysis for cache locking is carried out in terms of virtual cache
lines. We introduce the following definitions to ease the explanation
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N: Associativity of the cache; s: A cache set
Xs: Set of virtual cache lines which get mapped to set s
M: Cardinality of set Xs.
K: Hardware specified limits on maximum number of lines which can be locked in a
set
L: Number of lines to be locked, L ≤ K
The static cache locking problem has two objectives (i) determining L: the
number of lines which should be locked in this set (ii) selecting L virtual cache lines,
out of M candidates, which should be locked in the set.
If L lines are locked in this set, L locked virtual cache lines result in L compul-
sory misses and no other misses are observed for these lines. The remaining M - L
virtual cache lines from set Xs perceive the cache as a N - L set associative cache. In
case the total number of virtual cache lines sharing this particular cache set is more
than the associativity of the cache, this decreased associativity might result in an
increased miss rate for the remaining lines.
The number of solutions to the cache-locking problem is exponential since
there are an exponential number of ways to choose up to K lines to lock out of M
contenders. In all likelihood, this is a classical NP Hard combinatorial optimization
problem, which does not have an exact solution, although we have not attempted
to formally prove this. Further, finding an exact solution is complicated by the
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fact that the increased miss rate for remaining M - L virtual cache lines cannot be
accurately determined unless we know which virtual cache lines are locked in the
current set of the cache, which is one of the objectives of this optimization problem.
Hence, an exact solution will not only have an exponential number of solutions, but
will require a profiling run for each solution to determine the increased miss rate
for the remaining unlocked lines, which is completely infeasible. Consequently, we
explore an approximate solution for this problem, as presented below.
7.6.1 Cache Locking Algorithm
Here, the solution for one cache set is considered in detail; the same method is
employed repeatedly for each set. Our solution is based upon the total time taken
to access each virtual cache line during the lifetime of the program. We introduce a
time model for representing the total time taken to access a particular virtual cache
line during the lifetime of the program in presence of locking.
LOCKLIST: The running list of virtual cache lines locked so far in the set.
LL: The number of elements in list LOCKLIST.
HITLL(xi)/MISSLL(xi): Total number of hits/miss obtained for a virtual cache line
xi assuming that LL number of lines were locked in the current set
F(xi): The total number of accesses to a virtual cache line xi.
THIT/TMISS: Hit and Miss latency of the cache, respectively, in processor cycles.
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Mathematically, this model is described as
T ime(xi|LOCKLIST ) = HITLL(xi) ∗ THIT
+ MISSLL(xi) ∗ TMISS
(7.3)
In our notation, Time(A|B) is the total time to access virtual cache line A during
the lifetime of the program given that all the virtual cache lines in mathematical
set B have already been locked in A’s cache set. (This notation is borrowed from
conditional probability.). LOCKLIST is initialized as an empty list. Every time a
line is selected to be locked, the LOCKLIST is updated with the line. The analysis
presented is only applied to xi /∈ LOCKLIST.
In order to find the virtual cache lines which should be locked in this set,
we introduce a cost-benefit model based on the above time model to find the net
benefit (benefit - cost) of locking a particular cache line. The following relation
between number of accesses, number of hits and number of misses always holds
true, irrespective of the number of lines currently locked (LL) in the set:
F (xi) = HITLL(xi) +MISSLL(xi) ∀ LL (7.4)
Using the above relation and the time model from equation (7.3), the original
access time for virtual cache line xi, assuming that virtual cache lines in LOCKLIST
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are already locked in this set, can be represented as:
T ime(xi|LOCKLIST ) = HITLL(xi) ∗ THIT +
(F (xi)−HITLL(xi)) ∗ TMISS
(7.5)
If line xi is locked in cache, only one miss (a compulsory miss) would be
observed for this line. All the remaining accesses to this line would definitely result
in a hit. Thus the new access time for this line would be given by following relation:
T ime(xi|(LOCKLIST ∪ {xi})) = TMISS +
(F (xi)− 1) ∗ THIT
(7.6)
Subtracting equation (7.6) from equation (7.5), the potential benefit of locking
a particular line xi can be expressed as:
BenLock(xi) = T ime(xi|LOCKLIST )
− T ime(xi|(LOCKLIST ∪ {xi}))
= (F (xi)−HITLL(xi)− 1)
∗ (TMISS − THIT ) (7.7)
In order to calculate the cost of locking a line, we only consider the opportunity
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cost of locking a line and not the actual cost of executing locking. Since we are just
considering a static solution, the cost of executing a single locking instruction is
negligible and hence does not affect our analysis.
In order to represent the opportunity cost of locking a particular cache line, we
need to model the increase in total access time for the remaining virtual cache lines
which map to the set under consideration. So far, |LOCKLIST| = LL virtual cache
lines have been selected for locking. Let, Xsi denotes the set of virtual cache lines
mapped to the current cache set si, excluding the LL elements in the list LOCKLIST.
The elements in LOCKLIST are already locked in cache, hence they won’t observe
any opportunity cost.
According to above terminology, each line xj ∈ Xsi observes HITLL(xj) hits.
Each element belonging to set Xsi is a potential candidate for locking. If line xi
is locked at this step, then each remaining element xj of set Xsi would observe a
lesser number of hits, denoted by HITLL+1(xj). This constitutes the cost of locking
a particular line xi. Mathematically, for each xj ∈ Xsi , the original access time is
represented by equation (7.5). The new access time after locking line xi can be
represented as:
T ime(xj|(LOCKLIST ∪ {xi})) = HITLL+1(xj) ∗ THIT +
(F (xj)−HITLL+1(xj)) ∗ TMISS
(7.8)
The increase in access time for one element xj due to locking the line xi,
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denoted by CostLock(xi)(xj), can be represented as
CostLock(xi)(xj) = T ime(xj|(LOCKLIST ∪ {xi}))
− (T ime(xj|LOCKLIST )
= (HITLL(xj)−HITLL+1(xj))
∗ (TMISS − THIT ) (7.9)





The net benefit of locking a particular virtual cache line can be calculated as
NetBenefit(xi) = BenLock(xi)− CostLock(xi) (7.11)
A positive NetBenefit for a cache line implies that locking this line would
result in a lesser total memory access time for the program. Magnitude of the
NetBenefit represents the change in total access time. Thus the cache line with
maximum positive benefit is the ideal candidate for locking at this step.
In order to meet the both the objectives of the problem – determining the
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N : Cache size in number of lines
K: Number of lines which can be locked in each set
S: Number of sets in the cache.
si: Set where memory address xi gets mapped
Xsi : The set of memory addresses which get mapped to set si
F (xi): Total number of memory accesses to address xi
LL: Iterator over number of lines locked in one set
HITLL(xi): Total number of hits obtained for xi when LL lines are locked in set si
MISSLL(xi): Total number of miss obtained for xi when LL lines are locked in set si
LockList(si): Set of virtual cache lines which should be locked in set si
NumLockLines(si):Number of virtual cache lines which should be locked in set si.
THIT / TMISS : Hit/Miss latency in processor cycles
void Cache Locking Algorithm() {
1. for(each set si in range 0 to S -1 ) do {
2. for(each LL in range 0 to K -1 ) do {
3. for (each xi in Xsi) {





6. NetBenefit(xi) = BenLock(xi)− CostLock(xi)
7. }
8. If there exists a xk such that NetBenefit(xk) is maximum and is positive.{
9. Add xk to LockList(si)
10. NumLockLines(si) = NumLockLines(si) + 1
11. Xsi = Xsi − xk
12. }
13. else {






Figure 7.3: Static Cache Locking Algorithm.
number of cache lines to be locked in the set and selecting the virtual cache lines
to be locked in these lines of the set – we devise a greedy and iterative solution
for this problem. Let us examine the steps taken at the (LL + 1)th iteration. At
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this point, we have a list LOCKLIST of LL virtual cache lines which should be locked
in the set. The above model is used to calculate the NetBenefit for each of the
virtual cache line xi|xi ∈ Xsi . If the net-benefit is negative for all the elements, the
locking is discontinued for this set, implying that it is not beneficial to lock any more
cache line in this set. The running list LOCKLIST represents the final list of virtual
cache lines which should be locked in this set. If there is at least one element with
positive net-benefit, we find the virtual cache line which has maximum net benefit
for locking. This line is added to the list LOCKLIST and is removed from the locking
candidates set Xsi . The above steps are repeated at each iteration until at least one
of the following two conditions is true: (i) we reach the limit of maximum cache lines
which can be locked in a set or (ii) we reach a point where the net benefit becomes
zero for each virtual cache line in this set. At the end of this process, we get the
number of cache lines (|LOCKLIST|) as well as memory addresses which should be
locked in this set (LOCKLIST). In other words, we obtain the solution for both the
unknowns of cache locking problem. Figure 7.3 describes the psuedocode for the
cache locking algorithm.
In the above cost-benefit model, HITLL+1 cannot be determined precisely till
we know which virtual cache line gets locked during the current step of iteration
and would be different for each virtual cache line. Determing the exact value is
completely infeasible given that the number of profile runs needed would equal the
number of virtual cache lines, which is a very large number. Thus, an approximate
value of HITLL+1 is obtained by locking a dummy (unused) virtual cache line in the
set apart from LL lines already locked. Nevertheless, this approximation always
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provides conservative estimates for future hit rate – in reality, one less virtual cache
line would be competing for space in cache – and thus locking a line is guaranteed
to show performance improvement.
7.7 Dynamic Cache Locking
In this section, we discuss our mechanism for dynamically updating the contents
locked in a cache. As mentioned in Section 7.5, our dynamic solution is based
on possibly changing the locked contents of cache at the program points having a
possibility of a significant change in the program locality.
The solution consists of the following steps. First, the program code is analyzed
to determine a set of promising program points. Second, a timestamp is associated
with every program point such that the program points are reached during runtime
in the timestamp order. Third, the timestamps are updated to discard the program
points with high execution frequency since they will result in high locking overheads.
The code between two consecutive timestamped program points represents a code
region. Regions correspond to the granularity at which cache locking decisions
are made. Next, a heuristic based algorithm is employed to compute the locked
content in the cache at these refined program points. The cache content is fixed
in a particular region, but may change at region boundaries. We first describe our
method for determining such program points (and regions) and then propose our
solution to determine the locked cache content in each particular region.
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    main() { 
        proc-A(); 
        proc-B(); 
        while()  {..} 
    } 
 
    proc-A(){ 
        proc-C(); 
    } 
 
    proc-B(){ 
       proc-C(); 
       for() { ...} 
    } 
 
    proc-C(){ 
       ... 
     } 





















Figure 7.4: Example showing (a) a program outline; and (b) its DPRG showing
nodes, edges & timestamps (c) modified DPRG nodes and timestamps assuming
that execution frequency of proc C is greater than LIMIT
7.7.1 Program Points
The choice of program points is critical to the success of the algorithm. Promising
program points are those after which the program has a significant change in locality
behavior. Further, the dynamic frequency of program points should be less than the
frequency of regions, so that the cost of executing cache locking instructions can
be recouped by corresponding improvement in memory performance. Hence, sites
just before the start of loops are especially promising program points since they are
infrequently executed compared to the insides of loops. Moreover, the loop often
re-uses instructions, justifying the cost of locking lines in the cache.
With the above considerations, we employ a modified version of Data-Program
Region Graph (DPRG), proposed by Udayakumaran and Barua [145], for determin-
ing program points. We modify the original DPRG structure [145] in two aspects.
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First, the original DPRG was proposed to solve the data allocation problem, hence
it also represents variable accesses. We do not need to represent variables since we
are only targeting instruction cache locking. Second, we refine the program points
obtained through original DPRG structure by discarding the program points with
high execution frequency, since locking at those locations results in high overheads.
The threshold for refining the program points is heuristically determined using pro-
filing, as explained in later sections. Below, we summarize the DPRG structure and
our modifications to this structure.
DPRG defines program points as (i) the start and end of each procedure; (ii)
just before and just after each loop (even inner loops of nested loops). In this way,
program points track most major control-flow constructs in a program. Program
points in a DPRG are the only initial candidate sites for applying cache locking
in the ensuing region. This set is further refined and the actual solution regarding
the elements to be locked in each region is governed by the method proposed in
Section 7.7.2.
Figure 7.4 shows an example illustrating how a program is divided into regions
and then marked with timestamps. Figure 7.4(a) shows the outline of an example
program. It consists of four procedures, namely main(), proc-A(), proc-B()
and proc-C() and two loops, Loop1 and Loop2.
Figure 7.4(b) shows the Data Program Relationship Graph (DPRG) (exclud-
ing variable accesses) for the program in figure 7.4(a). The DPRG data structure
helps in the marking of timestamps and the identification of regions. The DPRG
is essentially the programs call graph appended with new nodes for loops. In the
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DPRG shown in figure 7.4(b), there are three procedures and two loops. We see that
oval nodes represent procedures and circular nodes represent loops. Edges to pro-
cedure nodes represent calls while edges to loop nodes shows that the loop is nested
in its parent. The program points – namely the starts of procedures and loops –
are represented by the start of the code in each oval or circular node. In case of a
loop, its program point is outside the loop at its start. In case of a procedure, its
program point is inside its body at its start.
Figure 7.4(b) also shows one or more timestamps (e.g 1.1, 1.2) for each node
in the DPRG. Since the start of each node is a program point, this timestamps
the program points as well. Timestamps are derived using the following rule: the
timestamp for each node is the timestamp of its parent appended by a “.” followed
by a number representing which child it is in a left to right order. In this way if the
main() function is assigned a timestamp of 1, the timestamps of all nodes can be
computed by a simple variant of the well-known breadth-first-search graph traversal
method. The figure shows the results. A node may get more than one timestamp if it
has more than one parent. An example of such a scenario is the node for proc-C(),
which is marked with two timestamps: 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. An ordering on timestamps
is their dictionary order. In other words, timestamps are compared according to
the following rule: find their longest common prefix ending with a “.”; the larger
timestamp is the one with the larger subsequent number. For example, 1.2.1 < 1.3
since their longest common prefix ending with a “.” is “1.”, and the subsequent
number (2) for the first timestamp is less than that of the second timestamp (3).
With such an ordering, the timestamps always form a total order among themselves.
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Timestamps are useful because they reveal dynamic program execution order:
the order in which the program points are visited at runtime is roughly the same as
the total order of their timestamps.
This initial set of program points is further refined by considering the actual
execution frequency at each program point. We define a threshold LIMIT and discard
the program points whose execution frequency is greater than LIMIT, since the
overhead of locking at those points might be too high. The actual value of LIMIT
is determined through heuristics, as discussed in Section 7.9. Since the timestamps
always form a total order among themselves, removing some timestamps from the
list does not impact the relative order of remaining timestamps.
Figure 7.4(c) shows the resulting program points and corresponding times-
tamps after applying the above refinement in this example. Each program point
in this modified graph denotes the beginning point of a region. The code block
between two consecutive program points is considered a region. As evident, a code
block can simultaneously be part of two different regions. The locked content in a
code block will be dynamically governed as per the actual execution path.
7.7.2 Dynamic Locking Algorithm
The above method divides a program into a set of regions, where the program
locality is consistent in a region. Each region can be analyzed separately since only
one region is active at an execution instant. Consequently, the solution for cache
locking in each region is obtained by extending the static cache locking algorithm
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proposed in Section 7.6 with some modifications, as discussed next.
We introduce the following definitions to ease the description. Similar to static
cache locking method, the formulations are for one particular cache set s.
R: Set of program regions; r: An element of set R; p: A program point;
Execp: Execution frequency of point p; LockInst: Number of cycles for locking a
line
Yr: Set of virtual cache lines accessed in a region r mapped to a particular cache
set s1
Lr :Lines which should be locked in a set s in a region r
The dynamic cache locking problem has two objectives (i) For each region
r, determining Lr (ii) selecting |Lr| virtual cache lines out of |Yr| candidates which
should be locked in the set in this region.
The benefit for locking a line in a region r is same as static cache locking and is
given by Equation 7.7. However, the cost for locking a line in a region is influenced
by two factors. First, only the program addresses belonging to region r need to be
considered for computing the opportunity cost. Second, the locking instructions are
now executed each time a program point is executed. Hence, the cost of locking is
no more negligible and the model needs to be reflect the locking cost.
1Since we are considering solution independently for each cache set, we have simplified the
notation by ignoring the set representation s in the notation for Yr and Lr
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N : Cache size in number of lines; K: Number of lines which can be locked in each set
S: Number of sets in the cache.
R: Set of regions determined by DPRG
Yr: The set of memory addresses which get mapped to set si in a region r
F (xi): Total number of memory accesses to address xi
LL: Iterator over number of lines locked in one set in region r
HIT rLL(xi): Total number of hits obtained for xi when LL lines are locked in set si in region
LockListr(si): Set of virtual cache lines which should be locked in set si in region r
NumLockLinesr(si):Number of virtual cache lines which should be locked in set si in region r
THIT / TMISS : Hit/Miss latency in processor cycles
LockInst: Number of cycles for locking a lines;
Execr: Execution frequency at beginning of region r
void Dynamic Cache Locking Algorithm() {
1. for (each region r in set R) do {
2. for (each set si in range 0 to S -1) do {
3. for(each LL in range 0 to K -1) do {
4. for (each xi in Yr) {
5. BenLock(xi) = (F (xi)−HIT
r





7. CostDynLock(xi) = OppCostDynLock(xi) + LockInst ∗ Execr
8. NetBenefit(xi) = BenLock(xi)− CostDynLock(xi)
9. }
10. If there exists a xk such that NetBenefit(xk) is maximum and is positive.{
11. Add xk to LockList
r(si)
12. NumLockLinesr(si) = NumLockLines
r(si) + 1
13. Yr = Yr − xk
14. }
15. else {






Figure 7.5: Dynamic Cache Locking Algorithm.
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The opportunity cost of locking a single element is given by Equation 7.9.
However, this opportunity cost is observed only by the elements belonging to region





Further, the total cost, considering the actual cost of locking, is defined as
follows:
CostDynLock(xri) = OppCostDynLock(xri) + LockInst ∗ Execp (7.13)
Hence, the net benefit of locking a line can be denoted as
NetBenefit(xri) = BenLock(xi)− CostLock(xri) (7.14)
The above net benefit heuristic is applied in each region to determine the set




In this section, we discuss the implementation of binary rewriting scheme for in-
struction cache locking. Figure 7.6 presents an overview of our experimentation
workflow. Our mechanism for cache locking can be implemented inside any existing
binary rewriting framework such as Diablo [57] or SecondWrite [10].
First, the binary rewriter framework is employed to obtain an intermediate
representation (IR) from the input binary. Next, the techniques presented in Sec-
tion 7.7.1 are employed to determine the DPRG regions/program points in the input
binary. Next, the IR is instrumented with dummy placeholders at these program
points and the binary rewriter’s backend is employed to obtain an instrumented
binary.
The instrumented binary is used to obtain an instruction trace of the appli-
cation using a processor simulator (details below). Next, this instruction trace is
used to obtain cache statistics using a cache simulator. This cache simulation is






























Figure 7.6: The Experimental WorkFlow
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final list of virtual cache lines to be locked in the cache in each program region.
As mentioned in Section 7.2, special locking instructions are provided in target
platforms which upon execution lock the elements at specified addresses in the cache
lines. Since our method is based on analyzing the instruction memory addresses of
original binary, the code layout of the re-written binary should be exactly the same
as instrumented binary. Modifying the program layout might render the above
analysis to be incorrect. Hence, after determining the addresses to be locked in
the cache, binary rewriter is employed again to insert the actual lock instruction
corresponding to the required lines and the remaining placeholders are replaced by
NOP instructions.
The workflow in Figure 7.6 corresponds to dynamic locking. In case of static
locking, a single placeholder is inserted only at the beginning of the binary, instead
of determining the placeholders using DPRG, but otherwise the workflow is similar.
7.9 Results
The experiment setup consists of a Intel XScale processor core with clock frequency
600 Mhz (PXA27x family), on-chip 16 kB 4-way set-associative data cache, on-chip
instruction cache and a unified off-chip memory. The ARMulator software, which is
part of ARM Development Suite is used to simulate the processor core. The above
architectural parameters can be easily configured in ARMulator. Dinero IV [60], a
well-known cache-hierarchy simulator is used to simulate the cache. We modified
Dinero to provide the cache statistics at the granularity of virtual cache lines and
203
Application Lines Of Code Num of Instr Num of DynInstr
Sha 207 2501 355452842
Crc 128 1027 75738737
BitCnts 543 3340 149409187
Susan 1456 4040 60516192
Blowfish 3260 2909 868261350
Jpeg 19804 9718 104615385
Dijikstra 268 18612 536074136
Lame 15959 19810 569002359
Gsm 4779 14040 64340338
StringSearch 3072 1839 8051466
QuickSort 79 2298 830913008
Lout 30689 59828 538663
FFT 278 5868 671496345
BasicMath 7367 6375 102147075
Patricia 296 7756 114446172
Rinjdal 1017 4960 578559602
Table 7.1: Application Table
augmented it with the ability to simulate cache locking.
We configured the ARMulator to simulate a perfect zero-wait memory system.
It generates the execution time in terms of processor cycles. The instruction and
data miss statistics provided by Dinero are used to calculate the effect of cache
misses on execution time and is added to the execution time calculated by ARMu-
lator to obtain the total execution time of the application. A sample memory map
file available in ARMulator with average off-chip memory access time of 150ns is
chosen to calculate off-chip memory access latency. As per the XScale’s architecture
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manual, each locking instruction is assumed to take four cycles and is considered
accordingly while calculating the execution time of resulting binary.
A subset of MiBench benchmarks were randomly selected to substantiate the
performance improvement obtained by our method of cache locking. At this point we
have simply included all the benchmarks that compiled and ran in our infrastructure
in the time available – the benchmarks have not been selected to be favorable to
us in any way. Table 7.1 lists the benchmarks which are used for carrying out
the experiments. All the benchmarks are statically compiled with the GNU-ARM
toolchain.
The results for static cache locking are presented in Section 7.9.1 while Sec-
tion 7.9.2 presents the improvement obtained by dynamic cache locking over the
static mechanism. Section 7.9.2 also compares our static and dynamic mechanisms
with the static mechanism suggested by Liang and Mitra [98]. We refer to the
method suggested in [98] as OPT-static. Based on the execution frequency of pro-
gram regions, the value of LIMIT (Section 7.7.1) was kept to 50 in our experiments.
7.9.1 Static Cache Locking
Various kinds of experiments are performed with different cache configurations for
analyzing the improvement in the instruction-cache miss rate and run-time of the
applications. The cache configuration is varied across two dimensions: size and
associativity. The block size is kept fixed at 4 words.
































































































2KB 4 KB 8 KB 16 KB
Figure 7.7: Percentage improvement
in instruction-cache miss rate over cache































































































1 Way 2 Way 4 Way 8 Way
Figure 7.8: Percentage improvement
in instruction-cache miss rate over cache
with no locking for different associativi-
ties of the cache. The cache size is kept
fixed at 4 Kb.
compared to the cache configuration without locking is displayed in Figure 7.7 for
different cache sizes. As evident from this figure, the proposed I-cache locking
mechanism results in a consistent improvement in the instruction cache miss rate
over all the benchmarks and cache sizes. We obtain an average improvement of 15%
in the I-cache miss rate for small cache sizes and around 25% for large cache sizes.
Interestingly, the improvement in the I-cache miss rate increases with an increase
in the cache size for most of the applications. This is expected since a small cache
size results in a high opportunity cost in our cost-benefit model as locking a line
prevents many other lines from accessing that cache location, resulting into fewer
lines being locked in the cache.
Figure 7.8 displays the variation of I-cache miss rate improvement with vari-
ation in associativity of the cache. We see that the improvement in the I-cache
miss rate ranges from 15-18% for set-associative caches. Virtually all commercial
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cached embedded processors support only set-associative caches 2, which establishes
our proposed approach as a robust mechanism for improving memory system per-
formance. The average improvement in case of direct mapped cache is, not surpris-
ingly, limited – having only one way in a set amounts to extremely high opportunity
cost resulting in very little locking. Our goal is not to get improvements in direct-
mapped cache – we never expected to, and such caches are very rare in embedded
systems – but the results are presented for completeness, and show that the method
never degrades performance, even managing a small improvement for direct mapped
caches3.
Next, the impact of instruction cache locking on run-time performance of
various applications is analyzed. Figure 7.9 shows the savings in runtime obtained
by using the instruction cache-locking. Comparing Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.9 brings
out several interesting observations.
First, even though the cache locking scheme results in considerable improve-
ment of instruction cache miss rate consistently over all the applications, not all
applications experience an improvement in run-time performance. The improve-
ment in I-cache miss rates translates to run-time performance improvement only for
those applications where the overall I-cache miss rate is high. This is not surprising
since a technique like ours to reduce the I-cache miss rate will not help if it is not a
problem to begin with.
Revisiting Figure 7.9, we see that the benchmarks on the right-hand side are
2For example, among the ARM processors, only one of the 15 processors listed on ARM’s
website offers a direct-mapped cache.
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Significant for 2 kB
Significant for 4 kB
Significant for 8,16 kB
Figure 7.9: Improvement in execution
time of the applications over cache with

































































































200 Mhz 400 Mhz 600 Mhz 800 Mhz
Figure 7.10: Variation of execution time
improvement for processors with different
clock speeds for a 4kB 2 way set associa-
tive cache
marked “significant” for different cache sizes. These are the benchmarks that have
a significant I-cache miss rate (which we define as > 1.5%) for that cache size. For
the benchmarks with significant I-cache miss rate, the run-time improvement from
our cache locking method averages 11.5% for a cache size of 8kB. The averages are
shown in Figure 7.9 in the last two columns as AVERAGE and SIG-AVERAGE,
for all the benchmarks, and those with significant miss rates, respectively. For the
benchmarks with very low I-cache miss rates, the benefits from cache locking are,
not surprisingly, low – only 1.7 % for a 2kB cache.
The 11.5% run-time improvement with cache locking for benchmarks with a
significant I-cache miss rate is encouraging and shows the benefit of our method.
For some benchmarks the benefit is even higher – e.g, the Rinjdal benchmark has a
run-time gain of 23%. Overall we see that about 20-60% of the benchmarks show
significant improvement, depending on the cache size and associativity used. The
fact that not all benchmarks benefit from cache locking is not an indictment against
our method – indeed there is a long history of research into techniques that benefit
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only a class of applications 4. As classes of applications go, benefiting 20-60% of
benchmarks significantly is quite good.
Further, we observe that although increasing cache size results in better per-
formance in terms of instruction cache miss rate reduction, the average percentage
improvement in execution time decreases with an increase in cache size. An increase
in the cache size results in a lower initial miss rate and thus yields smaller run-time
benefits from locking.
Next, in order to analyze the applicability of our approach for different proces-
sor generations, we analyze the improvement in execution time for various processor
frequencies. We vary the processor clock speed while keeping the DRAM latency
constant in nanoseconds – this is equivalent to varying the DRAM latency in cycles.
We obtain a consistent improvement in execution time with an increase in processor
frequency, as displayed in Figure 7.10. Thus our method can be applied effectively
for different generations of processors.
7.9.2 Dynamic Cache Locking
In this section, we present the results for our dynamic cache locking algorithm and
compare the results with our static algorithm (Static in CacheLocking/figures) as
well as the OPT-static algorithm suggested by Liang and Mitra [98].
Figure 7.11 presents the percentage improvement in the I-cache miss rate with
dynamic cache locking, as compared to both static algorithms, for different cache
4e.g. faster garbage collectors only benefit benchmarks with heap data, and among those, only






































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7.11: Percentage improvement in instruction-cache miss rate, compared with
static cache locking, for a 2-way set-associative cache of size 2 kb,4 kb, 8 kb and 16
kb.
sizes. As evident from this figure, the dynamic I-cache locking mechanism results in
a consistent improvement in the instruction cache miss rate over all the benchmarks
and cache sizes. We obtain an average improvement in the range of 35% to 40% in
the I-cache miss rate for all cache sizes.
Figure 7.11 shows that OPT-static obtains a slightly better I-cache miss rate
than our static algorithm, thereby revalidating the results presented in [98]. How-
ever, our dynamic mechanism consistently results in a better I-cache miss rate than
both static methods. We also notice a few scenarios (blowfish - 16 kB, FFT - 8 kB)

































































































1 way 2 way 4 way 8 way
Figure 7.12: Percentage improvement in
instruction-cache miss rate with dynamic
cache locking over cache with no locking
for different associativities of the cache.



































































































Significant for 8 KB
Figure 7.13: Improvement in execu-
tion time of the applications with dy-
namic cache locking, as compared with
static and optimal static cache locking,
for varying size of a 8 kb 2-way set as-
sociative cache
this can be overcomed by actually applying OPT-static, instead of applying our
static version, to determine the lines to be locked within each program region.
The results in Section 7.9.1 demonstrate that the improvement in the I-cache
miss rate due to static cache locking increases with an increase in the cache size
for most of the applications. Figure 7.11 demonstrates that dynamic cache locking
mechanism does not display this behavior. It results in a consistent improvement
of around 40% across all cache sizes. This is not surprising since the dynamic
mechanism overcomes the inherent opportunity cost involved in the static locking
mechanism by dynamically adpating the cache content with program demand. An
interesting corollary of this result is that the dynamic mechanism is much more effec-
tive for smaller cache sizes. For example, for cache size of 4 kB, the dynamic method
improves the cache miss rate by 35% as compared to 15% by static method whereas
in case of a 16 kB cache, the relative improvement is 37% over 27% improvement
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obtained by static mechanism.
Figure 7.12 displays the variation of I-cache miss rate improvement with vari-
ation in associativity of the cache. We see that the improvement in the I-cache miss
rate due to dynamic cache locking ranges from 32-35% for different associativity
of set associative caches, as compared to 15-18% improvement obtained by static
mechanisms. An interesting feature is that dynamic cache locking is also able obtain
20% performance improvement for direct mapped caches. Recall from Section 7.9.1,
static cache locking was mainly effective for set associative caches. This is due to
the reduced opportunity cost in dynamic locking models.
Next, the impact of instruction cache locking on run-time performance of
various applications is analyzed. Figure 7.13 shows the reduction in runtime by using
dynamic instruction cache-locking for a particular cache configuration, as compared
to static algorithms. Similar to Fig 7.9, we average the improvement in execution
time for all the benchmarks as well as the benchmarks with significant initial miss
rate. Figure 7.13 demonstrates that the improvement in miss rate obtained by
dynamic algorithms translate effectively to an improvement in execution time. For
benchmarks with a significant I-Cache miss rate, the dynamic mechanism improves
execution time by 20% on average as compared to 11.5% and 12.5% obtained by
static and OPT-static mechanisms respectively.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work
It is conventional wisdom that static analysis of executables is a very difficult prob-
lem, resulting in a plethora of dynamic binary frameworks. However, a static binary
framework based on a compiler IR enables applications not possible in any existing
tool and our results establish the feasibility of this approach for several pragmatic
scenarios. We do not claim that we have fully solved all the issues; statically han-
dling every program in the world may still be an elusive goal. However, the resulting
experience of expanding the static envelope as much as possible is a hugely valuable
contribution to the community.
In this work, we have presented several component techniques essential for
translating executables to a high-level intermediate representation of an existing
compiler. Our techniques overcome challenges unique to executables: an explicitly
addressed stack, the lack of function prototypes and the lack of symbols. The com-
piler IR allows the application of source-level complex transformations and advanced
symbolic execution strategies on executables and enables functional source-code re-
covery.
Next, we have proposed techniques to obtain a functional and precise represen-
tation from executables and presented methods to adapt symbolic analysis to work
213
effectively on executables. The improved memory model considerably enhances the
precision of our symbolic analysis framework and our symbolic analysis framework
improves the efficacy of various analyses.
We extend our underlying representation and analysis framework to define De-
mandFlow, a novel information-flow framework for executables, which possesses the
desired properties of practicality, precision, scalability and extensibility. Demand-
Flow uncovers seven new zero-day vulnerabilities in popular programs at a false
positive rate comparable to source-level tools.
We demonstrate another application of our framework by formulating an in-
struction cache locking mechanism in a binary rewriter. We present the first method
in literature for improving the average-case run-time of embedded systems, extend-
ing the applicability of cache locking beyond real-time systems. Our results indicate
that on average, the proposed cache locking scheme achieves a 32% improvement in
run-time performance of instruction cache-constrained applications.
8.1 Future Directions
Figure 8.1 presents several possible future extensions of our work. The future ex-
tensions are categorized analogous to the contributions of this dissertation.
First, several enhancements can be made in expanding the scope of our repre-
sentation recovery mechanism. Our current techniques do not handle self modifying
code or dynamically generated code. We have not tested our techniques against
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Figure 8.1: Future Directions
SecondWrite’s underlying disassembler [135] distinguishes code and data using re-
strictions of a compiled code.
It is very difficult for any analysis tool to statically reason about the code
generated at runtime. Hence, a natural extension would be to define a hybrid
static-dynamic framework to recover intermediate representation in presence of ob-
fuscated and dynamically generated code. Several dynamic mechanisms [5] have
been proposed in this regard. Such dynamic mechanisms can be integrated with our
static frontend to recover a detailed representation.
Next, given a possible untrusted executable program, a rudimentary task is
to determine the behavior and purpose of the program. There has been exten-
sive research in architecture recovery of software systems by parsing its source
code [41, 105, 51]. Several software engineering methods have been proposed to
identify the modular components of a system and to discover the relations between
such components. Such architecture recovery methods can be applied on our analysis
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framework for recovering an abstract description of a unknown executable sample.
This will enhance the ability to uncover functionality and possible unsafe behavior
of an unknown executable.
Our current security vulnerability mechanism, DemandFlow, is a static mech-
anism and does report a few false positives. In scenarios where the reporting of false
positives may be considered unacceptable, the analysis can be aided with a hybrid
static-dynamic framework.
Finally, we believe that the ability to obtain a functionally equivalent rewrit-
ten executable can be employed to solve an important challenge posed by increasing
heterogeneity of computing platforms. The increasing heterogeneity of modern pro-
cessors has posed a serious problem to the standard software development tool-chain.
Most of the users do not develop software programs and just install third party soft-
ware on their systems. The third party softwares are distributed in the form of
compiled binaries as revealing the source code would reveal the IP. The software
developers are not aware of the details of the platform where the software is going
to run. Different processors employ different level of features like number of cores,
hardware pipeline, memory systems, functional units and these features cannot be
fully exploited by an existing compiler tool-chain due to the unavailability of such
information while compiling the software. This results in a widening gap between
peak processor performance and sustained processor performance, and software is
able to exploit only a fraction of the available performance on the processor. This
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